Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero - Rethinking the Warren Court\u27s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution by Lain, Corinna Barrett
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2004
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero - Rethinking the
Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure
Revolution
Corinna Barrett Lain
University of Richmond, clain@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero - Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1361 (2004)
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO? RETHINKING THE 
WARREN COURT'S ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
REVOLUTION 
CORINNA BARRETT LAINt 
Our courts were entrusted with the responsibility of judicial review, in large part, 
to protect individuals and minorities in their fundamental rights against 
abridgement by both government and majorities.1 
When we think about judicial review, we tend to envision the Su-
preme Court as a "countermajoritarian hero,"2 protector of minorities 
from tyrannical majority rule. The Supreme Court itself has long 
promoted this image, most famously in a 1938 footnote3 but elsewhere 
1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; J.D., University 
of Virginia, 1996. Like the Beatles, I get by with a little help from my friends. Special 
thanks to Ron Bacigal, Michael Klannan, Earl Dudley, Michael Allan Wolf, Carl Tobias, 
John Nowak, Warren Billings, Emmy Paulette Reeves, Jim Gibson, John Douglass, and 
John Lain for their substantive input and editorial comments. Thanks also to Stacy 
Reed, Dan Petouvis, and Anne Major for their research assistance and to Richmond's 
talented library staff for helping me locate several period documents. I am likewise 
grateful for a research grant provided by Hunton & Williams, P.C. Finally, I credit jes-
sica Marie Lain for her exceptionally impeccable timing. 
1 Arthur J. Goldberg, The Court Sits-In the Center of the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1964, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. Justice Goldberg served on the Warren Court from Octo-
ber 1962 to July 1965. Linda Greenhouse, Arthur J Goldberg, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 848, 848 (Leonard W. Levy eta!. eds., 1986). 
2 I credit Michael Klarman for coining the term "countermajoritarian hero." See, 
e.g., Michael]. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutionalism Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REv. 1881, 1933-34 (1995) [hereinafter Klarman, A Re-
sponse] (referring to the "myth of the Court as 'countermajoritarian hero"'); Michael J. 
Klarman, Majoritarianjudicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 CEO. LJ. 491, 493 
(1997) [hereinafter Klarman, The Entrenchment Problem] (arguing that 'judges do not 
act as 'countermajoritarian heroes' or 'villains'"); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996) [hereinafter Klar-
man, Rethinking] (noting the "overblown nature of the [Supreme Court's] counterma-
joritarian hero image"); Michael]. Klarman, Whats So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 
Nw. U. L. REv. 145, 192 (1998) [hereinafter Klarman, What's So Great] (arguing that 
"[o)nly one who thinks about judicial review ahistorically and acontextually could sub-
scribe to the romantic vision of the Court as countermajoritarian hero"). 
3 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor 
need we enquire ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be 
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry."). 
(1361) 
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as well, touting courts as "havens of refuge for those who might oth-
erwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or be-
cause they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public ex-
citement."4 It is hardly surprising, then, that as today's top constitu-
tional scholars debate the merits ofjudicial review,5 its defenders have 
returned to the notion that the Court's involvement is necessary to 
protect minority rights. 6 For some, like myself, the Supreme Court's 
role as countermajoritarian hero is theoretically appealing, but a nag-
ging question remains-how much does the Court actually play it? 
If ever a Court played the heroic, countermajoritarian role we 
romantically ascribe to judicial review, it was the Warren Court.7 Mter 
all, it was the Warren Court that Alexander Bickel was referring to 
when he coined the term "countermajoritarian difficulty,"8 and it was 
4 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940). 
5 See, e.g., MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (). 
32 (1999) (arguing that judicial declarations deserve no preferential consideration); 
jEREMY WALDRON, lAW AND DISAGREEMENT 285-91 (1999) (asserting thatjudicial re-
view violates precepts of liberalism); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Courl, 115 
HARV. L. REv. 4, 12 (2001) (arguing that people, not the judiciary, should be the final 
resort for the resolution of constitutional disputes); Keith E. Whittington, nxtrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 779 
(2002) (noting that "[a]ctivejudicial intervention in constitutional debates and strong 
deference by political actors to judicial interpretations are not necessary for achieving 
constitutional order or preserving constitutional principles"). 
6 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of judicial Review: The Perils of Popu-
lar Constitutionalism, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, University of Illinois College 
of Law (Feb. 17, 2003) (arguing that the Constitution requires judicial review to ade-
quately protect the rights of minorities), available at http://www.law.uiuc.edu/ 
conferences/baum/sp03.asp; see also Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence 
and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REv. 721, 725 (2003) (arguing that it 
is the judiciary's duty "to protect racial minorities from tyranny"); Mark D. Rosenbaum 
& Daniel P. Tokaji, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and Criminal justice, 98 MICH. L. REv 
1941, 1964 (2000) (arguing that it is the judiciary's role to protect the fundamental 
rights of racial minorities). 
7 The Warren Court began with Earl Warren's recess appointment as Chief justice 
in October 1953 and ended with his retirement in june 1969. G. Edward White, War-
ren Courl, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 2023, 
2023. 
8 Professor Bickel explained: 
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our 
system .... [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative 
act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives 
of the actual people of here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the 
prevailing majority, but against it. 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962). 
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the Warren Court that gave us Brown v. Board of Education.9 Earl War-
ren himself once declared, '"Everything that I ever did in my life that 
was worthwhile I caught hell for,"' 10 and the same was generally true 
for his Court. Accused of protecting blacks, communists, criminals, 
atheists, pomographers, and other perceived threats to white, middle-
class America, the Warren Court was quite possibly the most vilified 
Supreme Court in United States history. 
Yet even among the Warren Court's more controversial decisions, 
few rulings are thought to epitomize the heroic, countermajoritarian 
ideal better than those involving criminal procedure. By conventional 
wisdom, the Warren Court's criminal procedure rulings were "plainly, 
even aggressively countermajoritarian"11-the one doctrinal area 
where the Court knew it lacked public support but took a stand any-
way.12 Indeed, even constitutional historians who generally deny the 
Supreme Court's capacity for countermajoritarian decision making 
cite the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions as exceptions to 
13 the rule, and for good reason. Together, these cases produced what 
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Klarman, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 19 (crediting 
Brown for the Court's image as "heroic defender of minority rights"); Anthony Lewis, 
Earl Wamm, in 4 E:\'CYCLOPEDIA OF THE A.\tERIC\ .. '1 CO~STITL'TIO~, supra note 1, at 
2019, 2020 (noting that Earl Warren "represented the hope of authority bringing jus-
tice to the downtrodden" and crediting Brown for giving him that status). 
10 JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA, 
at vii (1979) (quoting Chief Justice Warren). 
11 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
justice, 107YALE LJ. 1, 54 (1997). 
12 See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT 
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 110 (1991) ("Perhaps the most 
controversial of all the major rights movements identified with liberalism over the past 
twenty-five years were the initiatives in behalf of criminal defendants and prisoners."); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 95 (1998) 
("Of all the rulings of the Warren Court, none was more unpopular than its criminal 
justice decisions."); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 
394 (2000) ("The criminal procedure revolution was the one area where the Court 
knew there was no public support for its actions."); STEPHEN L. WASBY, CONTINUITY 
Al'ID CHANGE: FROM THE WARREN COURT TO THE BURGER COURT 75 (1976) ("[T)he 
reform of criminal procedure ... was the policy area in which the Court's most con-
troversial set of rulings was handed down."); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism 
Pendulum, 98 W.VA. L. REV. 771, 782 (1996) ("The Warren Court would buck popular 
consensus by swinging the federalism pendulum in favor of extending federal constitu-
tional protections to those suspected of criminal activity."). 
13 See, e.g., Michael]. Klarman, Bush v. Gore: Through the Lens of Constitutional His-
tory, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1750 (2001) (recognizing Miranda v. Arizona as one of few 
cases where the Supreme Court's ruling was opposed by a clear majority of the nation); 
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 
49 (2000) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Origins] (contrasting the Supreme Court's 
early criminal procedure cases with "the sort of countermajoritarian judicial decision 
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is widely known as the "criminal procedure revolution," so vast were 
the protections afforded to unpopular and politically powerless crimi-
nal defendants. 14 Like any revolution, the one to protect criminal de-
fendants did not go unnoticed. Its most aggressive decisions drew 
criticism from coast-to-coast, faired poorly in major public opinion 
polls, triggered contrary legislation, and even inspired a backlash "law 
and order" campaign that helped send Richard Nixon to the White 
House in 1968.15 It is therefore entirely understandable why scholars 
have viewed the criminal procedure revolution as the quintessential 
example of the Supreme Court playing a heroic, countermajoritarian 
role. 
For all the credit the revolution has received, however, no one yet 
has paused to consider whether the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure decisions were truly the bastion of countermajoritarian decision 
making they have been made out to be. 16 In fact, scholarship consid-
ering these decisions in their relevant social and political context is, as 
one author has noted, "virtually nonexistent."17 With last fall marking 
the fiftieth anniversary of Earl Warren's appointment as Chief Jus-
tice/8 enough time has passed to place the criminal procedure revolu-
tion in proper historical perspective and rethink the Court's role 
there as countermajoritarian hero. In the discussion that follows, I 
making one often associates with landmark criminal procedure decisions such as Mapp 
or Miranda"). 
14 The phrase "criminal procedure revolution" is commonly used to refer to the 
Warren Court's rulings of the 1960s that extended new constitutional protections to 
criminal defendants in state court. See, e.g., CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION, at xi (1993) ("The 'criminal procedure revolu-
tion' refers to a series of constitutional decisions by the United States Supreme Court 
during the 1960s that 'revolutionized' the criminal procedures of the states."); Joseph 
L. Hoffman, Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: ~y Federal Habeas Corpus Courts 
Should Review the Merits of Every Death Sentence, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1771, 1782 n.57 (2000) 
(noting that the "so-called 'criminal procedure revolution'" refers to the Warren 
Court's "enforce[ment of] often-unpopular new federal constitutional rules" in state 
court proceedings); see also infra text accompanying note 57 (describing the Supreme 
Court's change in approach to criminal procedure in the 1960s). 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 65-68 and 205-08 (discussing the public and 
political reaction to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1991), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
u.s. 436 (1966)). 
16 Michael Klarman has come the closest. While recognizing the need for more 
scholarship in this area, he has suggested that "the entire criminal procedure revolu-
tion was intertwined with changing popular attitudes" toward poverty and race. Klar-
man, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 64. 
17 !d. at 62. 
18 Earl Warren joined the Supreme Court as its fourteenth Chief Justice in Octo-
ber 1953, retiring in June 1969. Lewis, supra note 9, at 2019. 
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aim to do that by examining five of the revolution's most celebrated 
decisions: Mapp v. Ohio/9 Gideon v. Wainwright, 20 Miranda v. Arizona,21 
Katz v. United States,22 and Terry v. Ohio.23 In none of these cases, I ar-
gue, did the Supreme Court act in a manner truly deserving of its 
countermajoritarian image. To be clear, I do not deny that these de-
cisions were historically significant, salient events; nor do I deny that 
they were doctrinally revolutionary (though two fall short of even that 
mark) .24 My point is simply that upon close inspection, the landmark 
cases of the criminal procedure revolution say more about the Su-
preme Court's lack of inclination for counterm'tioritarian decision 
making than the contrary-and that, in turn, has profound implica-
tions for the heroic, countermajoritarian function we tend to ascribe 
to judicial review. 
Before proceeding, the scope of this Article warrants a few further 
points of clarification. First, I do not purport to provide a compre-
hensive analysis of the entire criminal procedure revolution. The 
Warren Court decided hundreds of criminal procedure cases, several 
dozen of which could be characterized as doctrinally significant, revo-
lutionary decisions. 25 I cannot possibly discuss all of these within the 
confines of a law review article, and thus my more modest aim: a dis-
cussion of the five decisions we most often think about when we think 
about the revolution, the decisions that made the revolution famous 
and helped create the Court's counterm'tioritarian image there. 
Whether these decisions fairly represent the revolution as a whole is a 
topic I leave for another day. 
Second, even if (as I believe) the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure decisions were less counterm'tioritarian than we tend to think, I 
do not deny that, at times, they at least showcased the Court playing 
19 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
20 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
21 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
22 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
2~ 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 175-85 (discussing the doctrinal inevitability 
of Girj,eon); infra text accompanying notes 355-71 (discussing the same regarding Katz). 
2
, See Francis A. Allen, The judicial Quest For Penal justice: The Warren Court and the 
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 ("In the sixteen years of Chief Justice War-
ren's tenure, the Supreme Court decided upwards of 600 criminal cases."). One need 
only open a criminal procedure textbook to catalogue the dozens of Warren Court 
cases that significantly shaped our modern jurisprudence. See generally RONALD JAY 
ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001) (discussing numerous 
Warren Court decisions). 
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countermajoritarian hero at the local level.26 Of course, whenever a 
locality is out of step with an emerging or established national consen-
sus and the Supreme Court validates that consensus, its decision will 
be countermajoritarian in a way-but that kind of countermajori-
tarian decision making can occur even without judicial review. The 
1964 Civil Rights Act,27 which was immensely unpopular in the South, 
amply demonstrates that Congress can play local countermajoritarian 
hero as well as the Court, at least when the nation's collective will is 
behind it. Thus, to the extent we need the Supreme Court's heroism, 
we need it to protect against an oppressive national m"!iority, not a lo-
cal one, and it is therefore the national sociopolitical context that is 
my focus. 
Next, my claim that the Supreme Court lacks the inclination to 
make countermajoritarian decisions is not a claim that it watches elec-
tion returns (or any other measure of public opinion) and then delib-
erately renders decisions that will enjoy popular support. Concededly, 
the Court sometimes bows to public or political pressure, as it did in 
1937's "switch in time that saved the Nine,"28 and the Warren Court 
was not immune to this phenomenon.29 But by and large, the Justices 
26 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the provision of 
counsel in all felony prosecutions for indigent defendants); see also infra Part I.C (dis-
cussing the Gideon case). 
27 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
28 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393 (Fred R. Sha-
piro ed., 1993). The "switch" referred to Justice OwenJ. Roberts' alleged change of 
position in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding a key New 
Deal legislative program that coincided with the failure of President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt's "court-packing" plan. See Michael Arens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 
HARv. L. REv. 620, 625-34 (1994) (describing the historical circumstances surrounding 
the "court-packing plan" and contemporary allegations that Roberts had switched his 
vote in West Coat Hotel to prevent President Roosevelt and Congress from restructuring 
the Court). But see Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313-15 
(1955) (asserting that Justice Roberts voted to uphold the New Deal legislation in West 
Coast Hotel prior to Roosevelt's proposal). 
29 The Warren Court's change of heart on national security issues following its 
heavily criticized "Red Monday" decisions of 1957 provides a prime example. See 
HORWITZ, supra note 12, at 62-65 (describing the national security cases following Red 
Monday as "The Court in Retreat" and attributing that retreat to hostile reaction to the 
Court's earlier rulings); PAULL. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 334-36 
(1972) (arguing that the change in the Warren Court's stance on domestic security 
issues was an "obvious and direct effect" of congressional pressure); POWE, supra note 
12, at 135 (noting that the Warren Court "r[an] away from the domestic-security deci-
sions of its 1956 Term as fast as it could"); Alan F. Westin, Also on the Bench: "Dominant 
Gpinion ", in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 63, 68-69 (Leonard W. 
Levy ed., 1972) (noting that in the face of criticism, the Warren Court "reacted by 
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of the Warren Court saw their ability to make unpopular decisions 
when necessary as the judiciary's primary contribution to the political 
system;30 reading the election returns was the last thing they thought 
they were supposed to do, and the one thing they were rarely accused 
of doing.31 This is not to suggest that the Warren Court tried to be 
countermajoritarian any more than it tried not to be. For the most 
part, I believe the Court made decisions based on what it thought the 
Constitution said, or at least meant to say, or at the very least should 
have said. In short, my claim that the Supreme Court lacks the incli-
nation to make countermajoritarian decisions has less to do with any 
conscious considerations in the deliberative process and more to do 
with its natural tendency toward adopting m~oritarian positions. 
Finally, my claim that the Supreme Court is naturally inclined to-
ward majoritarian positions has nothing to do with the political proc-
ess in which the Justices are selected. Admittedly, the fact that the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches determine the Court's membership 
helps to ensure that the Justices' views somewhat resemble those of 
the electoral majority. Presidents nominate, and Senates confirm, in-
dividuals who generally think like them and their constituencies.32 
But this "mirroring process"33 is short-term; Supreme Court Justices 
have a political life expectancy much longer than those who put them 
on the bench and thus their views could still differ from the prevail-
ing ideology of any given moment. Moreover, the mirroring process 
is itself imperfect, and no appointment better illustrates the point 
than that of Chief Justice Warren-"'the biggest damn fool mistake"' 
distinguishing or diluting virtually all of the bold and assertive rhetoric of the 1957 rul-
ings"). 
30 See supra text accompanying note I (quoting Justice Goldberg's view of the 
Court's function); see also Fred Rodell, Crux of the Court Hullabaloo, in THE SUPREME 
COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 29, at 191, 195 (describing the judicial phi-
losophy of Justices Black and Douglas as rhetorically asking "[w]hy have a written Bill 
of Rights-if not to protect against majority rule[?]"). 
31 See The 'Warren Court' Era, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1968, at 1 ("The Warren Court 
was rarely accused of reading the election returns."). But see Fred P. Graham, New Tide 
in High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1968, at 32 ("[T]he stop and frisk decision ... gen-
erate[s] feelings that the Justices are showing their ages or watching the election re-
turns."). 
32 See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 613-14 
(1993) ("As vacancies occur, presidents fill them with judges whose views are at least 
somewhat similar to their own and, more important, to the views of the people who 
elected them."). For an excellent discussion of the political aspects of the federal ap-
pointments process, see MICHAEL]. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPO!l\'TMENTS PROCESS: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000). 
33 Friedman, supra note 32, at 614. 
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President Eisenhower claimed he ever made.34 Thus, although the 
process by which Justices are selected may contribute to their majori-
tarian leanings, it need not do so, and in any event, it is not the im-
pediment to countermajoritarian decision making that is my focus. 
My focus is on the Supreme Court's tendency to adopt majori-
tarian positions just because of the sociopolitical context in which it 
operates. The Court is a part of contemporary society, and so we can 
(and should) expect its decision making to be naturally influenced by 
contemporary societal norms. Indeed, it would be naive to think that 
the Court could remain unaffected by the dominant normative as-
sumptions of its time, even if it wanted.35 We should therefore not be 
surprised to see Supreme Court Justices take positions coinciding with 
those of the general public; the same historical events that shape our 
opinions also shape theirs, and the same social and political currents 
that move the rest of the country will undoubtedly move them as well. 
Judges are, after all, people too. And when we forget that fact-when 
we ignore the indelible historical context in which the Supreme Court 
operates-we get a distorted image of the Court and overestimate 
what it can realistically accomplish with judicial review. 
In the discussion that follows, I argue that even the landmarks of 
the criminal procedure revolution illustrate the Supreme Court's ten-
dency to decide cases consistent with the prevailing policy positions 
and ideology of its time. In Part I, I consider two of the revolution's 
early landmark decisions, Mapp v. Ohio36 and Gideon v. Wainwright. 37 
Given the historical context in which each case was decided, I con-
clude that Mapp reflected an emerging national consensus about the 
exclusionary rule and federal intervention in state criminal justice 
34 MELVIN UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS Al'\ID LEGACY 90-91 
(2001) (quoting President Eisenhower); see also POLLACK, supra note 10, at 12 (noting 
that President Eisenhower saw Earl Warren as "high level mediocrity," a middle-of-the-
road politician too good at pleasing the masses to upset the status quo with novel con-
stitutional interpretations). 
35 See Michael]. Klarman, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 265, 278 (2000) (reviewing ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICfu'\1 FREEDOM 
(1998)) ('Judges are part of contemporary culture and thus are exceedingly unlikely 
to interpret the Constitution in ways that depart dramatically from contemporary pub-
lic opinion."); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 
69 TEX. L. REV 1881, 1925 (1991) ("[]Judges cannot even think without implicating 
the dominant normative assumptions that shape their society and reproduce their po-
litical and cultural context."); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921) ("The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of 
men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by."). 
36 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
37 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
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affairs, while Gideon validated a well-established national consensus as 
to the necessity of legal assistance for indigent felony defendants. In 
Part II, I examine the strongest example of the Court's countermajori-
tarian inclinations in the criminal justice area, Miranda v. Arizona.38 
While conceding that Miranda was controversial, I argue that it too 
was a product of its time and well within the parameters of publicly 
acceptable responses to the problem of coercive interrogation. In 
Part III, I address two of the revolution's later landmark decisions, 
Katz v. United Statel9 and Terry v. Ohio.4° Katz, I argue, was a welcomed 
concession to law enforcement interests on the issue of wiretapping at 
a time when the country as a whole was becoming more conservative 
on criminal justice issues. Terry, I contend, was a complete capitula-
tion to law enforcement interests at a time when "law and order" 
dominated the national mood. In Part IV, I conclude the analysis, 
underscoring the need to recognize the Court's inherent limitations 
and adjust our expectations of judicial review. 
I. IN THE BEGINNING 
The most sensible starting point for any historical discussion of 
the criminal procedure revolution is at the beginning, when a change 
in the Court's stance on criminal procedure first became apparent in 
1961. Yet change is a relative concept, and revolutionary change no 
less so. Thus, to understand what the revolution was and did, it is first 
instructive to understand what life for criminal defendants was like be-
fore it. 
A. Before the Revolution 
Before the revolution, as now, only around 1% of all criminal 
cases were prosecuted at the federal level.41 As a practical matter, 
then, the only constitutional protections that mattered for the vast 
majority of criminal defendants were those available in state, as op-
posed to federal, courts. Prior to the revolution, the distinction was 
38 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
39 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
40 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
41 See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 29 (1970) ("[U]pwards of 
99.6% of the criminal cases in the [United States] are handled by the states."); WAYNE 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4 (3d ed. 2000) ("[T]he federal system is respon-
sible each year for less than 2% of the total number of criminal prosecutions brought 
in the United States .... "). 
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an important one. Criminal defendants in federal courts received the 
full panoply of protections enumerated in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments. Criminal defendants in state courts, by 
contrast, were protected only by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause, which the Supreme Court early on refused to inter-
pret as incorporating the Bill of Rights guarantees.42 Thus, for some 
ninety-nine percent of all criminal defendants, those guarantees-at 
least as a matter of federal constitutional law-were no guarantee at 
all. 
This is not to say that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause failed to provide state criminal defendants with any protection 
whatsoever. To the contrary, it required states to meet a standard of 
"fundamental fairness" in their criminal prosecutions,43 which, at least 
in certain instances, necessitated providing defendants with protec-
tions akin to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Thus, while fun-
damental fairness did not require application of the full Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel,44 it did require the appointment of an 
attorney when state defendants were charged with a capital crime45 or 
when other "special circumstances" made one particularly necessary.46 
Similarly, although fundamental fairness did not require application 
of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination,47 it did bar the admission of plainly coerced confessions 
42 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908) (holding that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not an essential component 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 
604 (1900) (rejecting claim that an eight-person criminal jury violated the Sixth 
Amendment and suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 
may not require state jury trials at all); see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-51 
(1947) (rejecting argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of 
Rights and applied it to the states). 
43 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 55 (discussing the fundamental fairness doc-
trine). 
44 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942) (upholding state court decision 
denying counsel to indigent defendants). 
45 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (requiring the provision of de-
fense counsel for capital crimes). 
46 See Betts, 316 U.S. at 472-73 (holding that in special circumstances states may be 
required to provide counsel); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 555-56 (discuss-
ing Betts' "special circumstances" rule). 
47 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 50-51 (rejecting argument that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporated the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimin-
ation). 
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at state trials.48 And even though fundamental fairness did require 
application of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures in state courts, it did not require evi-
dence obtained in violation of that prohibition to be excluded at trial, 
as was the rule in federal courts.49 In state courts, evidence was consti-
tutionally inadmissible only when it was obtained in a manner so of-
fensive as to "shock[] the conscience" of the Court (if not also churn 
its stomach).50 In short, the fundamental fairness doctrine provided 
state criminal defendants with some protections, but it fell far short of 
those afforded under the Bill of Rights. Because the doctrine pre-
vented only the most unfair state practices, it was more like a litmus 
test of egregiousness, eradicating abuses based on the same "I know it 
when I see it" approach Justice Stewart would later use to describe 
h 51 pornograp y. 
With the Supreme Court otherwise unwilling to interfere in the 
administration of state criminal justice, criminal defendants before 
the revolution were largely dependent on the states for their treat-
ment before, during, and after trial. As a practical matter, that meant 
the quality of criminal 'justice" rendered before the revolution varied 
from state to state and, all too often, with the color of a defendant's 
skin. Particularly in the Deep South, where racial prejudice fueled 
already hostile sentiment toward those accused of criminal wrongdo-
ing, defendants were routinely treated like pieces of meat to be proc-
essed and then forwarded for proper packaging.52 Police plucked in-
dividuals off the streets for little or no reason, searched them without 
48 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (excluding evidence obtained 
by brutality and violence). The facts of Brown are discussed infra in notes 212-13 and 
accompanying text. 
49 Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (requiring an exclu-
sionary rule in federal courts), with Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (refusing 
to extend the exclusionary rule to the states). 
50 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the use of a 
stomach pump to retrieve evidence in the defendant's vomit "shocks the conscience" 
and is therefore constitutionally inadmissible). 
51 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I 
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within th[e] shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I 
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it .... "). 
52 See Yale Kamisar, Equal justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure, in CRIMINAL jUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 14-19 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) 
(comparing treatment of defendants to cattle); Richard Neely, The Warren Court and the 
Welcome Stranger Rule, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 184, 185 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1996) (noting that "[i]n the 1960s, the average criminal [suspect] was 
treated like a piece of meat on its way to dressing and processing"). 
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a warrant, questioned them using strong-arm tactics, and then (if suf-
ficiently satisfied with the evidence of guilt) sent them on to the for-
mal adjudication process for trial or, more likely, a guilty plea.53 In 
sum, many state criminal justice systems before the revolution pre-
sented "'dismal pictures of officiallawlessness,"'54 and criminal defen-
dants, who were disproportionately poor, uneducated, and black,55 
lacked the wherewithal to do anything about it. They needed a hero. 
Beginning in 1961, the Warren Court gave them one, at least for a 
while. Tired of the steady stream of abuses that continued to filter up 
from the states, the Supreme Court of the 1960s made policing the 
police, as well as state courts, a distinctly federal concern. In all fair-
ness, the Warren Court showed some concern for criminal defendants 
in the late 1950s as well, but its early attempts at cleaning up criminal 
procedure were "sporadic and doctrinally modest" at best56-nothing 
like the activism that would later mark the Court's decisions in this 
area. It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court started making 
wholesale revisions to state criminal justice practices, demonstrating 
what would become a sustained interest in protecting criminal defen-
dants on more than an ad hoc basis. By the time it was finished, the 
Court would incorporate into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause nearly all of the relevant Bill of Rights guarantees, add-
ing bold new content to more than a few along the way.57 Clearly, the 
Supreme Court's shift in stance on criminal procedure was itself 
53 See Kamisar, supra note 52, at 19 ("The legal courts ... [were] reduced to the 
position of merely ratifying the plea of guilt which the police ha[d] obtained." (quot-
ing Ernest]. Hopkins, The Lawless Arm of the Law, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1931, at 
279, 280-81)); Neely, supra note 52, at 185-86 (discussing the unfair treatment of sus-
pected criminals by both the police and the courts). 
54 Russell Porter, Justice Brennan Finds Court Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1961, at 21 
(quoting a speech by Justice William]. Brennan, Jr.). 
55 See White, supra note 7, at 2029 (noting that "a high percentage of criminals in 
the 1960s were poor and black"); see also GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 86-101 (reporting 
sociological data that blacks committed proportionately more crimes than whites be-
cause of their disproportionate representation in low-status groups that tended to 
commit more crime); Richard]. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Na-
tion's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1357 (1968) 
(describing the typical criminal defendant as "a young, single, Negro, male recidivist of 
low socioeconomic status characterized by low income, low educational attainment, 
high unemployment, poor job status, borderline overcrowded living accommodations, 
and a dearth of voluntary affiliations"). 
56 Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 GEO. LJ. 1153, 1155 (1998). 
57 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 70-71 (discussing the selective incorporation 
doctrine of 1960s criminal procedure cases). 
2004] COUNTl!.'RMA]ORITARIAN HERO OR U'RO? 1373 
revolutionary-and that shift began with the Court's 1961 decision in 
Mapp v. Ohio. 58 
B. Mapp v. Ohio: The Launch of a Revolution 
Widely recognized for launching the criminal procedure revolu-
tion,59 Mapp v. Ohio required state courts to exclude evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, just as federal courts 
had done since 1914.60 According to Mapp, the exclusionary rule was 
more than just an evidentiary concept to be adhered to or discarded 
at each state's will; it was an integral part of the Fourth Amendment 
and thus fully binding on the states under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.61 As contemporary observers quickly rec-
ognized, Mapp was no ordinary case. Commentators reacting to the 
decision called it "the most significant limitation ever imposed on 
state criminal procedure by the Supreme Court in a single decision,"62 
and they were right. Gone in one fell swoop was the Court's willing-
ness to intervene in only the most egregious state criminal procedure 
cases; that approach had marked the Court's 1949 decision in Wolfv. 
Colarado,63 which Mapp overruled. Equally remarkable was the setting 
in which the Supreme Court chose to inaugurate its dramatically dif-
ferent approach to state criminal procedure. In Mapp, the Court not 
only eschewed an ad hoc approach in favor of a bright-line rule, but 
58 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
59 See, e.g., ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 375 (1997) 
(marking the beginning of the criminal procedure revolution in 1961, when the Su-
preme Court decided Mapp); POW£, supra note 12, at 195 (same); Allen, supra note 25, 
at 519 (same); Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of 
Criminal Procedure, 95 W.VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (same); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court 
and Criminal justice, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 52, at 116, 
116 (same); Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Year.s: Its Impact on Ro.ce in America, 52 CAsE 
W. REs. L. REv. 471, 478 (2001) (same). 
60 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55; see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 
(1914) (imposing the exclusionary rule on federal courts). 
61 367 U.S. at 657. 
62 High Court Bars Evidence States Seize Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1961, at I. The 
Warren Court Justices also recognized Mapp's enormous import. See CRAY, supra note 
59, at 375 ("Mapp was 'so terribly important,' Warren told his son, so important, Earl 
Junior decided that 'it's hard to say it's a case. It's like a huge cloud from which a lot 
of things are raining."'); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS 
SUPREME COURT-AJUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 391 (1983) (noting Justice Abe Fortas' de-
scription of Mapp as "the most radical decision in recent times"). 
63 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
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the bright-line rule it chose invalidated a long-established practice in 
64 
roughly half the states. 
Not surprisingly, Mapp was less than well received in certain quar-
ters. Police across the country cried loudly in protest, blaming the de-
cision for a burglary wave in Minneapolis (which they later attributed 
to lack of snow) 65 and a decrease in narcotics convictions in New 
York.66 In their view, Mapp posed a serious obstacle to law enforce-
ment, one that the public might not be able to tolerate.67 Those more 
solicitous of states' rights than the Court found Mapp disturbing as 
well. The President of the American Bar Association, for example, 
publicly criticized the Court for turning state criminal law into "a 
mere appendage of [f]ederal constitutional law" while giving "inordi-
nate weight" to defendants' rights. 68 With comments like that, Mapp's 
holding appeared to be as controversial as it was consequential. In-
deed, scholars have long regarded Mapp as one of the two most un-
popular criminal procedure decisions in Supreme Court history,69 
making it a seemingly perfect example of the Court's countermajori-
tarian role in the criminal procedure revolution. 
In part, understanding the Court's ruling in Mapp requires an un-
derstanding of the facts of the case. Dollree Mapp was no saint,70 but 
64 See High Court Bars Evidence States Seized Illegally, supra note 62, at I (noting that 
twenty-four states admitted illegally seized evidence before Mapp); see also Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 app. at 224-25 tbl.l (1960) (listing each state's position on 
the exclusionary rule as of 1960). 
65 See Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 
COR.t"'ELL L.Q. 436, 439 (1964) (discussing police comments to local papers). 
66 Leonard E. Ryan, Narcotics Case Convictions Drop Since Ban on Illegal Searches, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1962, at 35. 
67 See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 440 (noting comments of local police superinten-
dent doubting "that the public 'can live' with the exclusionary rule"); Limit on Searches 
Scored by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1962, at 74 (reporting police commissioners' views 
that the exclusionary rule was an obstacle to effective law enforcement). 
68 Anthony Lewis, Bar Chief Assails High Court Views, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 7. 
69 The other is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., Bacigal, supra 
note 12, at 782 (noting that "Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule to the states, and Miranda v. Arizona, which required the now famous 
warnings, must rank among the most unpopular decisions in Supreme Court history" 
(footnotes omitted)); Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 2, at 49 (contrasting the Su-
preme Court's early criminal procedure cases with "the sort of countermajoritarian 
judicial decision making one often associates with landmark criminal procedure deci-
sions such as Mapp or Miranda"); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 53 (arguing that decisions 
like Mapp and Miranda are "nothing if not countermajoritarian"). 
70 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 375 (noting that Mapp later moved to Queens, New 
York, where she was ultimately convicted of operating a heroin factory out of her home 
and sentenced to a prison term of twenty years to life). 
2004] COUNJ'J<.'RMA]ORITARJAN HERO OR zt1W? 1375 
she presented about as attractive a case for overruling Woifv. Colarado71 
as one could ever find. Mapp lived in a boarding house in Cleveland 
and was under investigation for harboring an alleged bombing sus-
pect.72 When police arrived at her home and demanded entry, Mapp 
called her lawyer, who advised her not to admit them without a war-
rant.73 She did exactly that, but the police (who numbered at least 
seven) broke the glass on a back door and entered the home anyway.74 
When Mapp at once demanded to see their warrant, one of the offi-
cers waived a paper in front of her, which she grabbed and stuffed in-
side her bra.75 The police went after it. Mapp resisted and a struggle 
ensued over the warrant's "official rescue" from her bosom. 76 The of-
ficers eventually retrieved their paper, at which time they handcuffed 
Mapp for acting belligerent and searched her house.77 In the base-
ment they found a trunk containing the pornographic materials for 
which Mapp was ultimately prosecuted: four pamphlets, a couple of 
smutty pictures, and "a little pencil doodle."78 Although Mapp insisted 
that the trunk and its contents belonged to a recent boarder, she was 
convicted for possession of obscene material and sentenced to one to 
' • 0 i9 
seven years 1mpnsonment. 
As it turned out, the police never had a warrant to search Mapp's 
home in the first place,80 though at the time that was irrelevant. 
71 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
72 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. Interestingly, that suspect was believed to have bombed 
the home of future boxing promoter Don King, who at the time was an alleged 
numbers racketeer. See FRED W. FRIENDLY & MARTHA J. H. ELLIOTT, THE CON· 
STITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 129 (1984) (noting that "Don King ... who 
would later become the prominent promoter of championship boxing bouts," re-
ported the bombing that led to the Mapp case); see also Katz, supra note 59, at 471 
("[P]olice officers, looking for a man suspected of bombing Don King's home, sur-
rounded Dollree Mapp's house .... "). I credit Michael Allen Wolf for locating this bit 
of trivia. 
73 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. 
74 /d. 
75 !d. 
76 !d. at 644-45. 
77 !d. 
78 /d. at 668 (Douglas,]., concurring); see also id. at 645 (describing the search that 
revealed the pornographic materials). 
79 /d. at 668-69 (Douglas,]., concurring). 
80 See id. at 645 ("At the trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, 
nor was the failure to produce one explained or accounted for. At best, 'There is, in 
the record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant for the search 
of defendant's home."' (quoting State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ohio 1960))). A 
police offer involved in the search later admitted that they had never secured a war-
rant. FRIENDLY & ELLIOTT, supra note 72, at 130-31. 
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Under the Supreme Court's decision in Wolf v. Colorado, the exclu-
sionary rule was optional, so states like Ohio could convict a defen-
dant on illegally obtained evidence if they pleased.81 Still, the facts of 
Mapp made crystal clear what Wolf had become in practice-a green 
light for police to break the law. The old adage "[t]he criminal is to 
go free because the constable has blundered"82 had lost its intuitive 
appeal under the facts of Mapp; police were violating the Fourth 
Amendment on purpose, not by accident, because they had no reason 
not to. At the very least, then, Mapp's egregious facts made it easier 
for the Supreme Court to forge a new doctrinal path. Indeed, Mapp 
even afforded the Court the relatively rare opportunity to reverse on a 
Fourth Amendment claim where the defendant's factual guilt was in 
doubt. 
Even so, egregious facts would not have led to Mapp's revolution-
ary ruling unless the Justices were already poised to make it, as two 
points amply demonstrate. First, Mapp began inconspicuously enough 
as a First Amendment case and was briefed and argued as such before 
the Supreme Court.83 In fact, when Mapp's lawyer was asked during 
oral argument whether he also wanted the Court to reconsider its rul-
ing in Wolf, he declined the invitation.84 Only the closing lines of an 
American Civil Liberties Union amicus brief requested the Supreme 
Court in Mapp to rethink Wolf, and its request consisted of just three 
sentences completely devoid of argument.85 Adding to the irony, a 
81 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33 ("[I]n a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure."). 
82 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,587 (N.Y. 1926). 
83 Brief for Appellants, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236), reprinted in 
55 Lfu"'DMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1081-1112 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK 
BRIEFS]; Oral Argument, Mapp (No. 236), reprinted in 55 Lfu"'DMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 
1157-1200. 
84 Oral Argument at 8-9, Mapp (No. 236), Teprinted in 55 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra 
note 83, at 1157, 1165-66; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 673, 673-74 nn.4-6 (Harlan,]., dis-
senting) (quoting at length Mapp's statement of the questions raised on appeal and 
noting counsel's failure to advocate overruling Wolf during oral arguments). 
85 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 20, Mapp (No. 236), 
reprinted in 55 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 1131, 1154; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 
673 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (reproducing the ACLU's request for reconsideration 
of Wolf). Even at oral argument, ACLU's counsel emphasized that its "principal rea-
son" for appearing before the Court was to argue that Ohio's obscenity statute was un-
constitutionally vague. See Oral Argument at 13, Mapp (No. 236), reprinted in 55 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 1170 ("Our principal reason for appearing on be-
half of the American Civil Liberties Union and its Ohio affiliate is to urge the unconsti-
tutionality of the Ohio obscenity law .... "). 
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majority of the Justices in conference had already agreed to reverse 
Mapp's conviction on First Amendment grounds, so there was no 
need to even address the more difficult Fourth Amendment issue.86 
In short, Justice Harlan was undeniably correct when he argued in dis-
sent that the Mapp majority had "reached out" to overrule Wolf. 87 For 
those members of the Court already inclined to impose the exclusion-
ary rule on the states, Mapp provided the perfect opportunity to do it, 
First Amendment case notwithstanding. 
Second, and equally revealing, the Supreme Court had con-
fronted the same sort of egregious police conduct seven years earlier 
in the 1954 case of Irvine v. California88 but had little difficulty affirm-
ing Wolf under those facts. 89 In Irvine, police sent a locksmith to the 
defendant's home while he was absent to make a key to his door.90 
They then entered the defendant's home on three separate occasions 
to install and move a microphone hidden in his bedroom.91 For over 
a month, the police listened in on the private marital communications 
(and presumably, intimacies) of Irvine and his wife, not once attempt-
ing to secure a warrant for intrusions that would have landed anyone 
else in jail.92 The Justices were outraged. Noting that the police con-
duct in Irvine "would be almost incredible if it were not admitted," 
they went on to say that "[f]ew police measures have come to our at-
tention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated ... 
the Fourth Amendment."93 Still, the Court affirmed Irvine's convic-
tion for illegal gambling, reasoning that it would rarely be proper 
to force the exclusion of evidence in a state prosecution when the 
burden of administering criminal justice rested almost entirely with 
the states.94 Although Irvine was a difficult five-four decision for the 
Court and produced only a plurality opinion, the central dispute in 
that case was whether the police conduct was shocking enough to 
86 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS 
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 486 (Del Dickson ed., Oxford 2001) 
[hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE] (reproducing the Conference 
notes on Mapp). 
87 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 674 (Harlan,J., dissenting). 
88 347 u.s. 128 (1954). 
89 See id. at 134 (jackson, J., plurality opinion) ("We think that the Wolf decision 
should not be overruled for the reasons so persuasively stated therein."). 
90 !d. at 130-31 (Jackson,J., plurality opinion). 
91 !d. at 131 (jackson,]., plurality opinion). 
92 !d. at 132 (jackson,]., plurality opinion). 
93 !d. (jackson,]., plurality opinion). 
94 See id. at 134 (Jackson,J., plurality opinion) (declining to overrule Wolf because 
" [ t] he chief burden of administering criminal justice rests upon state courts"). 
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require exclusion under the fundamental fairness doctrine, not 
whether the fundamental fairness doctrine required overruling Wolf.95 
Wolfs continuing validity, at least as of 1954, was never in serious 
doubt. 
Thus, although appealing facts certainly made the case for over-
ruling Wolf more compelling, they alone cannot explain the Court's 
willingness in 1961 to impose upon the states a federal notion of jus-
tice. So what had changed since 1954? One answer is the composi-
tion of the Court, as four new Justices joined the bench between the 
years Irvine and Mapp were decided.96 With the exception of Justice 
Brennan, however, these were all relatively conservative appointments; 
the Warren Court did not become decidedly liberal in composition 
until 1962-after Mapp was decided.97 Moreover, although Justice 
Brennan helped form the fivejustice majority in Mapp, that majority 
would not have materialized had not two other Justices also changed 
their minds about the exclusionary rule. One of the two, Justice 
Black, had been a member of the original majority in Wolf,98 while the 
other, Chief Justice Warren, had joined the plurality in Irvine that ex-
plicidy endorsed Wolf's hands-off rule and rationale.99 Given these 
considerations and the fact that conservative Justice Clark authored 
95 Compare id. at 133-34 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) (concluding that because 
police conduct did not entail physical violence to the defendant's person, admission of 
the evidence did not violate fundamental fairness), with id. at 144-49 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that police conduct was sufficiently outrageous to "shock the con-
science" despite lack of physical violence and therefore admission of that evidence vio-
lated fundamental fairness). 
96 In October 1954, Justice Jackson died; Justice Harlan replaced him in March 
1955. In September 1956, Justice Minton retired; Justice Brennan replaced him in 
March 1957. In January 1957, Justice Reed retired; Justice Whittaker replaced him 
that March. In October 1958, Justice Burton retired; Justice Stewart replaced him in 
May 1959. See A&'IOLD S. RICE, THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969, at 6-17 (1987) (dis-
cussing the evolution of the Warren Court and the tenure of the individual Justices). 
97 See id. at 20 (noting that the Warren Court's conservative voting block lost con-
trol in 1962, when liberal Justice Arthur Goldberg replaced conservative Justice Felix 
Frankfurter); Kermit K. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND. 
L. REV. 309, 315 (1995) (noting conventional wisdom that the increase in liberal deci-
sions in the early 1960s resulted from Justice Goldberg's appointment at the beginning 
of the 1962 term); see also Rice, supra note 96, at xi-xii (discussing the liberal and/or 
conservative bent of individual Warren Court Justices). 
98 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring) ("But I agree with what ap-
pears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary 
rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evi-
dence which Congress might negate."). 
99 See Irvine, 347 U.S. at 134 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) ("We think that the 
Wolf decision should not be overruled, for the reasons so persuasively stated therein."). 
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the Mapp opinion, something else had to be driving the result in Mapp 
besides the Court's increasingly liberal composition-but what? Con-
cededly, the question can never be answered in any definitive sense, 
though evolving legal and extralegal contexts afford the most plausi-
ble explanation. 
1. Mapp's Legal Context 
As the Supreme Court in Mapp openly acknowledged, its decision 
to overrule Wolf was based in part on the exclusionary rule's growing 
support at the state level. 100 According to the Court, almost two-thirds 
of the states had rejected the exclusionary rule in 1949, when Wolf was 
decided, while more than half of the states had adopted it by 1960.101 
Truth be told, the Court was only talking about an eight-state gain, for 
a grand total of twenty-six states in favor of the exclusionary rule when 
Mapp was decided-and those eight states included newcomers Alaska 
and Hawaii, which arguably had little choice in the matter. 102 Still, the 
remaining six states to endorse the exclusionary rule after Wolf pro-
vide valuable insight as to just how accepted the rule had become by 
1961. Four of the six states-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island-adopted the exclusionary rule by statute, rather than 
judicial decision making, and in Rhode Island, the statute was passed 
after a judge rejected the exclusionary rule the year before. 103 The 
100 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 ("While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-
thirds of the [s]tates were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now ... more 
than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial opinion, 
have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to [it]."). 
101 See id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 app. at 224-25 tbl.l (1960)). 
102 In 1949, when Wolf was decided, twenty-nine of the forty-nine states admitted 
illegally seized evidence, while in 1961, when Mapp was decided, twenty-four of fifty 
states still did. In addition to the five states that changed their position on the issue, 
Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Alaska adopted the exclusionary rule without having re-
jected it before Wolf, bringing the total number of states adopting the exclusionary 
rule between 1949 and 196I to eight. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at app. 224-25 tbl.1 (listing 
each state's position on the exclusionary rule before and after the Wolf opinion). 
While federal territories, Hawaii and Alaska had been required to follow the exclu-
sionary rule, so each would have had to overrule existing judicial precedent to reject 
the exclusionary rule upon achieving statehood. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383,393 (1914) (requiring the exclusionary rule in federal courts). 
103 See ALA. CODE§ 210 (1951) (enacting a limited exclusionary rule); Mo. CODE 
fu'\IN., art. 35, § 5 (1951) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15-27 (1951) (adopting the exclu-
sionary rule); R.I. GEN. lAWS§ 9-19-25 (1956) (same); State v. Hillman, 125 A.2d 94, 
95-96 (R.I. 1956) (reexamining precedent rejecting the exclusionary rule based on a 
newly enacted statute to the contrary). For an excellent discussion of each state's posi-
tion on the exclusionary rule after 1949, see E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status 
1380 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1361 
other two states, California and Delaware, adopted the exclusionary 
rule by overruling prior precedent, 104 a move the Court considered to 
be "most illuminating."105 Importantly, no state to consider the exclu-
sionary rule rejected it during this time, whether deciding the ques-
tion as a matter of first impression or after having experimented with 
h I . . 106 t e rue m practice. 
For the majority in Mapp, California's conversion to the exclu-
sionary rule in 1955 was particularly persuasive.107 One might surmise 
that this was partly due to the fact that California was a recognized 
leader in progressive law enforcement practices, as well as Earl 
Warren's home state. 108 The fact that California Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Roger Traynor, one of the nation's most respected and influ-
ential state jurists, authored the California opinion adopting the ex-
clusionary rule probably played a role too-especially since he had 
written the 1942 opinion it overruled. 109 None of this, however, was 
of Rule Governing Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 50 
A.L.R.2o 531, 556-68 (1957). 
104 See People v. Cahan, 82 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) (overruling People v. Gonzales, 
124 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1 942)); Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199 (Del. I 950) (overruling State v. 
Chuchola, 120 A. 212 (Del. 1 922)). 
105 See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 220 ("The experience in California has been most illumi-
nating. In 1955 the Supreme Court of that State resolutely turned its back on many 
years of precedent and adopted the exclusionary rule." (citation omitted)). 
106 Michigan is the only state that even comes close. In 1952, Michigan expanded 
its already established exception to the exclusionary rule to include in the class of 
nonexcludable items evidence related to drug offenses. See People v. Gonzales, 97 
N.W.2d 16, 23-24 (Mich. 1 959) (recognizing the validity of a 1952 state constitutional 
amendment expanding the class of nonexcludable evidence). In 1957, South Dakota 
recognized a limited return to the common law rule of admissibility, but it did so based 
on a statute that was passed long before Wolf was decided. See State v. Lane, 82 N.W.2d 
286, 289-90 (S.D. 1 957) (recognizing a limited return to common law rule of admissi-
bility based on S.D. CODE§ 34.ll02 (1939)). 
107 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 ("Significantly, among those now following the rule is 
California .... "). 
108 See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA.t'J CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 175 (lst ed. 1 980) ("California made the greatest advances in both law en-
forcement and corrections through the 1 940s and 1 950s .... In other states reformers 
and progressive administrators looked to California for a model they might follow."). 
Given Earl Warren's law enforcement background, California's position on the exclu-
sionary rule may well have struck him as particularly influential. See POLLACK, supra 
note 10, at 43-66 (discussing Warren's experience as a district attorney and state attor-
ney ?,eneral). 
09 See Cahan, 282 P.2d at 911 (overruling People v. Gonzales, 24 P.2d 44 (Cal. 
1942)); see also POW£, supra note 12, at 199 (noting the well-respected and influential 
reputation of California Chief Justice Roger Traynor); Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio 
at Large in the fiJty States, 1962 DUKE LJ. 319, 321 (referring to "[t]he education that 
leads a judge to overrule himself''). 
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mentioned in Mapp. What did merit discussion was the reason Cali-
fornia had changed its mind about the exclusionary rule: other 
methods of enforcing the Fourth Amendment had proven to be an 
abject failure in curbing the brazen, illegal practices of local police. 110 
To the majority in Mapp, the point was an important one. Indeed, 
cases like Irvine had led the Court to the same conclusion a full year 
before Mappwas decided."' 
Given the exclusionary rule's growing popularity among the states 
by 1961, it is worth noting even at this juncture of the analysis that 
Mapp was not the aggressively countermajoritarian decision scholars 
thus far have thought it to be. By the time the Court decided Mapp, a 
solid half of the states had already adopted the exclusionary rule, with 
the trend among them unmistakably in favor of the Court's deci-
sion.112 Indeed, no state to consider the exclusionary rule after 1949 
rejected it (despite Wolf's tacit encouragement to do so), while most 
of those adopting it used majoritarian politics to effectuate the 
change. 113 With California's prestige behind the exclusionary rule as 
of 1955, the rule's momentum was, as the Court itself noted in 1960, 
"seemingly inexorable." 114 It would appear, then, that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Mapp coincided with an emerging national con-
sensus on the exclusionary rule, albeit at its early stages. Even under 
the most begrudging analysis, however, the exclusionary rule imposed 
by Mapp had the support of half the states-hardly an example of the 
Court acting against a clear majority preference to the contrary. Had 
110 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 ("Significantly, among those now following the rule is 
California, which, according to its highest court, was 'compelled to reach that conclu-
sion because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the 
constitutional provisions .... "'(quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445 (1955))). 
111 See Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 217 ("[O]ther remedies have completely failed to se-
cure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with 
the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required 
to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement offi-
cers."). In Iroine, Justice Jackson and Chief Justice Warren noted the availability of a 
federal prosecution against the officers in that case, directing that the record and a 
copy of the opinion be forwarded to the Attorney General for possible action. Jroine, 
347 U.S. at 137-38. Apparently, nothing was ever done, which profoundly affected at 
least Warren's perspective on the necessity of judicial involvement. See Bernard 
Schwartz, Earl Warren, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 52, at 
256, 268 (discussing Iroine and its effect on Chief Justice Warren's views regarding ju-
dicial activism). 
112 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (describing the trend among the 
states toward adoption of the exclusionary rule). 
113 ld. 
114 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 219. 
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the Supreme Court mandated the exclusionary rule in 1949, when it 
decided Wolf, one could have concluded differently. But the Court in 
Woifrefused to make that move, in part because state practices at the 
time did not support it. 115 
Still, it is one thing to recognize that the states were choosing the 
exclusionary rule on their own and quite another for the Supreme 
Court to force that choice upon them. Even the apparent futility of 
other means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment cannot fully ex-
plain the Court's impetus to overrule Wolf; after all, if the states were 
concluding for themselves that the exclusionary rule was necessary (an 
argument that had been made since 1914),116 why bother to intervene? 
If anything, the exclusionary rule's momentum among the states 
urged patience from the Court, not intervention-and in years past, 
the Justices would have agreed. 117 By 1961, however, the Supreme 
Court was more interested in curbing police abuses than in waiting for 
the states to do it themselves. To understand why, one need only ex-
amine the extralegal context in which Mapp was decided. 
2. Mapp's Extralegal Context 
By 1961, the American public was clearly more concerned with il-
legal law enforcement practices than it had been in years past. Even 
by the late 1950s, courts and commentators alike had begun to note 
the nation's growing unease with unchecked police power. 118 For the 
115 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29 ("The contrariety of views of the States is particularly 
impressive in view of the careful reconsideration which they have given the problem in 
the light of the Weeks decision."). 
116 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 ( 1914) (reasoning that if evidence 
illegally seized can still be used as evidence, "the protection of the Fourth Amendment, 
declaring [the] right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, 
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Con-
stitution"). 
117 As Justice Harlan stated in Mapp: 
The presen'ation of a proper balance between state and federal responsibil-
ity in the administration of criminal justice demands patience on the part of 
those who might like to see things move faster among the States in this re-
spect. ... For us the question remains, as it has always been, one of state 
power, not one of passing judgment on the wisdom of one state course or an-
other. 
367 U.S. at 680-81 (Harlan,]., dissenting); see also Porter, supra note 54, at 21 (summa-
rizing a speech in which Justice Brennan stated that considerations of federalism had 
previously prevented the Supreme Court from applying various Bill of Rights safe-
guards to the states in criminal prosecutions). 
118 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) (noting "the deep-
rooted feeling that police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end 
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purposes of the present analysis, however, the most interesting com-
mentary on the subject came in 1962, following the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mapp. Reporting for the New York Times, Anthony Lewis 
wrote that the Court's efforts to eradicate unfair criminal justice prac-
tices "reflect[ed] a national moral sentiment."119 Explaining the point, 
he went on to write: 
Americans [a] re plainly less willing to tolerate police misbehavior in any 
state, regardless of the political niceties of Federal-state relations, than 
they were in earlier years. Many Americans have a national conscience 
that is injured by any state's misbehavior. And more and more the na-
tional ideal is prevailing over state orientation.120 
If Lewis was right, then the Supreme Court's newfound willingness to 
intervene in matters of state criminal procedure coincided with a 
readiness among the American public for it to do so. 121 As such, Mapp 
may well have reflected an emerging national consensus regarding not 
only the exclusionary rule, but also the legitimacy of federal interven-
tion in state criminal justice affairs. The intriguing question, again, is 
why that would have been so. Here the analysis necessarily becomes 
more speculative, though two developments provide at least part of 
the explanation. 
First, the nation in 1961 was almost certainly still trying to distance 
itself from the more unpleasant aspects of totalitarian police practices 
it had witnessed during World War II. Having seen for itself where 
unrestrained police power could lead, the American public in the late 
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those 
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves"); People v. Cahan, 82 
P.2d 905, 912 (Cal. 1955) (recognizing that "[t]oday one of the foremost public con-
cerns is the police state"); Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sys-
tems of Criminal justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 254 (1959) (noting the "quickening pub-
lic interest in the administration of criminal justice"). An early draft of the Mapp 
opinion reportedly noted the phenomenon as well. See Schwartz, supra note Ill, at 
267 (relaying contents of Justice Clark's first Mapp draft, including his reference to 
"aroused public opinion" on the issue of police discipline). 
119 Anthony Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, june 17, 1962, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 7. 
120 !d. 
121 The fact that editorials praised the Court's decision in Mapp, despite the mis-
givings of police and states' lights advocates, provides at least anecdotal support for 
Lewis's claim. See, e.g., Editorial, The Individual's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, june 22, 1961, at 
30 (arguing that "police illegality can only breed public disrespect for law, and there is 
no effective way to curb it save by making the evidence inadmissible"); Nathaniel Phil-
lips, Letter to the Editor, Ban on Unlawful Search Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, june 26, 1961, at 
30 (describing the ban on evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure as contribut-
ing to the nation's image as a champion of individual rights). 
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1940s quite naturally developed an "ideological revulsion" against Ge-
stapo-type law enforcement techniques that translated into an ongo-
ing desire to rein in police authority at home. 122 The ensuing Cold 
War of the 1950s would have only reinforced this desire as Americans 
sought to prove to themselves and the rest of the world that demo-
cratic freedoms were superior to KGB-enforced communist controls. 123 
And with the national crime rate in 1961 at just 1% over 1960/24 there 
was little to distract the public from the need to more meaningfully 
safeguard its Fourth Amendment protections. 
Second, the nation had become a much more cohesive unit by 
1961, and so Americans were more comfortable with the idea of fed-
eral intervention in areas traditionally considered to be state affairs. 
Advances in communication and transportation had given the public 
an increasingly national perspective and that, in turn, had made in-
creasingly obsolete the notion that criminal defendants could be 
treated poorly just because it was a state's prerogative.125 With charis-
matic john F. Kennedy's election to the presidency in 1960, the public 
became even more focused on the national scene, causing the "feder-
alism pendulum" to swing even further away from the states.126 By 
1961, then, the legitimacy of using federal power to solve nationwide 
problems (even those traditionally considered to be local ones) was 
not in serious dispute. 
122 See Klarman, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 65 (discussing the likely impact of 
"ideological revulsion against Nazi practices" on criminal procedure norms). 
123 See id. at 34 (discussing the so-called "Cold War imperative" pushing post-World 
War II America to demonstrate to the world that democratic capitalism was superior to 
communism). 
124 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REP-
ORTS FOR THE UNITED STATE£-1961, at 3 (1962). As it turned out, 1961's 1% increase 
in crime over 1960 was the lowest of the decade. See infra notes 292, 336, 424 (report-
ing higher crime rates throughout the mid- to late-1960s). 
12
" See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 4 ("[D]ifferences from state to state in the treat-
ment of persons who ran afoul of the law had become intolerable in a nation where 
state lines had come to mean so little."); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal 
Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249, 258 (1968) ("The mere status of being in America 
should confer protection broad enough to protect any man from the vagaries of a state 
which by inertia or design fails to keep pace with a national consensus concerning the 
fundamental rights of the individual in our society."); see also WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, 
WE THE JUDGES 42 (1956) ("In America, the trend has been toward the development of 
a strong and powerful national government."). 
126 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 16-17 (crediting the election of President john F. 
Kennedy for "a brief era of immense national faith in the capacity of enlightened and 
powerful men--especially in Washington-to accomplish reform"). See generally Bad-
gal, supra note 12 (coining the phrase "federalism pendulum"). 
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That said, neither of the above developments provides a fully satis-
factory explanation for the nation and Supreme Court's attitudinal 
shift between the time Wolf and Mapp (and even Irvine and Mapp) 
were decided. For starters, it was the New Deal of the 1930s that gave 
the public its confidence in a strong national govemment, 127 so to 
some extent that factor was present when the Court decided Wolf and 
Irvine as well. Even the incorporation aspect of Mapp was nothing 
new; by the early 1930s, the Supreme Court had already extended the 
First Amendment's freedoms of speech, religion and assembly to the 
states, 128 incorporating civil rights long before it ever turned to those 
in the criminal context. Similarly, the nation's recoil against totalitar-
ian-style law enforcement tactics must have also existed when Wolf and 
Irvine were decided. In fact, given the temporal proximity of both de-
cisions to World War II and the widely publicized Nuremberg trial 
that followed in 1945-46/29 one would think public sentiment would 
have been just as strong (if not stronger) in the late 1940s to mid-
1950s as it was in the early 1960s. 
Perhaps the most that can be said is that the nation may well have 
been ready for Mapp's ruling before the Supreme Court was ready to 
render it. There is reason to believe, however, that another, more re-
cent development was making federal regulation of police conduct 
particularly attractive to the Supreme Court and many Americans-
the burgeoning civil rights movement. Granted, black Americans had 
made significant strides in racial relations even by the time Wolf and 
Irvine were decided; as Michael Klarman has persuasively argued, 
World War II provided the egalitarian social, economic and political 
conditions that made possible the Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education. 130 Still, it was not until after 1954 that the modem 
civil rights movement truly began. Historically salient events like the 
1955-56 Montgomery bus boycotts, the 1957 showdown at Little Rock, 
127 Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court in Historical Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT: 
A RETROSPECfiVE, supra note 52, at 293, 300 (describing the rise of big government as 
"one of the enduring legacies of the New Deal"). 
128 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (incorporating the 
First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of the press into the Fourteenth 
Amendment); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the First 
Amendment's freedom of assembly into the Fourteenth Amendment). 
129 See CarolS. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV 820, 
842 (1994) (discussing the salience of the 1945-46 Nuremberg trial and its impact on 
Justice jackson). 
130 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Michael]. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil 
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) ("Many of the factors conductive to racial 
change ... were byproducts ofWorld War II .... "). 
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the 1960 sit-ins, and the early 1961 Freedom Rides all occurred be-
tween the time Imine and Mapp were decided;131 indeed, in the inter-
vening years between those decisions, Congress passed the first two 
pieces of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.132 None of this is 
to say that by 1961, the civil rights movement had taken the country by 
storm-it would have to wait two more years for that. 133 But between 
1954 and 1961, the nation had begun to undergo fundamental 
change as the civil rights movement gained momentum. 
In two ways, the burgeoning civil rights movement almost certainly 
influenced the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence. 
First, it gave the Court a good reason not to respect the power of the 
states to manage their own criminal justice affairs as in years past. 
States were using their power to discriminate, and the Supreme Court 
knew it as well as anyone. In the years immediately following Brown, 
state courts had joined local politicians in doing everything within 
their power to resist school desegregation;134 in one case, a Southern 
court's obviously obstructive efforts necessitated four trips to the Su-
preme Court before 1960 for enforcement of an early integration de-
cree.135 By the late 1950s, the Justices were clearly fed up with South-
ern states' massive resistance to Brown136 and that, in turn, made them 
131 See JUA1'1 WJLLIA1\1S, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-
1965, at 59-147 (1988) (providing an in-depth discussion of early events in the civil 
rights movement). 132 SeeCivil RightsActofl957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101,71 Stat. 634,634 (1957) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (2000)) (creating the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, §§ 101-301, 74 Stat. 86, 86-88 
(1960) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.)) (establishing penalties for obstruction of court orders, flight to avoid prosecu-
tion, and failure to maintain federal election records). 133 See ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIB-
ERALISM IN THE 1960s, at 86-87 (1986) (crediting events in Birmingham in 1963 for 
creating a mass constituency sympathetic to the civil rights movement); POWE, supra 
note 12, at 225-26 (recognizing Birmingham as a catalyst for the civil rights move-
ment); Klarman, supra note 130, at 130 (discussing the marked change in Northern, 
white opinion on the issue of civil rights after Birmingham). Birmingham is discussed 
infra in note 278 and accompanying text. 134 See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN 
THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 121 (1987) (noting that "many [state court] southern judges 
seemed to view themselves 'less as impartial umpires and dispensers of justice than as 
defenders ofwhite supremacy"'). 135 See Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 
TENN. L. REV. 869, 880-84 (1994) (describing Virgil D. Hawkins's attempt to desegre-
gate the University of Florida College of Law). 
136 See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MAsSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950'S (1969) (discussing Southern states' mas-
sive resistance to school desegregation). 
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highly unreceptive to cries of states' rights. Mter all, deferring to the 
states had little appeal when the states were using their power to mas-
sively resist a Supreme Court ruling on racial equality. 137 As Robert 
Glennon has noted, the Supreme Court's lack of faith in state courts 
to decide cases in a fair (i.e., nondiscriminatory) manner led to a re-
stricted "adequate and independent state ground" doctrine in the late 
1950s.138 Given that development and the sentiment driving it, it is 
not surprising that the Court contemporaneously refused to abide by 
traditional federalism constraints in other doctrinal areas as well. By 
1961, federalism was just enabling local power structures to discrimi-
nate against blacks, and that had become unacceptable. 
Indeed, in matters regarding the regulation of police conduct, the 
Supreme Court had even less reason to defer to the states. Police 
played an integral part in perpetuating racist culture, and as such, 
Southern states had every reason not to enforce checks on their behav-
ior. It is no coincidence, I believe, thatjust months before Mapp was 
decided the Court provided a § 1983 remedy to victims of police mis-
conduct under facts clearly demonstrating the propensity of police to 
enforce racist social mores. 139 By 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights had been investigating the connection between race and police 
brutality for two years/40 so the notion that law enforcement was being 
137 I credit Michael Klarman for this insight. 
138 See Glennon, supra note 135, at 910-11 (discussing the connection between the 
civil rights movement and the Warren Court's interpretation of the "adequate and in-
dependent state ground" doctrine). 
139 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (recognizing a cause of action 
against police officers in their individual capacity). Dissenting justice Frankfurter de-
scribed the facts of the case as follows: 
The complaint alleges that on October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chi-
cago police officers, led by Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape, broke through 
two doors of the Monroe apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, 
and forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center 
of the living room; that the officers roused the six Monroe children and 
herded them into the living room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe 
several times with his flashlight, calling him "nigger" and "black boy"; that an-
other officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other officers hit and kicked several of 
the children and pushed them to the floor .... 
!d. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In response to claims that the Court's ruling 
would disturb the delicate balance of federal-state relations, the majority stated, "It is 
no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal 
remedy is supplemental)' to the state remedy, and the [state remedy) need not be first 
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." !d. at 183. 
140 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, jUSTICE: 1961 COMMJSSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
REPORT, at xi (1961) [hereinafter 1961 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT) (noting that in 1959, 
the Commission's term was extended so that it could investigate, among other things, 
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used to maintain black subordination was hardly anything new. For 
good reason, then, the Supreme Court may well have concluded that 
some states would not come around to the exclusionary rule after all. 
Even the two Southern states that had adopted the exclusionary rule 
after Wolf did so in 1951,141 we!l before Brown propelled their racial 
politics to the right. In light of the South's stiffening racist resolve af-
ter Brown/42 it was almost unfathomable that any Southern state in the 
mid- to late-1950s would have taken action to curb police excesses on 
its own. 
In sum, one thing the burgeoning civil rights movement did was 
give the Supreme Court a reason to distrust the states, especially on 
matters of criminal procedure. Yet the nation's growing interest in 
protecting black Americans did something else too: it gave the Court 
a reason to take an interest in criminal defendants. Whether or not 
the Supreme Court was consciously thinking about racial discrimina-
tion under the facts of Mapp, it knew from prior cases that the most 
egregious abuses of police power were perpetrated against blacks, 143 
and that to the extent its ruling corrected an injustice, it would have 
the most impact there. 144 With the civil rights movement gaining mo-
mentum, it was only natural for the Supreme Court to launch a crimi-
nal procedure revolution when it did-criminal defendants were 
treated horribly in certain jurisdictions, and a disproportionate num-
ber of them were black. 145 Perhaps, then, the best explanation for 
racial discrimination in the administration of justice). The Commission's report, 
which was issued several months after Mapp was decided, concluded that "police bru-
tality in the United States today is a serious and continuing problem in many parts of 
the country . . . . The statistics suggest that Negroes feel the brunt of official brutality 
proportionately more than any other group in American society." Id. at 26-27. 
141 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Alabama and North 
Carolina's change of stance on the exclusionary rule between the time Wolf and Mapp 
were decided). 
142 See Klarman, supra note 130, at 85-149 (discussing the Brown backlash thesis). 
143 For an excellent discussion of the connection between race and the Court's 
earliest criminal procedure cases, see Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 13, at 50-77. 
144 As Lewis Katz has noted: 
The impact of Mapp was naturally greatest in the African-American com-
munity where Fourth Amendment violations were the most common. What-
ever limited effect Mapp would have, it would be felt most where police con-
duct was the least restrained. It was this community which the Warren Court 
intended to benefit by the due process revolution, because wherever injustice 
existed in America, its worst impact was felt in the black community. 
Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Year.s: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CAsE W. REs. L. 
REV. 471, 482 (2001). 
145 See supra note 55 (describing the typical criminal defendant). 
2004] COUN11ffiMAJORITARIAN Ht!W OR ZC!W? 1389 
Mapp and the revolution it inaugurated comes from the words of 
Archibald Cox: "Once loosed, the idea of [e]quality is not easily 
cabined." 146 Mter Brown gave blacks equality in education, it was only 
a matter of time before the Supreme Court would turn to racial equal-
ity in other contexts, such as criminal procedure. 147 Indeed, as the 
civil rights movement gained momentum, the notion that blacks 
should be protected in their civil rights, but not when their liberty and 
lives were at stake, must have seemed patently absurd. 
Thus, for several reasons, 1961 presented a much more favorable 
climate to launch a criminal procedure revolution, starting with re-
straints on police power, than had earlier years. By that year, a solid 
half of the states (and counting) had already adopted the exclusionary 
rule on their own. 148 Moreover, by 1961, the nation as a whole was less 
tolerant of local law enforcement abuses and more receptive to the 
notion of federal intervention in traditional state affairs. The Su-
preme Court's decision in Mapp reflects these developments. In 
Mapp, the Court took power from the states at a time when the states 
could not be trusted and protected blacks at a time when the nation 
was awakening to the need to protect them. As such, the common 
conception of Mapp as an aggressively countermajoritarian decision is 
simply inaccurate. That said, Mapp was still not the enormously popu-
lar decision that would come next among the landmark cases of the 
revolution, Gideon v. Wainwright. 149 
C. Gideon v. Wainwright: A Piece of Storybook Americana 
Decided in March 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright incorporated the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states, entitling all indigent 
felony defendants to a court-appointed attorney. 150 In so doing, the 
Court in Gideon overruled its 1942 decision in Betts v. Brady151 and 
erased any doubts that a revolution in criminal procedure had begun. 
Unquestionably, Gideon was one of the most monumental criminal 
procedure cases ever decided-it guaranteed to state felony defen-
dants "the most pervasive right," the one right defendants must have 
146 ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968). 
147 See Pye, supra note 125, at 256 ("Concern with civil rights almost inevitably re-
quired attention to the rights of defendants in criminal cases."). 
148 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing the trend among the 
states toward adoption of the exclusionary rule). 
149 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
ISO /d. at 345. 
151 316 u.s. 455 (1942). 
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in order to meaningfully exercise any others. 152 Moreover, because 
the vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent,153 Gideon's po-
tential impact on the administration of criminal justice was truly as-
tounding. Presumably for these reasons, Earl Warren considered 
Gideon to be the most important criminal procedure case his Court 
had decided and the third most important case of his tenure overall. 154 
As important as it was, however, Gideon merits a place in the pres-
ent analysis for another reason: it has been canonized by popular cul-
ture as a classic example of the Supreme Court's heroic, counterma-
joritarian role in the criminal procedure revolution. 155 In part, 
Gideon's acclaim stems from the holding of the case-that even the 
poor are entitled to an attorney's help when faced with serious crimi-
nal charges. In part, however, Gideon's fame stems from the facts of 
the case itself. Clarence Earl Gideon was by all accounts "the least 
among men," a 51-year-old drifter with nothing more than an eighth-
grade education and four felony convictions to his name. 156 Gideon 
was not the dangerous sort, just a small-time gambler and thief; those 
who would later write about him would say he was "a perfectly harm-
less human being, rather likeable, but one tossed aside by life."15i 
152 Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on 
"The Most Peroasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 9 ( 1962). 
153 See Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, TIME, Apr. 29, 1966, at 52, 53 
(noting that 60% of criminal defendants could not afford lawyers); supra note 55 and 
accompanying text (describing characteristics of a typical criminal defendant). 
154 Only the school desegregation and reapportionment cases ranked higher. See 
Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra 
note 29, at 3, 20 (discussing Earl Warren's ranking of cases in order of importance). 
155 See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (mentioning popular conceptions 
of Gideon); see also Gideon's Trumpet: The Poor Man and the Law (CBS News television 
broadcast, Oct. 7, 1964); infra note 157 (recounting depiction of Gideon in Gideon's 
Trumeet). 
1 6 CRAY, supra note 59, at 405. 
157 fuVTIIONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 6 (1964). Le\vis' full introduction on 
Gideon was as follows: 
Gideon was a fifty-one-year-old white man who had been in and out of pris-
ons much of his life. He had served time for four previous felonies, and he 
bore the physical marks of a destitute life: a wrinkled, prematurely aged face, 
a voice and hands that trembled, a frail body, white hair. He had never been 
a professional criminal or a man of violence; he just could not seem to settle 
down to work, and so he had made his way by gambling and occasional thefts. 
Those who had known him, even the men who had arrested him and those 
who were now his jailers, considered Gideon a perfectly harmless human be-
ing, rather likeable, but one tossed aside by life. Anyone meeting him for the 
first time would be likely to regard him as the most wretched of men. 
!d. at 5-6. 
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When he was charged with breaking and entering a Panama City, Flor-
ida, poolroom, Gideon requested a court-appointed attorney to repre-
sent him at trial. The trial court denied his request. In the colloquy 
that has since become famous, Gideon challenged the trial court, 
claiming (mistakenly at the time), "the United States Supreme Court 
says I am entitled to be represented by [c]ounsel."158 Again, the trial 
court denied his request. Gideon went to trial without an attorney 
and was promptly convicted of the felony charge, receiving a five-year 
sentence. Having time on his hands and some experience in jailhouse 
legal matters, Gideon fastidiously pursued an appeal of his case, ulti-
mately penciling a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court on lined 
sheets of paper from the Florida prison where he resided. All things 
considered, the Court could not have found a more perfect case to 
defend indigent felony defendants had it been looking for one-and 
the little-known truth is, it had been. 159 
The rest, as they say, is history. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Gideon's case and appointed one of Washington's most 
prominent lawyers, Abe Fortas, to argue on his behalf. 160 It then vin-
dicated Gideon's faith in the Court, refusing to allow the vagaries of 
personal finances determine a felony defendant's chances of prevail-
ing at trial. As Earl Warren's biographer, Ed Cray, would later write, 
Gideon was "a piece of storybook Americana .... No tale so affirmed 
the American democracy. No story broadcast around the world so 
clearly proclaimed that not just the rich received justice in American 
courts."161 Even last year, as Gideon celebrated its fortieth anniversary, 
scholars reminisced about the pride they felt when the highest court 
of the land reached down to rescue the quintessential little man, 
158 The Supreme Court's opinion in Gideon quoted the passage, and CBS reen-
acted the colloquy in its special broadcast of the case, using the actual trial judge and 
Gideon himself as actors. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 ( 1963); Gideon s 
Trumeet: The Poor Man and the Law, supra note 155. 
1 9 Chief justice Warren reportedly directed his clerks to search for a good case to 
overrule Betts, passing by the opportunity in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), 
because the defendant in that case was charged with incestuous sexual intercourse with 
his 13-year-old daughter. See POWE, supra note 12, at 381-82 (discussing Carnley and 
relaying Justice Frankfurter's comment that he could not '"imagine a worse case, a 
more unsavory case to overrule a long standing decision"' (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 62, at 408)); UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 172 (describing the Court's decision not 
to use Carnley to overrule Betts as an indication that the Court "controls its docket as 
well as its image"). 
160 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 932 (1962) (order appointing Abe Fortas as coun-
sel to Gideon). 
161 CRAY, supra note 59, at 405-06. 
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Clarence Gideon.162 If ever the Supreme Court played the role of 
counterm<:Yoritarian hero, surely it played it here-or so we think. 
Although Gideon was undoubtedly a heroic decision, our common 
perception of the Supreme Court's role there is only partly right; the 
Court may have rescued Gideon from the State of Florida, but it was 
hardly acting in the countermajoritarian fashion we tend to associate 
with the case. By the time the Court decided Gideon, all but five 
states-Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina-already provided counsel to indigent felony defendants, 
and those five were a less than prestigious lot in 1963.163 Even Florida 
provided counsel to indigent felony defendants in certain localities; it 
just so happened that Panama City was not one of them.164 Equally, if 
not more, telling of the nature of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gideon was the fact that twenty-two state attorneys general joined to-
gether to file an amicus curiae brief on Gideon's behalf; Florida, by 
contrast, could muster only two to support its position.165 As contem-
porary observers recognized, it was nothing short of extraordinary for 
the top law enforcement officials of so many states to ask the Court to 
impose upon them a constitutional protection for criminal defen-
dants.166 
Given the states' position on the issue, it should come as no sur-
prise that Gideon was one of the most popular cases of the Warren 
Court era. Newspaper and television coverage praised the decision/67 
as did the law review literature, which had long advocated that Betts v. 
162 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Gideon's Unkept Promise, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 17, 2003, at A12 
("Most of us experienced a surge of pride when the highest court of the land reached 
down to hear this little man's case .... "). 163 
POWE, supra note 12, at 380; see also Kamisar, supra note 152, at 17-19 (detailing 
the breakdown of state practices on the issue). 164 CRAY, supra note 59, at 403-04. 165 The Attorney General of Oregon filed a separate amicus brief on Gideon's be-
half, for a total of twenty-three states supporting the Court's ruling. Only Alabama and 
North Carolina filed an amicus brief supporting the State of Florida. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 u.s. 335,335-36 (1963). 
166 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, The Criminal Law Cases: Supreme Court Rulings on Coun-
sel and Other Points Pose Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1963, at 6 [hereinafter Lewis, The 
Criminal Law Cases] (describing position of the twenty-two attorneys general in Gideon 
as "an extraordinary event in the Court's history"); Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court 
Changes Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1963, at 12 [hereinafter Lewis, Supreme Court 
Chang_es Again] (describing same as "most unusual"). 167 See, e.g., Lewis, The Criminal Law Cases, supra note 166, at 6; Gideon s Trumpet: 
The Poor Man and the Law, supra note 155; see also POWE, supra note 12, at 381 (quoting 
an editorial from the Washington Post praising the Gideon decision). 
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Brady be overruled. 168 Even the American Bar Association strongly 
supported Gideon, a remarkable endorsement given its previously 
critical stance on Supreme Court decisions that took power from the 
states. 169 Gideon was so appealing, in fact, that it quickly became a part 
of pop culture, inspiring the best-selling novel Gideon's Trumper0 in 
1964 and, much later, a prime-time television movie with a handsome 
Henry Fonda playing the downtrodden Gideon role. 171 
Among the Supreme Court justices, too, Gideon was a popular de-
cision. Indeed, of the five landmark cases discussed in this paper, it is 
the only one to have received the Justices' unanimous support, provid-
ing yet another indication of just how mainstream the Court's ruling 
was by 1963. Conservative Justices Clark and Harlan both had little 
difficulty voting to overrule Betts; in conference, Justice Harlan re-
portedly went so far as to say, "[Betts] is a freak, and we should get 
done with it." 172 Even the Burger Court of the early 1970s-the Court 
known for launching a "counter-revolution" in criminal proce-
dure173-would embrace Gideon, unanimously extending its holding to 
misdemeanor cases where the defendant received jail time. 174 In 
short, Gideon's holding was agreeable to just about everyone, both in 
1963 and in later, more conservative years. 
Granted, much of Gideon's appeal for the Warren Court Justices 
and others had to do with the doctrinal landscape at the time it 
was decided. Although Betts required the states to provide counsel to 
168 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 404 (noting that "the legal profession had long held 
[Betts] in faint regard, the law journals in even lower repute"); Kamisar, supra note 162, 
at A12 (noting that Gideon "was widely applauded by both the legal profession and the 
general public"); Lewis, Suprmu: Court Changes Again, supra note 166, at 6 (noting that 
Betts had been "subjected to unrelenting attack in the law reviews"). 
169 See Counsel for Poor Acclaimed fry Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1963, at 5 (noting 
"strong support" for Gideon from the American Bar Association); supra text accompa-
nying note 68 (quoting the American Bar Association President's criticism of Mapp on 
federalism grounds). 
170 LEWIS, supra note 157. 
171 See]ohnj. O'Connor, TV: 'Gideon's Trumpet,' Landmark Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1980, at C30 (describing the movie as "absorbing" and Henry Fonda's per-
formance as "utterly convincing"). 
172 
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 503. Publicly, Justice 
Harlan took a slightly different stance, stating that he believed Betts was "entitled to a 
more respectful burial" than the majority's opinion in Gideon had given it. Gideon, 372 
U.S. at 349 (Harlan,J., concurring). 
173 See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 
(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
174 
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1972) (recognizing a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel if punished with incarceration). 
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indigent felony defendants only in "special circumstances,"175 the 
Court had found special circumstances present in every case it had re-
viewed after 1950.176 By the time the Supreme Court decided Gideon, 
it had even recognized as a special circumstance the complexity of le-
gal issues involved, though lawyers would have found those issues to 
be "of only routine difficulty."177 Clearly, the Court had come to real-
ize that a felony charge was, like a capital charge, its own special cir-
cumstance-a situation sufficiently perilous to justify the right to 
counsel. That being the case, it was easy to see why so many states 
urged the Court to overrule Betts and formalize the bright-line rule it 
had already implicitly adopted: more federal intrusion would actually 
mean less. 178 
Equally significant were developments in the Supreme Court's 
appellate criminal procedure jurisprudence. In 1956, the Court had 
held that indigent defendants were entitled to a free transcript on 
appeal/ 79 leaving little doubt among commentators that indigent de-
fendants were entitled to an attorney on appeal as well. 180 Indeed, as 
Scott Powe's research has revealed, a majority of the Justices had 
already agreed on the right to appellate counsel in another case, 
175 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 46, at 555-56 (discussing Betts's "special circum-
stances" test ) . 
176 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350-51 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that in no deci-
sion after Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950), had the Court found special cir-
cumstances lacking). 
177 See id. at 351 (Harlan,]., concurring) ("At the same time, there have been not a 
few cases in which special circumstances were found in little or nothing more than the 
'complexity' of the legal questions presented, although those questions were often of 
only routine difficulty." (footnote omitted)). 
178 See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE A..'\lD THE CONSTITUTION: 
LEADING SUPREME COURT CAsES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 274 (2000) (noting that 
Betts' special circumstances rule was less, rather than more, consistent with federalism 
principles given the proliferation of habeas corpus cases it produced and the resulting 
friction between state and federal courts). Future Justice Abe Fortas made the same 
point in an interview with CBS News. See Gideon s Trumpet: The Poor Man and the Law, 
supra note 155. 
179 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (requiring the provision of trial 
transcripts for indigent defendants appealing their conviction). 
180 See Francis A. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 151, 170-71 (1957) (noting that Griffin's rationale "is very suggestive of a forth-
coming requirement that indigents be furnished with counsel for an appeal"); R.D. 
Hursh, Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State as Regards 
New Trial or Appeal, 55 A.L.R.2D 1072, 1085 (1957) (noting that the right to counsel for 
indigent defendants on appeal addresses the same problem as Griffin and therefore 
"would appear to be no more than a logical extension of the Griffin doctrine"). 
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Douglas v. California, 181 well before Gideon was briefed and argued. 182 
Naturally, if indigent defendants had a right to counsel on appeal, 
they also had a right to counsel at trial, which perhaps explains why 
the Court carried Douglas over to the following term and decided it 
the same day as Gideon. 183 In retrospect, then, Abe Fortas had the not-
so-difficult job of convincing the Supreme Court to do what it was go-
ing to do anyway. No wonder Justice Douglas would remember For-
tas' presentation as "the best single legal argument" he had heard in 
his thirty-six years on the bench;184 Gideon himself could have argued 
the case and still won without a fight. 185 
No doubt, Gideon's doctrinal inevitability explains much of its ap-
peal among conservatives and law enforcement officials, yet there 
must have been more to it than that. Justice Harlan privately sur-
mised that he would have been among the Betts dissenters in 1942,186 
and the state attorneys general shared that sentiment, describing Betts 
as '"an anachronism when handed down."' 187 The Court's opinion in 
Gideon also took the position that Betts was wrong when it was de-
cided/88 so Gideon's holding must have been more than just a product 
of doctrinal attrition. Changing ideology played a role too; in fact, 
that was most likely the reason the Court's jurisprudence had strayed 
from Betts in the first place. By 1963, however, it was only natural for 
the Justices to support the provision of counsel for indigent felony de-
fendants as a matter of principle, and not just precedent. At the time, 
it was considered almost immoral not to. 189 To understand why, one 
181 372 u.s. 353,355 (1963). 182 The Justices had agreed upon the result and rationale of Douglas in June 1962, 
the same month the Court granted certiorari in Gideon. For an excellent discussion of 
the timing of events in the two cases, see POWE, supra note 12, at 381-85. 183 Both cases were decided on March 18, 1963. /d. at 384. 184 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 502. 185 See POWE, supra note 12, at 385 ("[W]ith Douglas in existence (although not 
publicly), Gideon could have argued Gideon and won 9-0."). 186 See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 503 (reproducing 
the Conference notes on Gideon). 187 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting the state attorney generals' amicus brief 
with approval). 18 See id. at 342 ("We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding 
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental 
rights."); id. at 344 ("[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless coun-
sel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth."). 
189 See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 82 (1983) ("[T]alking 
against the obligation of a democratic society to provide a fair trial for a poor, unedu-
cated fellow seemed immoral."); Lewis, The Criminal Law Cases, supra note 166, at 6 
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must again turn to the extralegal context in which the Court was op-
erating. 
Much of what has already been discussed regarding the impact of 
the civil rights movement on the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp 
applies with equal, if not more, force to its decision in Gideon just two 
years later. Though the events in Birmingham were still a month away 
when Gideon was decided, 190 the civil rights movement had gained sub-
stantial support by the beginning of 1963 and the plight of black de-
fendants in Southern courts had already begun to receive publicity. 191 
No doubt, the Supreme Court was thinking about the right to counsel 
in light of these developments; Gideon happened to be white, but the 
fact that only Southern states had refused to provide an attorney to 
indigent felony defendants made the connection impossible to ig-
nore. For a Court presumably interested in protecting blacks from 
Jim Crow justice, extending the right to counsel to the states was at-
tractive for two reasons. First and most obvious, it gave black defen-
dants a sorely needed legal advocate to argue on their behalf. Sec-
ond, and perhaps less obvious, it increased the opportunities for 
judicial oversight of suspect Southern courts. Appellate review of a 
defendant's conviction did little good if someone was not making mo-
tions and objections at the trial level, and most defendants needed an 
attorney to make that happen. In that regard, the Court's decision in 
Gideon served the same purpose as its habeas corpus ruling in Fay v. 
Noia, 192 which coincidentally (or not) was decided the same day: both 
("The idea that a man should be forced to undergo a criminal prosecution without a 
lawyer's help simply because he is poor seems to offend nearly everyone's sense of jus-
tice."). 
190 See supra note 133 (discussing the importance of Birmingham to the civil rights 
movement). 
191 See, e.g., Claude Sitton, When a Southern Negro Goes to Courl, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
1962, § 6 (Magazine), at lO (discussing the treatment of blacks in and out of Southern 
courtrooms); see also MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 85-86 (noting that eighty-nine 
members of the House of Representatives submitted civil rights bills at the beginning 
of the new congressional session in 1963). Events contributing to the movement's 
growing success included the Freedom Rides of 1961 and the admission of James 
Meredith into Ole Miss in 1962, along with the racist resistance those events provoked. 
For an in-depth discussion of those events, see WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 144-61, 
213-18. 
192 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (holding that federal habeas corpus is available even 
to those who procedurally defaulted their claims so long as state courts were not delib-
erately bypassed). 
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cases allowed federal courts to more easily scrutinize the treatment of 
black defendants by Southern criminal justice systems. 193 
Even so, the civil rights movement was not the only factor con-
tributing to the Court's ideological shift in favor of the right to coun-
sel. By the late 1950s, the problem of poverty had begun to infiltrate 
the American consciousness, and with Michael Harrington's publica-
tion of The Other America in 1962, it moved to America's conscience as 
well. 194 By all accounts, Harrington's book had an enormous impact 
on the national mood/95 though by 1962, Americans were in the 
mood to be sympathetic to the plight of poverty anyway. The late 
1950s to early 1960s marked one of the strongest peacetime econo-
mies in recorded business cycle history, with record-breaking profits 
and wages as high as anyone could remember. 196 At the same time, 
Americans were only a generation away from the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, so many knew how it felt to be poor through no fault of 
their own. In short, the early 1960s were a perfect time for the nation 
to tum its attention to the problem of poverty: the American public 
had wealth and was relatively open to the idea of sharing it. 
As one might expect, the plight of poverty had captured the atten-
tion of majoritarian politics by the early 1960s as well. Though Lyn-
don B. Johnson would not formally declare war on poverty until Janu-
ary 1964,197 the executive branch began to focus on the problem 
as early as 1960, when John F. Kennedy campaigned on the country's 
193 The Supreme Court itself later recognized this point. See Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (noting "the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional 
claims of some state judges in years past"). 
194 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 1010 (1965) (crediting John Kenneth Galbraith's The Ajjluent Society in 
1958 for bringing poverty to the national consciousness and Michael Harrington's The 
Other America in 1962 for placing it on the national conscience). 
195 See DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR ON POVERTY: RHETORIC AND 
HISTORY 24-25 (1986) (characterizing The Other America as "the most significant event 
in making the general public aware of poverty"); see also Dwight MacDonald, Our In-
visible Poor, NEW YORKER, Jan. 19, 1963, at 84 (reviewing The Other America and noting 
that "[i]n the last year we seem to have suddenly awakened, rubbing our eyes like Rip 
van Winkle, to the fact that mass poverty persists, and that it is one of our ... gravest 
social problems"). 
19 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 126-27 (noting that "[t]he era's affiuence 
spawned both social optimism and the revenues to pay for modest new welfare meas-
ures"); SCHLESINGER, supra note 194, at 1012 (discussing economic strength of country 
in Kennedy years). 
197 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the 
Union (jan. 8. 1964), in PUB. PAPERS 112, 114 ("This administration today, here and 
now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America."). 
1398 UNIVl:.'RSITY OF PANNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1361 
callous disregard for its poor. 198 In 1961, the Kennedy Administration 
turned specifically to problems faced by poor criminal defendants, es-
tablishing the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Ad-
ministration of Federal Criminal Justice-better known as the Allen 
Committee for its prestigious chairman, Francis A. Allen. 199 In 1963, 
just weeks before Gideon was decided, the Allen Committee reported 
its findings. Presuming at the outset that poverty should be irrelevant 
in any "civilized administration of justice," the Committee recom-
mended, among other things, federal legislation to adequately fund 
representation for indigent criminal defendants in federal courts.200 
With the executive branch contemplating ways to ensure that the poor 
received assistance of counsel in federal courts, the Supreme Court 
had even more reason (as if it needed one) to do the same at the state 
level, where it mattered most. 
Thus, for several reasons, Gideon was anything but an example of 
the Supreme Court swooping down to protect the underdog in the 
face of great opposition. Indeed, in light of the sociopolitical context 
of 1963, it is difficult to imagine the Court in Gideon not ruling as it 
did. In Gideon, the Supreme Court validated a well-established na-
tional consensus, suppressing Southern states that were out-of-step 
with the rest of the country's enlightened sense of fairness and equal-
ity by the early 1960s. As others have noted, this was the Warren 
Court's signature role. 201 Still, it is more than a little ironic that the 
same legal assistance at issue in the Warren Court's most popular 
198 Arthur Schlesinger vividly described this theme in Kennedy's presidential cam-
paign: 
[T]he message of Kennedy's 1960 campaign had been that the American way 
of life was in terrible shape, that our economy was slowing down, that we were 
neglectful of our young and our old, callous toward our poor and our minori-
ties, that our cities and schools and landscapes were a mess, that our motives 
were materialistic and ignoble and that we were fast becoming a country with-
out purpose and without ideals. 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 194, at 726. 
199 See REPORT OF THE ATTOR.!'IEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERlY AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at i, 1 (1963) [hereinafter ALLEN 
REPORT] (relaying the Committee's mission); see also BAKER, supra note 189, at 15-16 
(discussing the Kennedy Administration's "appointment of a Committee on Poverty 
and the Administration of Criminal Justice-known as the Allen Committee for its 
chairman, Francis A. Allen of the University of Michigan Law School-to evaluate the 
quality of justice being offered [to] the poor in the courts"); Kamisar, supra note 52, at 
76 n.233 (referring to the Allen Report). 
200 See ALLEN REPORT, supra note 199, at iv-ix, 5-6. 
201 See, e.g., POWE, supra note 12, at 490 ("In fact, the dominant motif of the War-
ren Court is an assault on the South as a unique legal and cultural region."). 
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criminal procedure decision would also become the subject of its 
least popular criminal procedure decision three years later, Miranda v. 
Arizona. 202 
II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: THE EXCEPTION THAT PROVES THE RULE 
Of the five decisions considered in this analysis, Miranda v. Arizona 
comes closest to realizing the heroic, countermajoritarian ideal we 
tend to associate with the criminal procedure revolution. Scholars 
have long regarded Miranda as a symbol of countermajoritarian deci-
sion making and controversy, the epitome of all that was wrong (and 
right) with the Warren Court's activism in the criminal justice arena.203 
Indeed, Miranda may even be the most countermajoritarian criminal 
procedure decision in Supreme Court history. In June 1966, when 
Miranda was decided, only three states required police to warn sus-
pects of their rights prior to custodial interrogation.204 Moreover, 
twenty-six state attorneys general filed an amicus brief in Miranda ask-
ing the Supreme Court not to impose any new constitutional restric-
tions on the admissibility of confessions-a complete 180-degree tum 
from the support the Court enjoyed when it decided Gideon just a few 
years earlier.205 Police across the country complained bitterly about 
the Court's holding in Miranda,206 and they were not alone in their 
displeasure. Prominent public opinion polls reported Americans' 
202 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
203 See POV.'E, supra note 12, at 394 ("If Miranda is not the most controversial deci-
sion by the Warren Court, it is close enough, and it is the most controversial criminal 
procedure decision hands down .... "); Martin H. Belsky, Whither Miranda, 62 TEX. L. 
REV. 1341, 1341 (1984) (reviewing BAKER, supra note 189) ("In the second half of the 
1960s, the case of Miranda v. Arizona became a symbol of much that was wrong with 
our criminal justice system and perhaps with society in general."); Alfredo Garcia, Is 
Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 477 
(1998) (describing Miranda as "the archetypal symbol of the Warren Court's excesses 
in expanding the constitutional rights of criminals"); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of 
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRJM. L. & CRJMINOLOGY 621, 666 (1996) ("Miranda has been 
the most celebrated and most reviled Supreme Court case in the history of American 
criminal justice."); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE LAW OF PRE-TRJAL INTERROGATION 119 ( 1986) (refer-
ring to Miranda's "symbolic status as the epitome of Warren Court activism in the 
criminal law area"). 
204 
Infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
205 Supra note 165 and accompanying text; infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
206 See infra notes 307-10 and accompanying text (discussing the reaction of police 
to Miranda). 
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disapproval of the decision by a two-to-one margin.207 By 1968, 
Miranda was so unpopular that Congress legislatively overruled it (or 
at least tried), and Richard Nixon made it a prominent part of his "law 
and order" presidential campaign.208 With all that in mind, how could 
Miranda not prove the Court's inclination for countermajoritarian de-
cision making? 
In all fairness, perhaps it does-at least if the relevant benchmark 
is what the states were doing when Miranda was decided. Yet the 
closer one looks, the clearer it becomes that Miranda, too, was a prod-
uct of its time and well within the parameters of publicly acceptable 
responses to the problem of coercive police interrogation. As dis-
cussed below, Miranda may have been controversial, but it was not the 
wildly countermajoritarian decision scholars have heretofore thought 
it to be. Like the other cases discussed in this Article, Miranda makes 
sense once placed in proper historical context, and that begins with 
an understanding of the Court's prior attempts to curb coercive police 
interrogation. 
A. Pre-Miranda Attempts to Curb Coercive Police Interrogation 
In its 1936 decision of Brown v. Mississippi, 209 the Supreme Court 
first addressed the problem of coercive police interrogation, also 
known as the "third degree. "210 As others have noted, the facts of 
Brown were perfectly suited for the task.211 In Brown, the police 
whipped three black sharecroppers, repeatedly hanging one of them 
from a tree, until they confessed to murdering their white landlord.212 
207 See infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text (describing public opinion poll 
data regarding Miranda). 
208 See infra notes 322-31 and accompanying text (discussing Miranda's role in the 
1968 £residential election campaign and legislation purporting to overrule it). 
2 297 u.s. 278 (1936). 
210 The phrase "the third degree .. generally refers to the infliction of pain to ex-
tract statements from a person against that person's will. See WALKER, supra note 108, 
at 174 (discussing various physical measures and sexual indignities used by police em-
ploying "third degree" methods); Peter Carlson, You Have the Right to Remain Silent .. . , 
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1998 (Magazine), at 6 (same). At least one commentator has 
claimed that the term "third degree" came from Russian police procedures, which re-
portedly had three degrees-first, cross-examination; second, confrontation; and third, 
physical duress. See BRADLEY, supra note 14, at 13 n. * ( 1993) (noting the possible ori-
gins of the phrase the "third degree"). 
211 See, e.g., Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 13, at 68 (noting that Brown "in-
volved an especially appealing set of facts in which to create a new constitutional 
right"). 
212 297 U.S. at 281-82. 
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At trial, a deputy sheriff admitted to the whippings but claimed they 
were "not too much for a Negro."213 The Mississippi Supreme Court 
affirmed the convictions, but the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 
to preclude the use of convictions that relied on confessions extracted 
by brutality and violence.214 In so doing, the Court established a "vol-
untariness" standard for determining the admissibility of police-
procured confessions.215 
In 1936, Brown was a major doctrinal move for the Supreme 
Court, though even then its interference with state criminal proce-
dure was anything but countermajoritarian. Every state to consider 
the issue, including Mississippi, had already agreed on the general 
principle that coerced confessions were inadmissible, so the Court was 
only holding the states to a standard they themselves purported to 
employ.216 Even so, Brown's voluntariness standard did not accomplish 
much either. The most immediate effect of the decision was to dis-
courage law enforcement officials from candidly reporting the cir-
cumstances of interrogation,217 leaving trial courts to decide the issue 
based on credibility determinations. With predominantly black de-
fendants pitted against predominantly white officers, the results were 
generally as one might predict. 
Years passed, but the problem of coerced confessions did not. By 
the early 1960s, the Supreme Court had nearly three decades of expe-
rience with the voluntariness standard and had developed a long list 
of factors (thirty-some in all) relevant to the determination ofwhether 
a defendant's confession was freely given.218 Some of those factors 
looked at the defendant's personal characteristics, such as age, intelli-
gence, and education, while others looked at the circumstances of the 
interrogation, such as its length and whether the defendant had been 
213 /d. at 284. 
214 See id. at 286 ("And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authori-
ties have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by vio-
lence .... [T]he use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and 
sentence was a clear denial of due process."). 
215 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 311-12 (discussing Brown's voluntariness 
requirement). 
216 See Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 13, at 67-68 ("[T]he new federal consti-
tutional right identified by the Court ... already was recognized by the law of every 
state."). 
217 /d. at 83. 
218 See Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 57 ("To weigh 
'totality,' the court developed no fewer than 38 criteria .... "). 
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denied food, sleep, or access to an attorney upon request. 219 None 
proved to be particularly helpful. In 1961, a highly publicized Civil 
Rights Commission Report found that police brutality in obtaini~g 
confessions remained a "serious problem" throughout the country, 
especially among black defendants.220 Meanwhile, state courts contin-
ued to affirm convictions based on confessions obtained under dubi-
ous circumstances and the Supreme Court continued to reverse, 
knowing that for every case it reviewed, there were many more it could 
not.221 In the end, the voluntariness standard had proven to be too 
fact-driven to restrain police behavior or provide guidance to lower 
courts, particularly those inclined to protect defendants no more than 
they absolutely had to. If the Court was going to make a dent in the 
number of coerced confessions, it needed a more definitive rule. 
The Supreme Court's first attempt at imposing a bright-line rule 
to curb coercive police interrogation came in the 1964 case of Escobedo 
v. Illinois. 222 Again, the facts were ideally suited for doctrinal change. 
Danny Escobedo was twenty-two years old when Chicago police ar-
rested him for murdering his brother-in-law and brought him in for 
questioning. 223 During the interrogation, Escobedo repeatedly told 
the police he wanted to talk to his lawyer, who, as it turned out, was 
219 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 313-17 (discussing factors relevant to the 
voluntariness test). 
220 See 1961 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 140, at 28 ("Police brutality-the 
unnecessary use of violence to enforce the mores of segregation, to punish, and to co-
erce confessions-is a serious problem in the United States."); id. at 27 ("The statistics 
suggest that Negroes feel the brunt of official brutality proportionately more than any 
other group in American society."); see also Sitton, supra note 191, at 10 (noting law 
enforcement's use offear and brutality in making arrests and obtaining evidence). 
221 Of the thirty-six coerced confession cases the Supreme Court heard from 1940 
to 1964, the Court reversed in twenty-six. BAKER, supra note 189, at 74. During oral 
arguments in Miranda, Justice Black candidly conceded that the Court was institution-
ally incapable of maintaining the case-by-case review that the voluntariness standard 
required: 
If you are going to determine [the voluntariness of a confession] each time on 
the circumstances after a man has been arrested, this means that someone has 
just-that this Court will take them one-by-one, and no court in the land can 
ever know what violates that right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, 
until it comes to us and we decide it .... It is more than we are capable of do-
ing. 
Oral Argument, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63 
LA.'\'D:\1ARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 843, 894; see also Fred P. Graham, Court Ponders 
Where to Draw Line on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1966, at E6 ("Everybody knew that 
for every coerced confession the Supreme Court struck down, thousands passed unno-
ticed."). 
222 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
923 
- ld. at 479. 
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also at the police station trying to talk to him.224 Despite the existence 
of a state statute specifically providing persons in custody access to an 
225 
attorney upon request, the police refused to allow the two to meet 
until after Escobedo had confessed.226 By that time, he had been 
handcuffed in a standing position for three hours and promised that 
he would only be used as a witness if he gave a statement implicating 
an alleged accomplice as the triggerman.227 Naturally, Escobedo was 
indicted for murder shortly thereafter and subsequently convicted of 
228 the charge. 
Though the Supreme Court could have easily reversed Escobedo's 
conviction under the voluntariness standard,229 it relied on the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to do so instead. The Court's holding in 
Escobedo was extremely limited, so much so that just stating it took an 
entire paragraph.230 The bottom line, however, was that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibited police who had "focused" on a suspect from 
denying that suspect's request to consult an attorney during custodial 
interrogation.231 In 1964, the proposition that arrestees who had law-
yers should be able to see them upon request was not particularly star-
tling; as one officer told the press, "[a]nybody would have known that 
224 /d. at 480. 
225 See id. at 481 n.2 ("The statute then in effect provided ... that: 'All public offi-
cers ... having the custody of any person ... restrained of his liberty for any alleged 
cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, admit any practic-
ing attorney ... whom such person ... may desire to see or consult .... "' (quoting 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 477 (1959) (repealed 1963))). 
226 ld. at 481-82. 
227 /d. at 482. 
228 /d. at 483. 
229 At conference, five Justices initially voted to do just that. THE SUPREME COURT 
IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 513-14. 
230 The Court stated its holding as follows: 
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a 
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular 
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a 
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, 
the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his 
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute consti-
tutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of 
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made 
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," and that no 
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against 
him at a criminal trial. 
&cobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91 (citation omitted). 
231 /d. The Court later limited Escobedo's holding to its own facts. See Kirby v. Illi-
nois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (recognizing this limitation). 
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guy had a right to see his attomey."232 Yet Escobedo's bark was worse 
than its bite. Nestled into the Court's opinion were sweeping con-
demnations of police interrogation and convictions based on a defen-
dant's confession233-and the fact that the Court had moved the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel from the courtroom to the "squealroom" 
had an ominous cast. At the time, it certainly looked as though the Su-
preme Court was about to give suspects subject to custodial interroga-
tion Gideon's right to an attorney, and that would have effectively 
ended police-procured confessions altogether. 
Not surprisingly, those in law enforcement sharply criticized the 
Court's decision in Escobedo, as did the conservatives who tended to 
back them.234 Among the general public, however, Escobedo was not sa-
lient enough to cause a reaction one way or the other.235 In 1966, 
232 Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 65; see also Joseph 
W. Bishop, Jr., The Warren Court Is Not Likely to Be Overruled, in THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 29, at 93, 97 (describing E-Scobedo as laying down "the 
not-very-startling rule that a man who is being questioned by the police is entitled to a 
lawyer when he asks for one"); supra note 225 and accompanying text (noting an Illi-
nois statute providing the same right recognized in Escobedo). 
233 See E-Scobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89 ("We have learned the lesson of history ... that 
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, 
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which de-
pends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." 
(footnotes omitted)); id. at 490 ("This Court also has recognized that 'history amply 
shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the 
trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence ... .'" (quoting Haynes 
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963))); id. ("If the exercise of constitutional rights 
will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something 
very wrong with that system." (footnote omitted)). 
234 See POWE, supra note 12, at 391-92 (discussing the hostile reaction to nscobedo 
among police and conservatives and mentioning sharp criticism of the decision by 
former President Eisenhower and 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater). It is 
somewhat puzzling why the law enforcement community was so upset with Escobedo 
when the Court's holding was relatively uncontroversial. The answer, I believe, lies in 
the press coverage of Escobedo, which relayed the decision's disturbing implications. 
See, e.g., UseoJConfession in Trial is Curbed, N.Y. TIMES,June 23,1964, at 1 (quotingJus-
tice White's dissenting view that Court's ruling in Escobedo would cripple law enforce-
ment). 
235 See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and Supreme Court: 
The Goldwater Campaign, 31 PUB. OPINION Q. 31, 35-36 (1968) ("The Supreme Court's 
decisions on reapportionment and on the rights of defendants in criminal cases, the 
two subjects that Goldwater assailed most frequently and stridently, were barely visible 
to the public at large."); id. at 46 ("Goldwater's complaints about the Court's decisions 
on reapportionment and the rights of criminal defendants could not possibly have had 
a great impact on public opinion. There was simply little popular reaction to these 
rulings."). Given law enforcement's low public esteem in 1964, there is no reason to 
assume that the views of police on Escobedo were representative of the public at large. 
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when Escobedo's picture graced the cover of Time, that was no longer 
the case.256 At that time, however, the press was eagerly awaiting the 
Court's decision in Miranda, and its coverage of Escobedo was com-
pletely favorable. Indeed, Time's 1966 cover story portrayed Escobedo 
much like Gideon had been depicted three years earlier, describing 
him as "a nobody for everybody" and using his case to illustrate why 
further police restraints-like those being considered in Mirand(J;-
b h . d = were ot appropnate an necessary. 
Even so, the Supreme Court's approach in Escobedo was, like its 
voluntariness standard, inherently problematic. Lower courts gener-
ally construed Escobedo's holding in the same limited fashion in which 
it had been presented, recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel during custodial interrogation only when defendants had hired 
lawyers and asked to see them.258 Because most defendants were too 
poor to hire their own attorney and too ignorant to know they could 
access one upon request, Escobedo had little practical effect.239 Mean-
while, the problem of coerced confessions began to receive substantial 
See infra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing the negative public image of law 
enforcement officials in 1964). 
256 See Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153 (reproducing Es-
cobedo's booking photo on front cover). 
257 /d. at 53-58. Interestingly, Time described Escobedo as a man who, at 5'5" and 
106 pounds, "hardly seem[ed] a threat to any healthy policewoman." /d. at 54, 60. 
The article even went so far as to suggest that Escobedo may have been justified in kill-
ing his brother-in-law and that Chicago police had planted evidence on him after his 
murder charges were dropped so they could bring another charge. /d. at 54, 58. As 
time passed, however, it became clear that Escobedo was not the victim Time made him 
out to be. He was subsequently convicted of drug dealing, attempted murder, inde-
cent liberties, and possession of illegal weapons; as of 2000, he was still serving time on 
the weapons charge. See POWE, supm note 12, at 411 (discussing Escobedo's subse-
quent charges and claim by a sentencing judge that Escobedo was a "career criminal"). 
238 See P.A. Agabin, Annotation, Accused's Right to Assistance of Counsel at or Prior to 
Arraignment, 5 A.L.R.3D 1269, 1284 (1966) (noting a division of opinion among courts 
as to whether the defendant must request counsel, with most holding that a request is 
necessary). For a discussion of the various positions taken by the states after E-scobedo 
but before Miranda, see generally Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 
153, at 57-58. 
239 As one New York Times article noted: 
So few lawyers ever appear at the precinct house while a suspect is being ques-
tioned-and so few suspects are worldly enough to ask for a lawyer or well-off 
enough to afford one-that the effect on police procedures would be negligi-
ble if that was all the court meant when it reversed Escobedo's murder convic-
tion. 
Sidney E. Zion, In the Station House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1965, at 33; see also supra note 
55 (describing the socioeconomic status of typical criminal defendants). 
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publicity,240 prompting some law enforcement officials to admit pub-
licly that the third degree was still in use. In New York, for example, a 
former deputy police commissioner confided: 
"It is hardly news that suspects of serious crimes often get 'worked over' 
in the back rooms of station houses. The truth is that most crimes are 
not solved by fingerprints and wristwatch radios and the skillful assem-
bling of clues. The suspect confesses, voluntarily or involuntarily."
241 
Clearly, the Supreme Court needed a better solution to the problem 
of coercive custodial interrogation, one that would protect the poor, 
unsophisticated defendants who were most susceptible to abusive po-
lice practices in the first place. With well over 100 certiorari petitions 
asking the Court to clarifY Escobedo's reach by late 1965,242 the time had 
come to try again. 
240 That publicity began around May 1965, in the wake of the George Whitmore 
case. In 1964, Whitmore confessed to murdering three women; his case was cited by a 
Manhattan prosecutor as "'the perfect example of the importance of confessions in law 
enforcement"' and an illustration of "how unrealistic and naive the Court [ wa]s" in its 
&cobedo decision. Sidney E. Zion, The Suspect Confesses-But Who Believes Him?, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. By early 1965, the same prosecutor had to 
drop all charges against Whitmore (who claimed he only confessed because the police 
beat him) because the physical evidence in the case failed to match his confession, 
creating a "stink bomb" of adverse publicity. ld. at 30-31, 89-90. Whitmore's case was 
reportedly mentioned as much as E-scobedo at a National District Attorney's Association 
meeting, id. at 90, and was salient enough to be mentioned in the Supreme Court's 
Miranda opinion as well. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (citing the 
Whitmore case as the "most recent conspicuous example" of coercive interrogation re-
sulting in a false confession). March 1965's "Bloody Sunday" in Selma, Alabama, 
probably also contributed to the rise in adverse publicity for police in general and con-
fessions in particular. See infra notes 281-82 (discussing Selma and its effect on public 
opinion of police). In any event, given the non-salient nature of the Court's 1964 deci-
sion in Escobedo, it is doubtful that the decision was in any way responsible for the pub-
lic attention given to confessions in 1965. See supra note 235 and accompanying text 
(noting Escobedo's lack of public impact). 
241 The Revolution in Criminal justice, TIME, july 16, 1965, at 22, 22 (quoting former 
New York City Deputy Police Commissioner Richard Dougherty); see also Eric Pace, 
Confession Rnle Asked for judges, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 23, 1965, at 33 (quoting the chairman 
of the penal law committee of the New York State Bar Association as saying, ''I'm not a 
cop fighter. If you'll pardon the expression, some of my best friends are cops, [but] I 
know what goes on in a police station"). 
242 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 457 ("By November, 1965, Earl Warren's clerks had 
identified 170 appeals from state prisoners who raised the unanswered issues of the 
previous year's &cobedo decision .... "). 
2004] COUNI'J:.'RMAJORITARIAN HA'RO OR ZERO? 1407 
B. Miranda's Holding and Historical Context 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miranda v. Ari-
zona243 and a few other "Escobedo cases" in November 1965,244 it was ob-
vious that the Court was going to lay down another bright-line rule for 
regulating custodial interrogation; the only question was what that 
rule would be. Because the Court had been on the verge of extending 
the full Sixth Amendment right to counsel to custodial interrogation 
in Escobedo, many feared it would actually take that step in Miranda, ef-
fectively eliminating law enforcement's ability to obtain even so-called 
"voluntary" confessions.245 Others doubted that the Court would go 
that far, predicting instead that it would simply require warnings prior 
to custodial interrogation.246 Importantly, a warnings requirement was 
the least the Supreme Court could do to place unsophisticated defen-
dants on equal footing with their more knowledgeable counterparts, 
rectifying at least part of the problem with Escobedo's limited hold-
• 247 
mg. 
As we all know, the Supreme Court in Miranda chose the latter op-
tion, interpreting the Fifth Amendment to require four warnings that 
are now so famous, anyone who watches television can recite them. 248 
That was a significant step back from where the Court appeared to be 
243 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
244 Miranda was a consolidated case involving four appeals: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 491-93 (1966), Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436, 493-95 (1966), Westover v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 436, 494-97 (1966), and California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 497-99 
(1966). 
245 See Kamisar, supra note 59, at 120 (discussing the fear of prominent judges, law 
enforcement officials, and other members of the bar that the Supreme Court in 
Miranda would condition interrogation on the presence of counsel). 
246 See, e.g., Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 58 ("So far, 
the best guess of Washington lawyers is that the court may simply require police to 
warr;grime suspects of their rights .... "). 
The other problem was that even among defendants who knew they could have 
access to an attorney upon request, many were too poor to afford one. See supra note 
239 and accompanying text (noting the poverty of most criminal defendants). 
Miranda addressed this problem as well by requiring the state to provide court-
appointed counsel to indigent felony defendants upon request. See infra note 248 
(quoting the required warnings). 
248 Miranda held: 
[A defendant] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right 
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of 
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot 
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if 
he so desires. 
384 U.S. at 479. 
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heading in 1964, though only upon closer inspection can one appre-
ciate just how much of a step back Miranda's ruling truly was. Accord-
ing to the Court in Miranda, the central problem with police interro-
gation was the inherently coercive atmosphere in which it took 
249 I d place. n eed, the Court went to great lengths to document the tac-
tics police used to discourage suspects from enlisting an attorney's aid 
or exercising their right to silence.250 In light of that fact, it is some-
what surprising that Miranda sanctioned police-provided warnings in 
lieu of requiring that they be given by a neutral and detached magis-
trate, as several prominent jurists suggested while the case was pend-
ing.251 Equally surprising is the fact that Miranda failed to require that 
the warnings be recorded, as others were then advocating, so that 
courts could at least monitor what, if anything, the police were doing 
to convince defendants to waive their rights.252 Given these considera-
tions, it is little wonder that Justice Fortas described Miranda as a 
"conservative decision" just after it was issued;253 the Court's ruling did 
nothing whatsoever to prevent the coercion police used to make sus-
pects talk from translating to the waiver context. 
249 See id. at 445-57 (detailing the coercive conditions of custodial interrogation); 
see also id. at 467 (concluding that "the process of in-custody interrogation of persons 
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely"). 
250 See id. at 454 (quoting interrogation instructions from FRED E. INBAU &JOHN E. 
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION At'\10 CONFESSIONS 111-112 ( 1962)). 
251 See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Letter to the Editor, Rights of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 1965, at 34 ("My view is that we cannot expect the police to advise a suspect 
effectively and disinterestedly of his right to remain silent at the same time as they are 
trying to elicit a confession from him."); Pace, supra note 241, at 33 (reporting a New 
York State Supreme Court justice's opinion that police were unsuited to inform sus-
pects of their rights and advocating that a neutral magistrate do so instead); see also 
Sidney E. Zion, justice Scorns Confession as Key to Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1965, 
at 1 ("Libertarians have long argued that a police station is coercive in itself and that a 
lawyer, rather than a detective, should advise a suspect of his rights."). 
252 See infra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of American 
Law Institute's proposed prearraignment procedures that would require police to 
make audio-recordings of both warnings and any subsequent waiver of rights); see also 
Sidney E. Zion, Ryan Asks Wide Revisions in Police Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1965, 
at 37 (reporting a New York City representative's call for "closed-circuit televising of 
the ~uestioning of suspects"). 
53 At that time, Justice Fortas also predicted that many suspects would waive their 
rights. See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 182 (quoting a conversation with Justice Fortas a 
few months after Miranda was issued). Given the experience of police departments 
that provided pre-interrogation warnings to suspects prior to Miranda, Justice Fortas's 
prediction was well-founded. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing the 
ability of police to obtain confessions despite having warned suspects of their rights). 
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Of course, even if Miranda was a comparatively weak decision in 
light of Escobedo and the Court's concerns about custodial interroga-
tion, it still could have been wildly countermajoritarian. It is difficult 
to conclude that this was the case, however, given the sociopolitical 
context in which Miranda was decided. Admittedly, only three 
states-California, Oregon, and Rhode Island-mandated Mirandtr 
like warnings in 1966, and all three did so only because they inter-
preted Escobedo to implicitly require them.254 Yet the Court's holding 
in Miranda did not spring out of thin air. By the time Miranda was de-
cided, a number of legal reform bodies had been studying the prob-
lem of coercive police interrogation for years, with the prestigious 
American Law Institute (ALI) leading the pack.255 By late 1965, both 
the American Bar Association and the National Crime Commission 
had agreed to endorse the ALI's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment 
Procedures,256 which was thought to represent the views of the nation's 
most influential law enforcement and conservative legal figures. 257 
Given the Model Code's endorsements, it is hardly a stretch to 
254 See, e.g., People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 371 (Cal. 1965) (holding that defen-
dant"s confession was inadmissible because the police had focused on the defendant as 
a "particular suspect" and subjected him to custodial interrogation without adequately 
informing him of his right to counsel and right to remain silent); State v. Neely, 398 
P.2d 482, 486-87 (Or. 1965) (holding that "before law enforcement officials can inter-
rogate a person who is the focal suspect of a crime, such person must effectively be in-
formed of his right to assistance of counsel as well as his right to remain silent"); State 
v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I. 1965) (citing Escobedo in holding that a court must 
"consider the validity of the confession in the light of its having been obtained without 
the police previously advising defendant of his right to have assistance of counsel"). 
255 The three main reform bodies involved in that endeavor were the American 
Law Institute (ALI), the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Minimum 
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, and the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice (commonly known as the National 
Crime Commission). See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 174-75 (describing the collabora-
tion of these groups on the creation of the Model Code as "a more-than;:oincidental 
concert of views on police interrogation ... between the most powerful nonjudicial 
legal institutions in the United States"). The ALI was the first of these groups to study 
the problem of coercive interrogation, having received a Ford Foundation grant to do 
so in April 1963. See BAKER, supra note 189, at 16 (discussing the purpose and scope of 
the Ford Foundation grant). The American Bar Association undertook a similar proj-
ect in February 1964, months before Escobedo was decided. See Austin C. Wehrwein, Bar 
Will Survey Criminal justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1964, at 9 (announcing the ABA's 
criminal justice project). Thus, the Court's decision in E:'scobedo cannot even be cred-
ited for galvanizing other reform groups into action. 
256 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tentative Draft No.1, 1966). 
257 See BAKER, supra note 189, at 159 (discussing membership of the Model Code's 
Advisory Committee); GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 174-75 (noting that the ABA and Na-
tional Crime Commission both supported the ALI's proposed Model Code). 
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conclude, as others have, that the ALI's project "carr[ied] the political 
and scholarly weight of virtually the entire American legal establish-
ment."258 
For the purpose of this analysis, the substance of the ALI's draft 
Model Code-published just days after the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Miranda259-is most revealing. On the subject of custo-
dial interrogation, the draft Model Code proposed that police be re-
quired to warn suspects of their right to silence and right to consult an 
attorney, audio-recording both the warnings and any subsequent 
waiver.260 The draft Model Code also provided for a maximum four-
hour interrogation period without an attorney's presence or consent, 
so that even arrestees who had waived their right to counsel would 
find their waiver invalid after a certain period of time.261 Concededly, 
the ALI's draft proposal differed from Miranda's holding in that it did 
not require the police to advise suspects of their right to court-
appointed counsel; in the draft Model Code, this right did not exist. 
Yet, even within the ALI, many thought indigent defendants should 
have a right to court-appointed counsel during custodial interroga-
tion, creating a rift that was at least partly responsible for the draft 
Model Code's failure to make it to final form.262 In any event, 
with one notable exception (and the significance of that exception is 
258 BAKER, supra note 189, at 159; see also GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 175 (noting 
that "[I]f the ALI were to approve its plan before the Supreme Court made its confes-
sions deci~ion, the slim Warren majority could find itself declaring a new constitutional 
right that the nation's legal establishment had only recently rejected"). 
259 Miranda was argued from February 28 to March 2, 1966, and the ALI's draft 
Model Code was published on March 1. BAKER, supra note 189, at 159. Chief Justice 
Warren attended the ALI's annual conference in May 1966, where the proposed code 
was debated. !d. at 160. 260 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 4.01, 4.09 (Tentative Draft 
No.1, 1966). 
261 !d. §§ 4.04, 5.08. 
262 See BAKER, supra note 189, at 160-61 (noting that the Model Code was not 
brought to a vote in part because of disagreement as to its provisions); see also Editorial, 
Limits on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1966, at 26 (criticizing the ALI's draft Model 
Code for making the safeguards a defendant enjoys "a matter of purse"); Sidney E. 
Zion, Model Crime Code Scored by A. C.L. U., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1966, at 1 (reporting that 
the ALI's proposed Model Code had already been "hotly condemned by a number of 
leading legal experts" including Chief Judge David L. Bazelon of the D.C. Court of 
Appeals, who criticized its failure to provide an attorney for indigent defendants as dis-
criminating against the poor). Admittedly, the main reason no vote was taken at the 
ALI conference in May was the fact that Miranda was pending, and some ALI members 
considered it a matter of professional courtesy to await the Court's ruling before taking 
further action. BAKER, supra note 189, at 160-61. 
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debatable),263 the ALI's proposed prearraignment procedures af-
forded the same, and in some aspects more, protection to suspects dur-
ing custodial interrogation than Miranda--not bad for a project 
thought to represent the views of conservatives and the police. 
Elsewhere, too, were significant indications that the Supreme 
Court's holding in Miranda was well within the parameters of publicly 
acceptable responses to the problem of coercive interrogation. By 
the time Miranda was decided, the FBI had been issuing the exact 
same warnings for years; indeed, its practice in that regard was de-
scribed by one justice as "'a tremendously important factor, perhaps 
the critical factor in the Miranda vote. "'264 Yet the FBI was not the only 
law enforcement body to issue warnings before Miranda. Across the 
country, police departments in a number of metropolitan areas-in-
cluding Denver, Detroit, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia-had also 
begun warning suspects of their rights well before the Supreme Court 
forced them to do so,265 in part because state courts had themselves 
become increasingly interested in warnings when determining the 
voluntariness of a confession.266 News articles written while Miranda 
263 See infra notes 317-19 and accompanying text (arguing that the Supreme Court 
in Miranda never envisioned the police actually providing indigent defendants with 
counsel). 
264 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 458 (quoting an unnamed Justice). The Court's 
Miranda opinion relied heavily on this fact. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-86 
(1966) (using the FBI's "present pattern of warnings and respect for the rights of the 
individual" as support for requiring "state and local agencies" to adopt similar proce-
dures). 
265 See Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 65 (describing 
the use of warnings by police in Denver, Miami Beach, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Seat-
tle); Fred P. Graham, General Reaction is Mild-Crime Unit Aide Sees No Major Changes, 
N.Y. TIMES, june 15, 1966, at 1 (noting that police in Oklahoma City, Minneapolis, Al-
buquerque, Denver, and Sacramento said their practices already followed the new 
guidelines); see also Zion, supra note 251, at 70 (reporting that at least two Eastern 
prosecutors had voluntarily ordered police to warn suspects of their rights prior to in-
terrogation). 
266 As Professor LaFave noted in 1962: 
If any trend at all is to be discerned in the state confession cases, it would be 
increased concern over lack of warning and denial of counseL ... [M]ore and 
more courts have indicated by dicta a possible willingness to strike down any 
statement received when a suspect was not warned or when he was not allowed 
to contact counseL 
Wayne R. LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 
1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 388 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court's confession 
cases under the voluntariness standard had likewise come to consider warnings as an 
important factor in determining whether a defendant's confession was admissible. See, 
e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 517 (1963) (recognizing warnings as an ap-
propriate circumstance to be considered involuntariness inquiry). Likewise, Escobedo's 
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was pending likewise supported the Court's forthcoming ruling, por-
traying warnings as an almost muted response to the enormous prob-
lem that abusive police interrogation had become.267 Indeed, by early 
1966, the idea of warning suspects of their rights before custodial in-
terrogation had become so publicly acceptable that in New York, a bill 
requiring preinterrogation warnings passed in the legislative assembly 
by a vote of 100 to 31268-with the strong endorsement of the Brooklyn 
and Manhattan district attorneys.269 Given these historical facts, it is 
difficult to conclude that Miranda was anything other than a reflection 
of what criminal justice reformers were championing at the time. 
Just the same, the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda makes all 
the more sense when considered in light of the prevailing social and 
political movements of its time. By 1966, when Miranda was decided, 
the nation had committed itself to a war on poverty.270 Even the gov-
ernment's brief in Miranda candidly conceded that it was virtually im-
possible to pick up a paper or listen to a public address without being 
reminded of the country's concern for its downtrodden and poor.271 
narrowly tailored holding relied, in part, on the fact that the police had not warned 
the defendant of his right to silence. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491-92 
(1964) (noting lack of warnings among facts relevant to narrow holding). 
267 See, e.g., Criminal justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 58 (noting 
that the presence of lawyers would bolster public faith in police interrogation but pre-
dicting that the Supreme Court "may simply require police to warn prime suspects of 
their rights" instead); Graham, supra note 221, at E6 (concluding that the only way to 
solve the problem of coerced confessions is to prohibit interrogation outside of an at-
torney's presence, but predicting that the Supreme Court instead will take "another 
measured step" toward that rule by requiring warnings first and then waiting a while 
before proceeding). 
268 Sydney H. Schanberg, Assembly Backs Suspects' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1966, 
at 35 (reporting passage of bill and its contents). 
269 See Sidney E. Zion, Access to Lawyer Is Urged By Koota, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1965, 
at 39 (reporting position of Brooklyn district attorney that confessions should not be 
admissible absent evidence that suspects understood they could have a lawyer, includ-
ing a court-appointed one); Zion, supra note 252, at 37 (noting that both the Manhat-
tan District Attorney and the Democratic candidate for Mayor of New York recom-
mended that police warn suspects of their rights to silence and counsel before 
interrogation). 
270 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing President johnson's dec-
laration of the war on poverty in 1964). 
271 The brief stated: 
[P]oor, motherless, unloved, downtrodden, culturally deprived, misguided, 
unguided, harassed, ad infinitum. It is practically impossible to pick up a na-
tional magazine, professional journal, or listen to an address without some 
dramatic usage of these descriptive adjectives to characterize some greater or 
lesser portion of the American population. 
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That being the case, we should hardly be surprised to see the Court in 
Miranda take steps to protect indigent suspects subject to custodial in-
terrogation; those steps mirrored perfectly the economic egalitarian-
ism of the mid-1960s that marked the national mood. Mter all, the 
rich had Escobedo. It was the poor who needed Miranda, just as they 
had needed Gideon three years before.272 And no matter what people 
thought about greater protections for accused criminals generally, no 
one in 1966 was willing to argue that rich criminal defendants de-
d . th th . 273 serve more protectiOn an e1r poor counterparts. 
Naturally, the civil rights movement also played a role in Miranda's 
outcome, though perhaps not in the way casual observers might sup-
pose. By 1966, the nation had already been convinced of the need for 
racial equality; that much was clear from the 1964 Civil Rights Ace74 
and 1965 Voting Rights Act. 275 One would think this national consen-
sus on racial equality would have made the Supreme Court even more 
solicitous of minority rights in the criminal procedure context than it 
had been in years past, and, in part, that was true. According to an 
early draft of the Miranda opinion, the majority initially saw the case 
as an opportunity to protect black defendants, rather than poor 
ones.
276 Yet the civil rights movement did something else that affected 
the Supreme Court's attitude toward police interrogation as well-
Brief for Respondent at 10, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), re-
printed in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 674, 683. 
272 See, e.g., The Revolution in Criminal justice, supra note 241, at 22 (contending that 
interrogation is not a problem "for the big-time crook with an attorney," just the sus-
pect without a lawyer-and that 60% of criminal suspects cannot afford one). 
273 See, e.g., Sidney E. Zion, Koota Says New Court Rulings Have 'Shackled' Police Offi-
cials: A Detective's View, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 13, 1966, at 1 (quoting New York City com-
mander of detectives as saying, "[I]n some ways I favor the decision [in Miranda], be-
cause at least it gives the poor, unfortunate suspect, the guy you have to protect, the 
same rights as the hardened criminal, who has the money for a lawyer and would never 
talk anyway"). 
274 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing uniform standards for the right to 
vote). 
275 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)) (removing the right of states 
to imroose voting qualification restrictions). 
2 6 See GRAY, supra note 59, at 459 (discussing and quoting an early Miranda draft 
that couched the problem of coercive interrogation in terms of brutality against black 
defendants). It was justice Brennan who suggested that the Court's Miranda opinion 
shift its focus. See id. (noting justice Brennan's position that poverty, rather than race, 
better characterized the victims of police brutality). 
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it created a "crisis of confidence" in the country's law enforcement es-
tablishment.277 
Most likely, the seeds of that crisis were planted in May of 1963, 
when the entire nation watched Birmingham's Commissioner of Pub-
lic Safety, Bull Connor, unleash his police department on over one 
thousand schoolchildren who were peacefully protesting the city's 
segregationist practices. Now-legendary pictures of white policemen 
using dogs, clubs, and firehoses to brutally suppress black children 
shocked the nation's conscience and, for the first time, forced it to 
confront the fact that police power was being used for illegitimate 
purposes.278 In 1964, national attention again focused on lawless po-
lice practices when an FBI investigation dubbed "Mississippi Burning" 
resulted in federal conspiracy charges against a local Mississippi sher-
iff and his deputies for the murder of three civil rights workers.279 And 
if that was not enough, March 1965 witnessed "Bloody Sunday" in 
Selma, Alabama. Selma was the starting point of a fifty-four-mile pro-
test march for voting rights that would have ended in the state capital 
277 Zion, supra note 252, at 37 (quoting Representative William F. Ryan, Demo-
cratic candidate for Mayor of New York City). 
278 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 87 ("Connor ... set upon the marchers with 
dogs, clubs, and firehoses, making martyrs of his victims and assuring their triumph."); 
POWE, supra note 12, at 224-25 (discussing Birmingham's importance to the civil rights 
movement); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 190-92 (same). By all accounts, Birmingham 
created an immediate mass constituency for the civil rights movement and meaningful 
civil rights legislation. See Klarman, supra note 130, at 130-49 (linking Birmingham 
and other violent civil rights confrontations of the early- to mid-1960s with the civil 
rights legislation that followed); see also Al.EXfu'iDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE 
WARREN COURT 94 (1965) (noting that Birmingham was not the first time police had 
used power to suppress blacks, but it was "one of those events which seem[ed] to tum 
the course of history"). 
279 See, e.g., James Atwater, If We Can Crack Mississippi, SATURDAY EVENING POST, 
July 25, 1964, at 15, 15-16 (describing the search for three murdered civil rights work-
ers); M.S. Handler, Author Describes Slaying of 3 Rights Workers in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 26, 1964, at 20 (describing Louis Lomax's account of the murders of the civil 
rights workers); John Herbers, 5 Mississippians Arrested by F.B.I. on Rights Charge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1964, at 1 (reporting the arrest of Mississippi law enforcement officers 
on federal civil rights charges for the death of the civil rights workers); David Nevin, A 
Strange, Tight Little Town, Loath to Admit Complicity, LIFE, Dec. 18, 1964, at 38, 38 (dis-
cussing the return to work of accused murderers Sheriff Lawrence Rainey and Deputy 
Cecil Price after dismissal of their federal indictments); Richard Woodley, A Recollection 
of Michael Schwerner, REPORTER, July 16, 1964, at 23, 23-24 (documenting the events 
preceding the disappearance and death of the three civil rights workers). A number 
of books on the event soon followed, see, e.g., WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THREE 
LIVES FOR MISSISSIPPI (1965); WILLIAM MCCORD, MISSISSIPPI: THE LONG HOT SUMMER 
(1965);JACK MENDELSOHN, THE MARTYRS (1966), and eventually the incident became 
the subject of a major motion picture, MISSISSIPPI BURNING (Orion Pictures 1988). 
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of Montgomery. 280 Just outside of town, however, state troopers de-
scended upon the marchers with tear gas and billy clubs, while a 
mounted posse of officers led by local Sheriff Jim Clark assaulted 
them with bullwhips and rubber hoses covered with barbed wire.281 All 
three major television networks broadcasted the carnage, appalling 
the nation and creating a massive constituency for voting rights legis-
lation almost overnight.282 Understandably, then, when Americans of 
the mid-1960s pictured racism and minority oppression, the face they 
th f h . 1. 283 saw was at o a w Ite po Iceman. 
Fair or not, the brutality and lawlessness exhibited by Southern 
police in response to the civil rights movement had a devastating ef-
fect on the public's perception of law enforcement as a whole. As 
early as 1964, Northern police complained about their "distorted and 
smeared" public image, portraying themselves as victims of misdi-
rected frustration with a few Southern racist regimes. 284 By early 1966, 
a police spokesman was quoted in the New York Times as saying: 
"Never before in the 150-year history of law enforcement has the police 
'stock' been at a lower point. Never before have the police been under 
such constant-and largely undeserved-criticism. Never before have 
public expressions of confidence in police been so meager. "285 
280 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 182 (describing the planned protest march 
from Selma to Montgomery); POWE, supra note 12, at 258 (same). 
281 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 183 (detailing the events of "Bloody Sunday" 
in Selma, Alabama); POWE, supra note 12, at 258 (same); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 
269, 273 (same). 
282 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 183 ("Bloody Sunday, filmed for the evening 
news, appalled the North and created an instant constituency for a new voting law."); 
POWE, supra note 12, at 258-59 (noting that President's Johnson's biographer, Robert 
Dallek, stated that '"the national reaction to what the press called 'Bloody Sunday' was 
everything advocates of a voting rights law could have wished. Television provided 
graphic descriptions of the police actions, and newspapers all over the country fea-
tured the story on their front pages."' (quoting ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT 198-99 
(1998))); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 273 (quoting Selma Mayor Joe Smitherman as 
stating that '"it looked like war .... [a]nd the people, the wrath of the nation came 
down on us"'). For an excellent exposition of Selma and its political ramifications, see 
DAVID]. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA (1978). 
283 See WALKER, supra note 108, at 222 (discussing Birmingham and noting that 
"[t]he police became the symbol of an unjust society"). 
284 Emanuel Permutter, Murphy Assails Critics of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1964, at 
48; see also Margaret Mead, Letter to the Editor, Urban Violence Discussed, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 1964, at 32 (noting the perception of police "as the natural enemies of law-
abiding citizens and lawbreakers alike"). 
285 Support for Police Seen at Low Point, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1966, at 38; see also Her-
bert Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 238, 
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The problem, the spokesman went on to explain, was that police were 
'"automatically equated with the 'red-necked sherif£,""286 and he was 
right. What most people knew about police came from the likes of 
Bull Connor and Jim Clark-and that was a public relations night-
287 
mare. 
By 1966, when the Supreme Court decided Miranda, the public's 
distrust of law enforcement was manifest. Much to the law enforce-
ment community's chagrin, major metropolitan areas throughout the 
country had established civilian review boards to hear complaints of 
police brutality,288 and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights had rec-
ommended to Congress and the President that local governments be 
made liable to victims of police misconduct.289 The Supreme Court 
was not oblivious to these developments. Indeed, its own docket 
made ignoring police brutality virtually impossible. In November 
1965,just two weeks before it granted certiorari in Miranda, the Court 
heard oral arguments in the Mississippi Burning case. In March 1966, 
the same month Miranda was argued, the Court unanimously reversed 
the lower court's dismissal of charges against law enforcement co-
conspirators in that case.290 With police brutality and lawlessness on 
everyone's mind-including the Justices'-it is hardly surprising that 
the Court acted to curb coercive police interrogation when it did. 
Distrust of law enforcement had prompted the press to attack police 
241 (1966) ("It is widely recognized that community relations is a major problem fac-
ing the police today."). 
286 Support for Police Seen at Low Point, supra note 285, at 38. 
287 See Trigger of Hate, TIME, Aug. 20, 1965, at 13, 13 (reporting a judge's comment 
that "[w]hat [people] know about sheriffs and police is Bull Connor and Jim 
Clark .... The people distrust the police and the police distrust the people"). 
288 See Thomas R. Brooks, Necessary Force-or Police Brutality?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 60, 68 (noting the use of civilian review boards in thirty-seven 
police departments across the nation to hear charges of police misbehavior); Police 
Chiefs' Head Urging Resistance to Review Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1964, at 27 (report-
ing speech by the President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police urging 
precincts to resist demands for civilian review boards and noting the existence of such 
boards in New York City, Philadelphia, and Rochester); see also Police-Review Units De-
plored by Hoover, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1964, at 42 (reporting FBI Director J. Edgar Hoo-
ver's criticism of civilian review boards then being championed in some localities). 
289 See John Herbers, Rights Board Asks Quick U.S. Arrests in Race Offenses, N.Y. 
TiMES, Nov. 14, 1965, at 1 (discussing the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's recommenda-
tions). 
290 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 242 
to include murderous conduct by civilians acting in conformity with the sheriff, deputy 
sheriff, and patrolmen involved in that case). Price was argued on November 9, 1965. 
!d. Certiorari was granted in Miranda on November 22, 1965. Miranda v. Arizona, 382 
u.s. 925 (1965). 
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interrogation for a good year before Miranda was decided.291 It is hard 
to imagine that the Court would not eventually make the connection 
too. 
Granted, there was another aspect of Miranda's historical context 
that seemingly cut against the Court's holding, and that was the na-
tion's growing concern over crime. In 1966, the crime rate rose 10% 
over the previous year, a figure ten times higher than the country's 
1% rate of population growth.292 That year, President johnson even 
issued a special message to Congress on the subject, accompanied by 
legislative proposals and appropriations requests. 293 To be sure, crime 
was becoming a major domestic issue when Miranda was decided, but 
it was not as salient as one might think. Gallup Poll results revealed 
that no one was listing crime among the country's most important 
problems in 1966; that year, the public was fixated on Vietnam, civil 
rights, and inflation instead.294 Perhaps the best explanation for the 
public's failure to focus on crime is the fact that in 1966, a 10% rise in 
291 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 288, at 60 (relaying the account of a young man 
who died as the result of excessive force by a police officer and the lack of action sub-
sequently taken against the officer); Graham, supra note 221, at E6 (noting the argu-
ments for and against an automatic bar to confessions from police interrogation); 
Zion, supra note 269, at 39 (reporting the Brooklyn District Attorney's position that all 
people should have access to a lawyer '"at the moment [they come] into contact with 
the law"' to guard against improperly solicited confessions); Zion, supra note 239, at 33 
(discussing the merits of extending Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections to custo-
dial interrogation); .Zion, supra note 251, at 1 (reporting the view of a state trial court 
judge that confessions are not the "backbone" of criminal justice, as some in Jaw en-
forcement claim); Zion, supra note 252, at 37 (reporting on suggestions made to 
change police interrogation methods); Zion, supra note 240, at 30 (discussing the case 
of a false confession to a rape and two homicides); Limits on Confessions, supra note 262, 
at 26 (discussing the need for procedural safeguards on obtaining confessions); The 
Revolution in Criminal justice, supra note 241, at 22 (describing the impact of heavy-
handed police interrogation practices and their disproportionate effect on indigent 
defendants). 
292 See FED. BUREAU OF I!,.'VESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1966, at 4 (1967) (reporting that population rose 
1.1 %, while the crime rate from 1965 to 1966 rose 10%). 
293 See PoWE, supra note 12, at 399 (describing crime as an important domestic is-
sue in 1966 and noting President Johnson's special message to Congress on the sub-
ject). 
294 On May 27, 1966, Gallup asked the public what it considered to be "the most 
important problem facing the country today." 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP 
POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 2009 ( 1972). The top three answers to that ques-
tion were Vietnam (45%), the high cost of living (16%), and civil rights (9%). Of the 
seven remaining answers, crime was not separately listed. /d. On September 11, 1966, 
and October 19, 1966, Gallup asked the same question, with similar results. See id. at 
2026, 2034 (reporting that the Vietnam conflict, civil rights, and inflation were the 
three most important problems mentioned by survey respondents). 
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the crime rate was nothing new. For the previous five years, the crime 
rate had risen from 5% to 11% per year, and 1966 was no different in 
that regard.295 This is not to deny that the crime problem was starting 
to grab the nation's attention when Miranda was decided. It was, but 
it was not the concern that civil rights and police brutality were, nor 
was it the concern it would become in 1967 and 1968, when crime 
rates did soar and the nation took note ofit.296 
Even so, the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda was almost un-
canny in the way it dovetailed with the nation's emerging crime-
control concerns. As already noted, Miranda's holding was a step back 
from the direction Escobedo had pointed in 1964,297 a move that makes 
sense with crime starting to garner public attention. What has not yet 
been noted is that the Court knew warnings would not hinder police 
investigative activities one whit. While Miranda was pending, precincts 
across the country reported that warnings had no effect whatsoever on 
the ability of police to obtain confessions, a discovery given ample 
press coverage and buttressed by the FBI's experience.298 Equally sig-
nificant is the fact that the Supreme Court refused to apply Miranda 
retroactively, an "unprecedented limitation" in its criminal procedure 
jurisprudence that prevented defendants in the exact same position as 
295 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1962, at 3 (1963) (reporting 1962's 5% rise in the 
crime rate); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1963, at 3 (1964) (reporting 1963's 9% rise in the 
crime rate); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM: CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1964, at 3 (1965) (reporting 1964's 11% rise in the 
crime rate); FED. BUREAU OF 11\'VESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1965, at 3 (1966) (reporting 1965's 5% rise in the 
crime rate). 
296 See infra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing 1967's rise in crime rate 
compared to 1966); infra note 424 and accompanying text (discussing 1968's rise in 
crime rate compared to 1967). 
297 See supra text accompanying notes 245-53 (discussing Miranda's holding against 
the backdrop of the E.Scobedo decision). 
298 See Crimina/justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 65 ("For police, 
at least, perhaps the most interesting news is that warnings by no means stop confes-
sions."); Zion, supra note 239, at 3 ("Thus, although the police have contended that a 
suspect will refuse to talk if they must tell him he has the right to remain silent and to 
have a lawyer, there is important evidence that this is not necessarily so."); Zion, supra 
note 251, at 70 (quoting a prosecutor who ordered police in his jurisdiction to warn 
suspects as saying, "'I hate to admit it, but on the basis of our early reports, we haven't 
lost a single confession except to racket men and hardened criminals who never talk 
anyway."'); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483 (1966) (noting the FBI's use 
of warnings without a loss in law enforcement effectiveness). 
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Ernesto Miranda from benefiting from the Court's ruling.299 Even the 
facts of Miranda and its companion cases reveal the Court's keen 
awareness of the debate over confessions then raging in the legal 
community. Although the police conduct in Miranda was, as others 
have noted, as benign as it had been egregious in prior confession 
cases,
300 it is worth noting that in 1965, there was a substantial question 
as to whether confessions were necessary at all301-and Miranda's facts 
played into that perfectly. Indeed, the Supreme Court went out of its 
way to note in the Miranda opinion that "the cases before us present 
graphic examples of the overstatement of the 'need' for confes-
sions."302 In a number of ways, then, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Miranda showed a remarkable sensitivity to crime control concerns-
299 John P. MacKenzie, The Warren Court and the Press, in THE WARREN COURT: A 
CRITICALA.t"'ALYSIS 112, I20-2I (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds. I969) (discussingjohnson 
v. Newjersey, 384 U.S. 7I9, 72I (I966)). Commentators have viewed the Supreme 
Court's retroactivity ruling in johnson as clearly political, evidencing the Court's will-
ingness to retreat when the implications of a ruling were more than the nation could 
bear. See, e.g., POWE, supra note I2, at 428 (characterizing the Court's decisions as rec-
ognizing that if Miranda meant emptying jails, "then Miranda, not the prisoners, would 
have ... to go"); WASBY, supra note I2, at I89 (interpreting the Court's refusal to apply 
Miranda retroactively as signifYing that it was "willing to retreat or modifY the thrust of 
its opinions when its liberalism was more than the public (and particularly important 
publics like the law enforcement community) could take"); Anthony Lewis, Earl War-
ren, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL fu"'ALYSIS, supra, at I, 25 (describing the 
Court's nonretroactivity ruling as reflecting its "desire to lay down a broad new rule 
without worrying the public about emptying the jails"). 
300 See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. I4I7, I427 n.50 
(1985) (noting that the facts of the Court's earlier confession cases were "as appall-
ing ... as [those in] Miranda were benign"). Indeed, Miranda's attorney conceded at 
oral argument that the police conduct at issue met the Court's voluntariness standard. 
See Oral Argument, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (I966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 853 ("We have raised no question that he was 
compelled to give this statement, in the sense that anyone forced him to do it by coer-
cion, by threats, by promises, or compulsion of that kind."). 301 See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Confessions Held Crucial By Hogan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
I965, at I (reporting the Manhattan district attorney's claim that confessions were cru-
cial in 27% of his homicide cases, while noting that this figure was "considerably be-
low" the 50% figure usually cited by law enforcement officials); Zion, supra note 25I, at 
I (reporting a study by New York State Supreme Court Justice Nathan Sobel conclud-
ing that fewer than IO% of indictments involved confessions, rendering law enforce-
ment claims as to the necessity of confessions "carelessly nurtured nonsense"); Sidney 
E. Zion, So They Don't Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2I, I966, at BI3 (noting that Detroit's 
chief of detectives had "produced statistics showing that the need for confessions had 
been vastly overestimated"); Zion, supra note 240, at 90 (noting that "district attorneys 
have no statistics to back up their claim that most murderers and rapists would walk 
out of the police stations, thumb to nose, if confessions were banned"). 
302 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481. 
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so much so that Justice Clark almost made the Court's ruling six to 
three, rather than five to four. 303 
C. A Closer Look at Evidence of Miranda's Countermajoritarian Nature 
In light of the above discussion, the evidence commonly cited as 
proof of Miranda's countermajoritarian nature is perplexing to say the 
least. Mter all, if the Court's ruling was truly in keeping with contem-
porary notions of acceptable law enforcement reform, how could it 
have been so unpopular? In part, the answer is that Miranda was not 
as unpopular as we have tended to think. The amicus brief signed by 
twenty-six state attorneys general, for example, voiced no opposition 
whatsoever to a general warning requirement prior to custodial inter-
rogation.304 Instead, the brief opposed extending the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to the custodial interrogation stage (a well-
founded fear given Escobedo two years earlier) and urged the Court to 
leave reform in the area of police interrogation to non-constitutional 
decision-making bodies like the ALI.305 Given the ALI's position on 
custodial interrogation at that time,306 there is no reason to believe the 
attorneys general would have opposed even constitutional adjudica-
tion of the issues in Miranda, had they known where the Court was ac-
tually heading. 
Even more intriguing was the law enforcement community's im-
mediate reaction to Miranda. Given the hostile tenor of the Court's 
opinion and the additional protections for criminal defendants that 
the decision imposed, it was entirely predictable that police would 
303 Justice Clark initially voted with the majority in conference, agreeing on the 
necessity of the same four warnings ultimately imposed in the case. THE SUPREME 
COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 516-17. Ultimately, he wrote a separate dis-
sent in the case because he decided that the Court's decision in Miranda went "too far, 
too fast," while the dissenters' position was also unsatisfYing. ld. at 518; see also 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("I am unable to join the majority be-
cause its opinion goes too far on too little, while my dissenting brethren do not go 
quite far enough."). 304 Brief of Amici Curiae State of New York et al. at 4-5, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 788, 791-
92. 305 See id. at 5 (arguing that "[p]rocedural developments in th[e] area [of confes-
sions] should take place in non-constitutional terms" through state courts, legislatures, 
professional organizations, and reform organizations such as the American Law Insti-
tute). 306 See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing warnings requirement in 
ALI's draft Model Code). 
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complain bitterly about Mirand~and many did.307 What is surprising 
is just how muted their response generally was. As reported on the 
front page of the New York Times, the law enforcement community's 
initial reaction to Miranda was "mild;" in fact, police spokesmen across 
the country stated they could "learn to live with" the new warnings re-
quirement.308 Perhaps the surprisingly muted response from these 
spokesmen was due to the fact that they, like the attorneys general, 
had anticipated a much stronger ruling from the Court. Just as likely, 
however, was the fact that, as the New Yom Times pointed out, many 
precincts had already employed warnings and thus knew suspects 
would frequently waive their rights.309 Indeed, James Vorenberg, then-
executive director of the National Crime Commission, told the press 
that Miranda would have little, if any, negative effect on law enforce-
ment because it merely moved the voluntariness inquiry from the con-
fession to the waiver context and "the police have done pretty well 
with these swearing contests over the years."310 In short, many in law 
enforcement breathed a sigh of relief when Miranda was decided, 
though their opinion one way or the other was hardly an indication of 
what the public at large thought of the decision. 
The public opinion poll data on Miranda, which at least purported 
to measure the average citizen's views of the decision, is a different 
matter altogether. Concededly, the 1966 Harris and Gallup polls ap-
pear to provide powerful evidence of Miranda's countermajoritarian 
nature, though upon closer inspection, there is reason to question 
whether either should be given much weight. In November 1966, 
four months after Miranda was decided, a nationwide Harris poll 
307 See, e.g., Crime and the Law: The Court on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, june I9, I966, 
DI, at I (quoting a police chief as saying, "[w]e might as well close up shop"); Rewriting 
the Rules, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1966, at 2I, 22 (noting executive director of the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police's statement that "I guess now we'll have to supply 
all squad cars with attorneys"); Zion, supra note 273, at AI (reporting Brooklyn district 
attorney's comment that Miranda had "effectively shackled" law enforcement, while 
noting his remarkably different position on the issue the previous fall); Zion, supra 
note 30I, at EI3 (commenting that Miranda caused most law enforcement officials to 
sing the "[w]e've got the handcuffed, hamstrung, might-as-well-close-up-shop blues"). 
308 Graham, supra note 265, at I ("The nation's police can Jearn to live with the 
new confessions limitations set by the Supreme Court, a check of Jaw enforcement offi-
cials indicated today. Reaction across the nation to yesterday's decision was regarded 
in legal circles here as mild."); see also Crime and the Law, supra note 307, at AI (noting 
that the law enforcement response to Miranda was "more muted than usual" and that 
some in law enforcement were saying that the Supreme Court's ruling had little mean-
ing because they had been warning suspects prior to custodial interrogation all along). 
309 Crime and the Law, supra note 307, at I; Graham, supra note 265, at l. 
310 Graham, supra note 265, at 28. 
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asked: "Another decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was to ... rule 
that the police could not question a criminal unless he had a lawyer 
with him. Do you personally think that decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court was right or wrong?"311 Answering that question, 35% of those 
surveyed said they believed the decision was right, while 65% believed 
it was wrong312-a result others have cited as proof of the public's 
overwhelming disapproval of Miranda's holding.313 Thus far over-
looked, however, is the fact that the Harris Poll's question inaccurately 
represented what the Court in Miranda actually held. Setting aside its 
reference to interrogation suspects as "criminals," the question incor-
rectly portrayed Miranda's ruling as requiring counsel during custodial 
interrogation, a move that not even the Court in Escobedo had con-
templated.314 That being the case, the most revealing aspect of the 
Harris Poll's question on Miranda may be that even after misrepre-
senting the Court's ruling as more aggressively protective than it was, 
35% of those surveyed still agreed with it-an impressive figure, but 
not as evidence of Miranda's dearth of public support. 
Although the 1966 Gallup Poll's question on Miranda was at least 
technically correct (or close), its results are likewise questionable as 
evidence of Miranda's countermajoritarian nature. In july 1966,just a 
month after the Supreme Court decided Miranda, Gallup asked the 
following in a nationwide survey: 
The Supreme Court has ruled that as soon as the police arrest a suspect, 
he must be warned of his right to remain silent and to have a lawyer. 
Only if he voluntarily waives these rights may the police question him. 
If he wants a lawyer, but cannot afford one, the State must pay the fee. 
The lawyer has a right to be present during the questioning and advise 
the suspect to say nothing. The following question was asked of those 
who said they followed the issue (about four persons in ten in the 
311 Louis Harris and Associates, Harris Sun'ey, Nov. 14, 1966, Question ID 
USHARRIS.111466 R2E. The ellipsis is in the original text, reflecting the sun'ey's in-
corporation of several different Supreme Court rulings into one question. /d. 
312 /d. 
313 See, e.g., CRAY, supra note 59, at 480 (discussing the Harris Poll results); G. 
THEODORE MITAU, DECADE OF DECISION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION 1954-1964, at 7 (1967) (same). 314 At most, Escobedo contemplated extending Gideon's right to an attorney to the 
custodial interrogation setting. See supra text accompanying note 233 (discussing the 
broad implications of the Escobedo holding). Yet not even Gideon required defendants to 
have an attorney; it just entitled them to one upon request. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 340, 342-45 (1963) (explaining that "in federal courts counsel must be 
provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and 
intelligently waived," and extending that requirement to state criminal cases under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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sample): Do you think the Supreme Court's ruling on confession was 
3\:l good or bad? 
1423 
In response, 30% of those surveyed said they had no opinion on the 
Court's ruling, 24% said they thought the ruling was good, and 46% 
sqid they thought the ruling was bad.316 By comparison, Gallup's re-
sults were weaker than those reported by Harris-only 40% of those 
surveyed actually followed the issue, and of those who did, 54% either 
had no opinion or actually approved of the Miranda decision. Yet 
Gallup's phraseology was misleading too. Although the question cor-
rectly noted that states would have to pay for attorneys provided to in-
digent suspects during custodial interrogation and that those attor-
neys could advise their clients to say nothing, not even the Miranda 
majority had envisioned its ruling working out that way in practice. As 
the Miranda opinion made clear, police were not constitutionally re-
quired to provide indigent suspects with lawyers upon request so long 
as they stopped questioning them.317 Because lawyers would presuma-
bly tell their clients to say nothing,318 halting the interrogation process 
was the only course of action that made sense when suspects invoked 
their right to counsel-and the FBI's experience showed that is ex-
actly what interrogators did.319 Thus, although Gallup's portrayal of 
Miranda may not have been inaccurate, neither was it realistic or even 
neutral in presenting the decision for public approval. 
That said, there was another public opinion poll on Miranda in 
the summer of 1966 that has yet to receive scholarly recognition, but 
should. Just after Miranda was decided, the National Opinion Re-
search Center (NORC) told participants in its nationwide survey: 
"The Supreme Court has recently ruled that in criminal cases the 
police may not question a suspect without his lawyer being present, 
315 3 GALLUP, supra note 294, at 2021. 
316 !d. 
317 The Court stated: 
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must 
have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners .... If 
authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable 
period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may re-
frain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege 
so long as they do not question him during that time. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. 
318 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (jackson,]., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain 
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."). 
319 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485-86 (noting the FBI's practice of halting interroga-
tion upon a defendant's request for the advice of counsel). 
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unless the suspect agrees to be questioned without a lawyer. Are you 
in favor of this Supreme Court decision or opposed to it?"32° For those 
still firmly convinced that Miranda was countermajoritarian, the re-
sults may be surprising: 65% of those surveyed said they were in favor 
of the Court's ruling, while 35% opposed it.321 Granted, even the 
NORC's question failed to provide a fully accurate depiction of the 
Court's ruling in Miranda; like the Harris Poll, it focused exclusively 
on the right-to-counsel aspect of the decision, ignoring the warnings 
component altogether. Yet what the question did say, it said in an ac-
curate and neutrally phrased manner, which is more than the Harris 
Poll and Gallup Poll questions were able to accomplish. In my mind, 
the NORC Poll provides powerful evidence that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Miranda was more majoritarian than not. The point, how-
ever, is a smaller one. Taken as a whole, the public opinion poll data 
on Miranda falls substantially short of proving that the decision was 
countermajoritarian, at least at the time it was rendered. 
Nothing stated so far is meant to suggest that Miranda remained a 
publicly acceptable decision for long. By 1968, Miranda was undenia-
bly unpopular, though the results of the presidential election that year 
are less probative of that fact than others have made them out to be.322 
Granted, in 1968, Richard Nixon ran for president-and won-on a 
"law and order" campaign that specifically targeted the Supreme 
Court's criminal procedure decisions as the cause of the nation's 
crime control problems.323 In 1968, however, "law and order" meant 
320 NAT'L 0PIJ\'ION RESEARCH CTR., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES65 (1966). 
321 !d. 
322 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 199, at 198 (crediting the election of Richard Nixon, 
an outspoken critic of Miranda, as evidence of the decision's unpopularity); AL-
EXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 93 (1970) 
(characterizing the 1968 election as "something of a vote of repudiation" of the War-
ren Court's criminal procedure decisions); Garcia, supra note 203, at 478 (connecting 
Miranda with Nixon's successful exploitation of fear of crime in the 1968 presidential 
election); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Flow and i'.ob of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in 
the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 CEO. LJ. 151,209 (1980) (attributing much of Nixon's 
support in the 1968 presidential campaign to his criticism of the Supreme Court's 
criminal procedure decisions). 
323 In May 1968, Nixon wrote a position paper on crime in which he blamed most 
of the country's woes on the Supreme Court. In that paper, he stated that the Court's 
decisions in Miranda and Escobedo "had the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace 
forces in our society and strengthening the criminal forces," concluding that "the 
cumulative impact of these decisions has been to set free patently guilty individuals on 
the basis of legal technicalities." BAKER, supra note 199, at 211 (quoting and discussing 
portions of Nixon's position paper). Nixon's position paper reiterated comments 
he had made in a November 1967 Reader's Digest article in which he blamed recent 
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different things to different people. To some, "law and order" repre-
sented a backlash against skyrocketing crime rates; to others, it was a 
backlash against blacks rioting in the streets; and to others still, it was 
a backlash against blacks period.324 Even so, the 1968 election results 
had as much to do with Vietnam as they did "law and order," and 
Nixon barely won.325 In fact, his margin of victory was just 0.6% of the 
popular vote, one of the lowest ever recorded in a presidential race.326 
Given those considerations, treating the 1968 presidential election as 
a referendum on Miranda is problematic to say the least. 
The same cannot be said for the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968,327 which purported to legislatively overrule 
Supreme Court decisions for "weakening the peace forces as against the criminal 
forces." Richard M. Nixon, What Has Happened to America?, READER'S DIG., Oct. 1967, 
at 49, 50; see also CRAY, supra note 59, at 497 (discussing portions of the Reader's Digest 
article). This phrase would become the backbone of Nixon's standard stump speech 
in the I968 campaign. See MATUSOW, supra note I33, at 40I (noting Nixon's compari-
son of "peace forces" and "criminal forces"); POWE, supra note I2, at 410 (same); see 
also Hall, supra note I27, at 293 (noting Nixon's promise during the I968 campaign to 
appoint only "strict constructionists" to the Supreme Court, justices who would not 
coddle criminals); Nixon Links Court to Rise in Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 3I, 1968, at AI8 
(reporting Nixon's accusation that the Supreme Court has "giv[en] the 'green light' to 
'the criminal elements' in this country"). 
324 See MATUSOW, supra note I33, at 40I ("A phrase splendid in its imprecision, law 
and order might intend as its targets students, blacks, criminals, or maybe all three. 
Let the hearer take his pick."); Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpre-
tation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AL"'D POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE I, I9 (Mark 
Tushnet ed., I993) ("As [Nixon] understood, the issue of 'crime in the streets' was a 
convenient vehicle for mobilizing white urban fears of African Americans; and by 
packaging the issue ... [as] attacks on the Warren Court's criminal procedure deci-
sions, Republicans could capitalize on those fears without openly appealing to ra-
cism."); see also Russell Baker, Observer: Crime in the Whats?, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 28, I968, at 
EI2 ("'[C]rime in the streets' is a white man's code phrase meaning 'niggers."'); 
Homer Bigart, Agnew Deplores Demonstrations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. I4, I968, at I6 (noting a 
caution from Nixon's supporters that "the phrase 'law and order' had taken on a con-
notation of racial repression"); Murray Schumach, Crime Statistics: A Numbers Game, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1968, at I (reporting the view that "'there is a tendency to make 
crime in the streets synonymous with racial threats or the need to control the urban 
Negro problem"' (quoting Dr. Kenneth B. Clarke)). 
325 See, e.g., MATUSOW, supra note I33, at 397 (describing Vietnam as "the issue 
which, more than any other, caused the bitter national mood in I968"). 
326 BAKER, supra note I99, at 257; THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE 
PRESIDENT: I968, at 396 (1969). By comparison, the 2000 presidential race had a 
popular vote margin of 0.5%-in favor of losing candidate AI Gore. See David Stout, 
Gore's Lead in the Popular Vote Now Exceeds 500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at All 
(noting that Gore received a plurality of about 500,000 votes nationwide, roughly 0.5% 
of the approximately I 00 million votes cast). 
327 Pub. L. No. 90-35I, 82 Stat. I97, 211-25 (codified as amended at I8 U.S.C. 
§§ 25I0-2522 (2000)). 
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Miranda and was passed by overwhelming margins in both the House 
and Senate.328 Granted, the Act provides significant proof that 
Miranda was unpopular in 1968-but that was 1968. Even in 1967, 
when the public's focus was turning away from civil rights and toward 
crime,329 the Southern-sponsored anti-Miranda measure had so little 
backing that it died without ever reaching the Senate floor. 330 By the 
time the measure was resurrected and tacked onto the omnibus fund-
ing bill in the spring of 1968, crime and lawlessness had become the 
nation's top domestic problem, and no one (least of all politicians in 
an election year) was willing to go on record against any measure 
promoting "law and order."331 In short, the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act may prove that Miranda was countermajoritarian 
in 1968, but it says nothing about Miranda as an example of the 
Court's inclination for countermajoritarian decision making. For 
that, one must return to 1966 and the historical context in which 
Miranda was decided. 
In light of the discussion above, one point should be clear: 
Miranda was not the aggressively countermajoritarian decision scholars 
have thus far portrayed it to be. Granted, the decision was controver-
sial; the nation's emerging crime-control concerns made that much a 
given. And granted, the Supreme Court in Miranda did act in a some-
what countermajoritarian fashion by imposing upon the states a 
328 See POWE, supra note 12, at 408 (noting that the Act passed in the House by a 
vote of 369 to 17 and in the Senate by a vote of 72 to 4). The Act provided that confes-
sions were admissible so long as they were voluntarily given, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501 (a) (2000). Nearly thirty years later, the Supreme Court finally found the Act to 
be ineffectual in its aim. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) 
(holding that the 1968 Act could not overrule Miranda). 
329 See Clark, Confirmed, Plans a Nw Price Fixing Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1967, at I 
(quoting Attorney General Ramsey Clark as stating that "there may be a little more 
public concern and interest in crime today, particularly 'crime in the streets' as we call 
it, than there has been in the past"); see also infra notes 333-45 and accompanying text 
(discussing rising salience of crime in 1967, particularly in latter half of year). 
330 See BAKER, supra note 199, at 206 (discussing the fate of the anti-Miranda meas-
ure in the 1967 congressional term). 
331 See id. at 208 ("A number of congressmen were rumored to have voted for [the 
1968 Act]. although they privately disapproved of it, because they could not afford to 
seem soft on crime in an election year .... "); see also Editorial, "Cruel Hoax": Veto Called 
For, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1968, at 38 (arguing that the vote on the omnibus bill was 
more about putting politicians on the record in favor of law and order than an en-
dorsement of its substantive measures); Editorial, Flawed Anti-Crime Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 1968, at 40 ("President Johnson's signature of the [Omnibus Crime Control 
Act] is more a surrender to public hysteria over crime in the streets than it is an ex-
pression of conviction that the bill represents a sound contribution to the defense of 
law and order."). 
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requirement that few had espoused on their own. Even here, how-
ever, one can see the limitations in the Court's willingness to evoke 
counterm£Yoritarian change. Though few states supported Miranda's 
mandate, elite legal opinion did-and popular opinion may have as 
well. Thus, to the extent Miranda presents an example of the Court 
acting in even a limited countermajoritarian fashion, it is the excep-
tion that proves the rule. Like the other decisions discussed in this 
Article, Miranda first and foremost exemplifies the Court's tendency 
to reflect the prevailing policy positions and socioeconomic currents 
of its time. That said, times change, and so did the tenor of the War-
ren Court's later landmark criminal procedure decisions. 
III. THE LATER YEARS 
To fully appreciate the Warren Court's later landmark criminal 
procedure decisions, it is important to note at the outset two points 
about the setting in which those decisions were made. First, the com-
position of the Warren Court reached its liberal height in June of 
1967, when civil rights activist Thurgood Marshall replaced the more 
police-oriented Tom Clark.332 Though that change still left the War-
ren Court with three conservatives (Justices Harlan, Stewart, and 
White), its six liberal members at least positioned the Court for a pre-
dictably liberal outcome in any given criminal procedure case. 
Second, the American public in 1967 became increasingly con-
cerned about crime. As early as March of that year, papers noted the 
common perception, if not fact, that crime was a serious problem and 
growing steadily worse.333 By the fall of 1967, crime had so completely 
captured the public's attention that President Johnson's advisors were 
urging him to have his picture taken with police officers just to associ-
ate himself with "law and order," which he did.334 That fall also saw 
332 See UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 73 (discussing Justice Marshall's NAACP leader-
ship and noting that "thanks to his own knowledge of how blacks had been treated by 
the criminal justice system, he became one of the strongest advocates of rights for the 
accused"); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger 
Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatcrry Practices, in THE BURGER 
COURT: THE COUl\'TER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T, supra note 173, at 62, 67 (noting 
Justice Marshall's 1967 replacement of "the more prosecution-oriented [Justice] 
Clark"). 
333 See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, The Law: Hawks vs. Doves on Crime and the Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1967, at E8 (noting "[t]he belief, if not the fact, that the crime prob-
lem is getting steadily worse" and that "the crime problem is very real, at least in the 
minds of many people"). 
334 MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 215. 
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prominent politicians like California Governor Ronald Reagan pre-
dicting that crime would be a m;:yor issue in the 1968 presidential 
election,335 and for good reason. As it turned out, the crime rate in 
1967 rose 15% as compared to 1966-an all-time high for the decade, 
at least until 1968.336 With 1967's rise in the crime rate at a level 50% 
higher than 1966's 10%,337 it is hardly surprising that major periodicals 
like U.S. News & World Reporl were headlining America's "growing law-
lessness" by the end of the year.338 Indeed, by early 1968, crime had 
eclipsed civil rights as America's top domestic problem-a first since 
public opinion polling began in the 1930s.339 
Much of the public's focus on crime, at least in the latter half of 
1967, almost certainly stemmed from the race riots that occurred that 
summer. Although the Watts riot in Los Angeles had shocked every-
one in the summer of 1965, and 1966 had seen a spate of smaller ra-
cial disorders,340 nothing the public had previously experienced could 
prepare it for the "long hot summer" of 1967. In 1967 alone, there 
were 164 racial disturbances, eight of which were bona fide riots seri-
ous enough to require calling in the National Guard.341 Much of the 
335 See Gladwin Hill, Reagan Says War is Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1967, at 
25 (reporting California Governor Ronald Reagan's prediction that crime would be 
the number one issue in the 1968 election). 
336 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE, UNIF0&\1 CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATE5-l967, at 4 (1968) (reporting a 15% increase in the 
crime rate for 1967); see also infra note 424 and accompanying text (reporting a 16% 
rise in the crime rate for 1968). 
337 See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the 1966 crime rate). 
338 
More Protests ... Growing Lawlessness-How Far Will it Go?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Dec. 18, 1967, at 6. 
339 See 3 GALLUP, supra note 294, at 2107 (indicating that crime and lawlessness 
were mentioned almost twice as often as any other local problem); Poll Finds Crime Top 
Fear at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1968, at 29 (reporting that "[c]rime and lawlessness 
are viewed by the public as the top domestic problem facing the nation for the first 
time since the beginning of scientific polling in the mid-thirties, according to the latest 
Gallup Poll"); see also Baker, supra note 324, at El2 (noting that "[a]t a time when 
Americans agree upon so few issues, it is odd that there should be such unity of loath-
ing for crime in the streets.");John Herbers, Crime: Rights Take a Back Seat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 1968, at E3 (observing "the decisive, almost sudden, shift that has taken place 
in two political issues-crime and civil rights" and remarking that "[a]s crime has gone 
up as an issue civil rights have gone down, in almost direct proportion"); Schumach, 
supra note 324, at 1 (noting that President johnson's attack on '"rising crime and law-
lessness' was the most strongly cheered point" in his State of the Union address). 
340 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 12, at 51 (discussing Watts and other urban 
riots). 
341 See id. (characterizing eight of the 164 disorders in 1967 as "major" on the 
grounds that they involved "'multiple fires, intensive looting, and reports of sniping; 
violence lasting more than two days; sizeable crowds; and use of National Guard"'). 
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violence that year occurred in June and July, with July being the far 
more turbulent month of the two. In mid:July, rioting in Newark 
killed twenty-three people. Ten days later, Detroit set a record for the 
worst riot of the century, necessitating the state police, the National 
Guard, and, finally, the United States Army to restore order.342 De-
troit's riot lasted six days and covered fourteen square miles of ghetto, 
leaving forty-three people dead and causing approximately forty-five 
million dollars in property damage. 343 With so much death and de-
struction, it was only natural for the public, press, and politicians to 
become alarmed that the country was "rapidly approaching a state of 
anarchy" in the second half of 1967.344 That is not to say that 1967's 
urban riots were wholly responsible for the nation's growing concern 
over crime, for President Johnson had focused on the problem before 
then. 345 One can say, however, that the violence the nation witnessed 
in the summer of 1967 almost certainly factored into crime's rising sa-
lience over the course of that year. 
If, as I have argued, the Supreme Court is moved by the same so-
cial and political currents that move the rest of society, one would ex-
pect the nation's focus on crime in the late 1960s to have produced 
more conservative rulings from the Court on criminal justice issues, 
despite its stronger than ever liberal membership. In fact, that is ex-
actly what happened. Although the Warren Court's decisions in the 
late 1960s were particularly liberal in some areas,346 its rulings on 
criminal procedure became remarkably conservative-so much so that 
Yale Kamisar has claimed in jest that there was not one Warren Court, 
but two. 347 Whether the change in the Warren Court's criminal 
342 See WHITE, supra note 326, at 202 (1969) (discussing the Detroit riot). 
343 See id. (detailing the destruction wrought by the Detroit riot); MATUSOW, supra 
note 133, at 363 (same). By comparison, Watts left thirty-four people dead and caused 
property destruction of approximately forty million dollars. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N 
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS 
IMPACT-AN AsSESSMENT 119 (1967) (hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME]. 
344 Max Frankel, johnson Accused by G. O.P. in Rioting, N.Y. TiMES, July 25, 196 7, at 1. 
345 See WALKER, supra note 108, at 202-04 (discussing President Johnson's efforts to 
combat crime in the mid-1960s); supra text accompanying note 293 (noting President 
Johnson's special message to Congress on crime in 1966). 
346 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam) (in-
terpreting the First Amendment in an unprecedented fashion to protect rights of free 
speech and press in context of subversive activities); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 638 ( 1969) (striking down waiting periods for welfare benefits). 
347 Kamisar, supra note 332, at 67 ("One might say there were two Warren 
Courts .... "); seeKamisar, supra note 59, at 116 ("In its final years, the Warren Court 
was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda."). I tend to agree 
with Professor Kamisar's sentiment, though I believe Miranda was a part of the Court's 
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procedure jurisprudence of the late 1960s was that stark is certainly 
debatable, but his point is well taken, and no decisions demonstrate it 
better than the last two landmarks of the criminal procedure revolu-
. v U . d S 348 d 7' oh· 349 tlon, n..atz v. nzte tates an 1 erry v. w. 
A. Katz v. United States: A Sign of Concession 
When the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States in Decem-
ber 1967, Chief justice Warren predicted it would be a '"milestone de-
cision,"'350 and he was right. Today, we think of Katz as the touchstone 
of modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; no discussion of the 
criminal procedure revolution would be complete without it. Yet Katz 
deserves a place in the present analysis for another reason as well-it, 
too, presents a seemingly strong example of the Warren Court playing 
the role of countermajoritarian hero. In Katz, the Supreme Court 
abandoned its restrictive property-rights approach to the Fourth 
Amendment in favor of a more malleable and broader conception of 
Fourth Amendment rights based on an individual's "reasonable 
expectation of privacy."351 Presumably, that required some courage in 
late 1967, when crime control was all the public could think about. 
After all, when the Court in Katz uttered those famous words, 
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"352 it was talk-
ing primarily about guilty people, and guilty people had never been 
more unpopular. At the very least, then, Katz's expansion of Fourth 
conseiVative turn. In my mind, Escobedo, rather than Miranda, marks the height of the 
Court's liberalism on criminal justice matters. See supra notes 243-53 and accompany-
ing text (describing Miranda as a step back from where the Court appeared to be 
heading in Escobedo two years earlier). 
348 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
349 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
350 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 62, at 718 (discussing the Katz decision). 
351 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. Ironically, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" termi-
nology came from Justice Harlan's concurrence, not from the Court's opinion. See 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,]., concurring) ("My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'). Within a year 
after Katz was decided, the Court recognized the term "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" as fairly characterizing the Fourth Amendment protection it had recognized in 
Katz. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("We have recently held that 'the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,' and wherever an individual may harbor a 
reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion." (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (Harlan,]., concurring))). 
352 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
2004] COUNI't."'RMA]ORITAJUAN HERO OR Zb"'RO? 1431 
Amendment protections appears to be a bold, liberal move against the 
backdrop of 1967's increasingly conservative times. 
Surprisingly enough, however, Katz was anything but the bold, lib-
eral decision it appears to be at first blush. All three of the Warren 
Court's conservatives joined in the Court's ruling, and one of them, 
Justice Stewart, wrote the majority opinion. Indeed, Katz would have 
been unanimous if Justice Black had not stubbornly refused to ac-
knowledge that intangible objects like a conversation could receive 
Fourth Amendment protection, a stance the Court had rejected years 
before353 and one that others would later point to as exemplifYing Jus-
tice Black's overly rigid interpretive style.354 Thus, while we might like 
to think of Katz as a decision that moved against the prevailing cur-
rents of its time, in fact it was sufficiently mainstream to garner the 
support of the Warren Court's liberals and conservatives alike. 
In part, understanding Katz's broad-based appeal requires under-
standing the doctrinal background against which it was decided. 
Though the Supreme Court in Katz abandoned nearly forty years of 
precedent when it overruled Olmstead v. United States, 355 its shift from 
property rights to privacy as the basis of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion was not the monumental change one might think. As early as 
1886, the Court referred to the Fourth Amendment's purpose as pro-
tecting "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"356 a 
view that became popular several years later when Louis Brandeis co-
authored an influential law review article on the subject.357 By the 
353 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1963) (applying a Fourth 
Amendment analysis to the search and seizure of an intangible object); see also Berger 
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 ( 1967) (noting that the idea that only tangible objects can 
come within the Fourth Amendment's reach "ha[s] been negated by our subsequent 
cases"). 
354 See, e.g., UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 38 (criticizingjustice Black's position on the 
Fourth Amendment in Katz as "rigidly literal" and "absurd"); see also POWE, supra note 
12, at 404 (explaining that justice Black's dissent in Katz was a result of the fact that 
"[h]e always eschewed the Fourth[ Amendment]'s rich history, owned no books dis-
cussing it, and focused instead on its use of that detested word 'reasonable' in its text." 
Roger Newman, Black's sympathetic biographer, noted that '"[justice Black] became 
fixated with [the Fourth Amendment's] wording, not its significance."' /d. (footnote 
omitted) (quoting ROGER K. NEWMA.t"', HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 554 (2d ed. 
1997)) ). 
355 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (basing Fourth Amendment holding on whether physical 
intrusion occurred). 
356 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
357 See Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REv. 193 (1890); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.l (1965) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (crediting Brandeis and Warren's article for giving the phrase "right to 
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time the Court decided Wolfv. Colorado358 in 1949, the notion that pri-
vacy interests lay at the core of the Fourth Amendment was so widely 
accepted that even the Court's conservative opinion in that case ac-
knowledged it.359 By 1961, the Court's opinion in Mapp v. Ohio360 was 
replete with references to the Fourth Amendment's "right to pri-
vacy,"361 which other prominent decisions in the 1960s likewise recog-
nized.362 In short, Katz was accepted in principle long before it was ac-
tually decided; the Court's property-rights approach had simply been 
a way of effectuating the Fourth Amendment's more nebulous privacy 
guarantee. 
By 1967, however, it was clear that the Court's property rights 
approach to the Fourth Amendment had become outdated. In the 
late 1950s, technological advances in eavesdropping equipment made 
it possible to overhear the most intimate of conversations without 
actually trespassing onto a person's property,363 and that led to Fourth 
Amendment decisions in the early- to mid-1960s that bordered on the 
absurd. Because Olmstead required a physical trespass to implicate 
the Fourth Amendment,364 the Court affirmed convictions where 
the police obtained evidence by attaching a listening device to the 
privacy" currency);John D. Pomfret, On Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 17,1965, § 6 (Maga-
zine) at E7 (noting that the privacy doctrine is grounded in an article by Warren and 
Brandeis). 
358 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
359 See id. at 27 ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."). 
360 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
361 /d. at 655-57. 
362 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (referring to "the Fourth 
Amendment's right of privacy"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) 
(recognizing the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment as safeguarding the privacy 
of individuals against arbitrary invasion by the government); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 304 ( 1967) (recognizing that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment 
is the protection of privacy rather than property"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 484-85 (1965) (citing Mapp for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment em-
bodies a "right to privacy"). 
363 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 46fr67 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the electronic surveillance problem has "grown enormously in recent 
years" and citing congressional hearings from the late 1950s in support of that proposi-
tion); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09 ( 1961) (discussing recent devel-
opments in the technology of eavesdropping equipment not involving physical inva-
sions). 
364 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (requiring "an actual 
physical invasion of [a defendant's] house 'or curtilage"' for a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation); see also Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438-39 (noting that the Court's prior Fourth Amend-
ment cases have "insisted only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful 
physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area."). 
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defendant's outer wall, and reversed where the evidence was obtained 
by a device that penetrated it.365 In one case, the Court even found a 
Fourth Amendment violation where the police had used a "spike 
mike" that breached the outer wall of a defendant's home by a frac-
tion of an inch,366 allowing critics to claim (and rightly so) that the dif-
ference between Fourth Amendment protection and none was a 
thumb-tack's length.367 Of course, such distinctions were absolutely 
irrelevant to the real point of the Fourth Amendment, which was and 
always had been the protection of privacy. 
Clearly, Olmsteatfs property rights approach no longer made sense 
as a means of effectuating the Fourth Amendment's privacy guaran-
tee, and (almost) everyone on the Supreme Court knew it. In the 
years before Katz was decided, the Court repeatedly denounced the 
use of property rights to define Fourth Amendment protections, even 
while its rulings continued to conform to that result.368 Indeed, the 
Court's repudiation of Olmstead was so complete that at least two 
Justices believed the 1928 decision had been overruled sub silentio 
365 Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (finding no 
Fourth Amendment violation where police obtained evidence by pressing a "detecta-
phone" against the outside wall of the defendant's room), with Silverman, 365 U.S. at 
50().()7, 512 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where a "spike mike" extended 
several inches into defendant's side of wall). See also Fred P. Graham, High Court Eases 
Curbs on Bugging; Adds Safeguard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1967, at A1 (noting the ironic 
results in the Court's prior eavesdropping cases due to technological advances). 
366 See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (Clark,J., concurring) (joining the 
decision because the '"spiked' mike used by the police officers penetrated petitioner's 
premises sufficiently to be an actual trespass thereof'), summarily revgClinton v. Com-
monwealth, 130 S.E.2d 437, 442 (Va. 1963) (noting the "very slight" penetration of the 
device in the wall, "such as one made by a thumb tack"). 
367 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 255 ("[A] thumb-tack's length could separate an 
individual from the protection of the Bill of Rights."). 
368 For example, in Silverman, the Court said: 
Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of 
ancient niceties of tort or real property law .... But decision here does not 
tum upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local 
law. It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area. 
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511-12 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise that property interests control the right 
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."); Lopez., 373 U.S. at 458-
59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I think it is demonstrable that Olmstead was erroneously 
decided, that its authority has been steadily sapped by subsequent decisions of the 
Court, and that it and the cases following it are sports in our jurisprudence which 
ought to be eliminated."). 
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before Katz was even decided.369 When Katz finally did overrule Olm-
stead, the Court's rationale was both predictable and difficult to dis-
pute: Olmsteaas authority had been "so eroded" by subsequent deci-
sions that it could no longer be recognized as controlling.370 It would 
appear, then, thatJustice Fortas was exactly right when he claimed a 
few years later that "Katz [wa]s not responsible for killing Olmstead."371 
By the time Katz was decided, Olmstead was already dead. 
Even so, Olmsteaas much anticipated demise provides only half of 
the reason police-oriented conservatives would have supported Katz in 
1967; the rest involves contemporary expectations of how electronic 
eavesdropping would fare if subjected to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
Prior to Katz, the prevailing view was that if the Fourth Amendment 
applied to electronic eavesdropping, the practice would never pass 
constitutional muster because it could never meet the Warrant 
Clause's particularity requirement.m That requirement provides that 
369 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
("I join the opinion of the Court because at long last it overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. 
United States and its offspring and brings wiretapping and other electronic eavesdrop-
ping fully within the purview of the Fourth Amendment." (citation omitted)). As 
Justice Black asserted in his dissent: 
[T]he Court's opinion leaves the definite impression that all eavesdropping is 
governed by the Fourth Amendment. Such a step would require overruling of 
almost every opinion ... on the subject .... [I]t does not take too much in-
sight to see that the Court is about ready to do, if it has not today done, just 
that. 
Id. at 82 (Black,]., dissenting). 
37
° Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
371 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 275 (1969) (Fortas,J., dissenting) ("In any 
event, there is no doubt that Olmstead was thoroughly repudiated by this Court long 
before ... Katz was decided. Katz is not responsible for killing Olmstead. Prior cases 
had left the physical-trespass requirement of Olmstead virtually lifeless and merely await-
ing the death certificate that Katz gave it."); see also id. at 273 ("Katz did no more than 
administer the coup de grace to [Olmstead's] moribund doctrine."). 
372 Justice Brennan's 1963 dissent in Lopez recognized the point when he argued 
that the unarticulated reason for the property rights approach 
is the pervasive fear that if electronic surveillance were deemed to be within 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment, a useful technique of law enforcement 
would be wholly destroyed, because an electronic 'search' could never be rea-
sonable within the meaning of the Amendment. For one thing, electronic 
surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate, so that compliance with the 
requirement of particularity in the Fourth Amendment would be difficult .... 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted); see also GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 253 (noting that "the rules for warrants 
were so strict that they seemed to preclude a valid warrant to wiretap" and discussing 
the Warrant Clause's particularity requirement); Herman Schwartz, The Legitimation of 
Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order", 67 MICH. L. REV. 455, 457 
(1969) (noting that "[t]he chief argument against the constitutionality of most kinds 
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all warrants must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized,"373 a virtually impossible task 
when it comes to electronic eavesdropping because the conversation 
to be seized had not yet occun-ed. At best, police can articulate what 
they hope to hear, but the fact of the matter is that electronic eaves-
dropping indiscriminately "seizes" every word spoken, whether or not 
it is relevant to the investigation underway.374 Arguably recognizing 
the point, the Court's mid-1967 decision in Berger v. United Stater5 in-
validated a New York statute that authorized court-approved wiretap-
ping because its provisions were insufficient to satisfy the Warrant 
Clause's particularity demands.376 Thus, prior to Katz, there was rea-
son to believe that if the basis of the Court's Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence shifted from property rights to privacy, electronic eaves-
dropping would become unconstitutional per se. 
Even in 1966, before Berger was decided, commentators consider-
ing the Warren Court's concern for protecting individual liberties 
predicted that the Justices would eventually declare the so-called "dirty 
business" of electronic eavesdropping unconstitutional.377 What is 
of eavesdropping is that the resulting search and seizure is unavoidably too sweeping 
to comply with the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment" (footnote 
omitted)). This is not to say that the particularity requirement was the only problem 
with applying the Fourth Amendment to electronic eavesdropping, for the prohibition 
against searches for "mere evidence" would have prohibited the practice as well. That 
obstacle, however, was removed by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden several 
months before Katz was decided. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967) 
("The requirements of the Fourth Amendment can secure the same protection of pri-
vacy whether the search is for 'mere evidence' or for fruits, instrumentalities or con-
traband."). 
3i3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
374 See Schwartz, supra note 372, at 457 (noting that electronic surveillance tech-
niques are incapable of separating irrelevant or privileged information from the in-
formation actually sought). 
375 388 u.s. 41 (1967). 
376 See id. at 56-58 (invalidating the New York statute, but suggesting that a more 
carefully drawn provision might pass constitutional scrutiny); see afso Graham, supra 
note 365, at AI (noting that Berger had created the impression that the Court would 
impose "impossible restrictions" on police eavesdropping); Fred P. Graham, A Plug in 
the 'Big J<.ar: N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1967, at EIO [hereinafter Graham, 'Big Ear1 (noting 
that after Berger, many assumed the Court would limit bugging with so many legal 
technicalities that "almost any useful eavesdropping would be deemed unconstitu-
tional"). But see Curb on Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, june 21, 1967, at 46 (noting that the 
Court's decision in Berger "stops far short of a total ban on the use of electronic devices 
in the war against crime" and "leaves the door open for passage of a more carefully 
drawn statute"). 
377 See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT: CAsES AND COMMENTARY 299 
(1966) ("[G]iven the Warren Court's concern to protect civil liberty, it is not unlikely 
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intriguing about Katz, and what made the decision eminently appeal-
ing to the Court's conservatives, was that the Supreme Court did just 
the opposite. Mter reversing Katz's conviction because the police in-
truded upon his reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed tele-
phone booth, the Court added what the press would call "a surprising 
postscript":378 if the officers had simply obtained a warrant first, their 
actions would have been constitutionally permissible.379 In one short 
paragraph, the Court erased years of unease with the notion of sub-
jecting electronic eavesdropping to Fourth Amendment scrutiny by 
reassuring all concerned that the practice could nevertheless survive 
it-and that was major news. In fact, the headline of the front page 
New York Times article on Katz read "High Court Eases Curbs on Bug-
ging; Adds Safeguard," while the subheadline declared, "Insists Police 
Must Obtain Warrant to Act-Doesn't Forbid Eavesdropping."380 
Granted, on page thirty, the Times also mentioned that the Court had 
"upheld" privacy rights,381 but in 1967, the significance of Katz was 
clearly not the same as it is today. In 1967, Katz was a pro-law en-
forcement decision that surprised everyone by giving the Court's 
blessing to judicially authorized electronic eavesdropping. 
Given the sociopolitical context in which Katz was decided, the 
Warren Court's approval of court-ordered electronic eavesdropping 
was, at least in retrospect, not so surprising after all. In early 1967, the 
that wiretap evidence will eventually be ruled inadmissible."); see also Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes,]., dissenting) (referring to wiretap-
ping as "dirty business"). 
378 Graham, 'Big nar', supra note 376, at ElO. 
379 The Katz opinion stated: 
[I] t is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly 
authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, 
specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly ap-
prised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have 
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure 
that the Government asserts in fact took place. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 354. 
380 Graham, supra note 365, at 1. The article's first sentence read "[t]he Supreme 
Court made it clear today that the Constitution does not forbid electronic bugging by 
law enforcement officers if they first obtain warrants authorizing the eavesdropping." 
/d. Of course, the press's interpretation of Katz was completely beyond the Supreme 
Court's control, but the Court knew full well (and had for years) that the real question 
in moving from a property-rights to a privacy rationale for Fourth Amendment protec-
tion was how that move would affect the constitutionality of electronic eavesdropping. 
See supra notes 372-76 and accompanying text (discussing fear that adopting a privacy 
approach to the Fourth Amendment would render eavesdropping unconstitutional 
perse). 
381 Graham, supra note 365, at 30. 
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National Crime Commission issued a report addressing the inherent 
difficulties associated with investigating and prosecuting organized 
crime, noting that electronic eavesdropping was considered "'the sin-
gle most valuable weapon"' police had.382 Though the problem of or-
ganized crime had received considerable attention from the federal 
government and the press throughout the 1960s,383 the National 
Crime Commission's report was particularly important for three rea-
sons. First, it was the government's first attempt to examine the prob-
lem and possible solutions in a comprehensive manner. Second, it 
came at a time when the country as a whole was becoming preoccu-
pied with crime. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it came just 
as the Court's property rights approach to the Fourth Amendment 
had proven itself incapable of dealing with advances in electronic 
eavesdropping equipment. Given the National Crime Commission's 
1967 findings and the crime-conscious tenor of the times, it is hard to 
fathom the Supreme Court rendering a decision that would have ef-
fectively outlawed electronic eavesdropping altogether.384 
382 PRESIDE!'oi'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201 (1967) [hereinafter NAT'L CRIME 
COMM'N REPORT] (quoting the testimony of a New York County District Attorney). In 
part, the importance of electronic eavesdropping stemmed from the fact that high-
echelon Mafia leaders participated in crimes only by orally ordering others to commit 
them. See id. ("High-ranking organized crime figures are protected by layers of insula-
tion from direct participation in criminal acts .... "). In part, the importance of elec-
tronic eavesdropping had to do with the unique dynamics of investigating organized 
crime. Ordinarily, police investigations start with a known crime and work back to an 
unknown criminal, but in organized crime investigations the reverse is often true-po-
lice start with a known criminal and work back (or forward) to an unknown crime. See 
Schwartz, supra note 372, at 469 (discussing unique challenges of investigating and 
prosecuting organized crime). 
383 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress on Crime and Law 
Enforcement (Mar. 9, 1966), in I PUB. PAPERS 291, 294 (reprinting President John-
son's claim in his 1966 special message on crime that "[t]he most flagrant manifesta-
tion of crime in America is organized crime"); GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 249 (noting 
the Kennedy Administration's "strong prosecutorial interest" in the nationwide activi-
ties of organized crime); POWE, supra note 12, at 402 (discussing Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy's "Get Hoffa Squad" in the early 1960s); Charles Grutzner, Mafia Steps 
Up Infiltration and Looting of Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1965, at 1 (reporting a Sen-
ate subcommittee's probe into the Mafia's widespread infiltration of American busi-
nesses and industry); Emanuel Perlmutter, Robert Kennedy Cites Rise in Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1963, at 1 (reporting Attorney General Robert Kennedy's description 
of syndicated crime as a "grave national problem"). 
384 Even the Court's decision in Berger hinted in dicta that other laws might be suf-
ficiently exacting to meet the Fourth Amendment's demands. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 
56-58 (suggesting that a statute containing precise requirements for the use of elec-
tronic eavesdropping might meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of particular-
ity); see also supra note 376 (noting mixed perceptions of Berger's significance). 
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Interestingly enough, the National Crime Commission's 1967 re-
port was salient (and convincing) enough to spawn legislative efforts 
to do exactly what the Supreme Court did in Katz.: authorize court-
approved wiretapping. In 1934, Congress outlawed the practice of 
wiretapping, which at the time was considered outside the purview of 
the Fourth Amendment because it required no physical trespass to ef-
fectuate.385 Over time, technological advances in electronic eaves-
dropping equipment outflanked the 1934 wiretapping statute just as 
they had the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, resulting in a 
host of surveillance techniques not prohibited by the statute because 
they were technically not wiretapping practices at al1.386 Based on the 
National Crime Commission's 1967 report,387 Congress was in the pro-
cess of closing that loophole while relaxing its wiretapping ban when 
the Supreme Court decided Katz.. Legislation pending when Katz. was 
decided proposed expanding the 1934 statute's reach to other consti-
tutionally permissible electronic eavesdropping practices while mak-
ing all of them (including wiretapping) permissible only if police first 
obtained a warrant.388 In short, the Supreme Court's decision in Katz. 
imposed the exact same restrictions on electronic eavesdropping that 
Congress was then contemplating, and in fact imposed a mere six 
months later.389 
It is difficult to say whether the Supreme Court's decision in Katz. 
was a conscious response to the nation's needs at that time or an 
385 See 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1934) (defining wiretapping and barring use of evidence 
obtained thereby in federal courts). 
386 See NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 382, at 202-03 (concluding that 
"[a]t the present time there is no Federal legislation explicitly dealing with bugging"); 
GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 254-55 (noting that new electronic surveillance techniques 
"were largely outside the reach of the Jaw"). 
387 See NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 382, at 203 ("A m<Uority of the 
members of the Commission believe that legislation should be enacted granting care-
fully circumscribed authority for electronic surveillance to law enforcement officers to 
the extent it may be consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in People v. 
Berger .... "). 
388 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 267-69 (discussing the political context in which 
Katz was decided, including the proposed amendments to the 1934 wiretapping statute 
then pending in Congress); Graham, supra note 376, at 10E (reporting the Katz deci-
sion while noting that "[a] bill to authorize court-supervised police eavesdropping is 
already before the Senate judiciary Committee, and the Katz decision is certain to help 
it along."). 
389 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 268 (noting that the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 authorized for the first time "court-approved wiretapping 
and bugging to gather evidence"). 
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unconscious reflection of the national mood.390 With Congress con-
templating legislation on electronic eavesdropping and newspapers 
characterizing the Court's earlier decision in Berger as "politically haz-
ardous,"391 the Justices were undoubtedly under pressure to avoid what 
seemed to be an impending constitutional ban on electronic eaves-
dropping altogether. On the other hand, the "law and order" mood 
oflate 1967 may well have subconsciously pulled the Court toward the 
result in Katz anyway. Whatever the reason, the same Supreme Court 
known for taking a dim view of police practices that impinged upon 
individual liberties went out of its way to make an important conces-
sion to the police when that was what the nation wanted. No doubt, 
the Court's 1967 decision in Katz "tapped into" dominant public opin-
ion at the time, even while liberalizing the Fourth Amendment's 
foundational precepts. Even more in keeping with the times, how-
ever, was the last major landmark decision to come, Terry v. Ohio.392 
B. Terry v. Ohio: The Capitulation is Complete 
The Warren Court's June 1968 decision in Terry was without a 
doubt one of the most doctrinally significant developments of the en-
tire criminal procedure revolution. Prior to Terry, the Supreme Court 
had steadfastly interpreted the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 
and warrant clauses in pari materia; that is, in determining whether a 
search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court would ask whether the state action at issue was supported by 
probable cause and a warrant.393 Although the Court's decisions prior 
to Terry made clear that the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment was subject to exception in limited circumstances, never before 
in the criminal context had the Court recognized an exception to the 
probable cause requirement.394 In fact, the Court's prior decisions 
390 Even conservatives like Richard Nixon agreed that wiretapping should proceed 
only with prior judicial approval (though at some point he obviously had a change of 
heart). See Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Decries 'Lawless Society' and Urges Limited Wire-
tapping, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1968, at 1 ("Mr. Nixon strongly endorsed a limited use of 
wiretapping after a court order showing probable cause."). 
39 Graham, supra note 345, at 32. 
392 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
393 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 891, 894 (1998) ("The Warrant 
Clause's standard of 'probable cause' had been taken to define the 'reasonableness' of 
a search and seizure, even where obtaining a warrant was excused as impracticable."). 
394 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas,J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers up to today 
have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts 
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had gone the opposite way, stressing the importance of "strictly en-
forc[ing]" the Warrant Clause's probable cause mandate.395 Teny 
changed all that. In one fell swoop, the Court decoupled the Fourth 
Amendment's two clauses, recognizing for the first time ever that a 
search and seizure in the criminal context could be reasonable 
though based on less than probable cause. If any decision deserves a 
place among the giants of the criminal procedure revolution, it IS 
Terry v. Ohio. 
Traditionally, we in the academy have tended to view Teny as a 
compromise, a decision that was at least partly responsive to minority 
concerns at the time.
396 
I myself have taught the case that way, and the 
within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable 
cause."). The Court had, however, recognized an exception to the probable cause re-
quirement in the administrative search context in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523,538 (1967), a case on which the Terry decision heavily relied. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 
20-21 (extending Camera's balancing approach to the criminal context). 
595 In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), for example, the Court stated: 
It is important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the 
standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen .... 
And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident 
to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental 
search, it must be made with probable cause. 
/d. at 102 (citation omitted). 
396 See, e.g., Michael R. Cogan, The Drug Enforcement Agencys Use of Drug Courier Pro-
files: One Size Fits All, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 943,949 (1992) ("The resulting compromise 
between the needs of law enforcement and the rights of the individual permits the po-
lice to make what is commonly referred to as a 'Terry stop."'); David A. Harris, Frisking 
Every Suspect: The Withering ofTerry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1994) ("Terry 
surely represents the Court's best effort to engineer a series of compromises .... On 
the one hand, police may stop and frisk individuals ... without probable cause. How-
ever, an officer must be able to articulate the reasons that she thought that crime was 
afoot and that the suspect was dangerous."); Scott E. Sun by, A Return to Fourth Amend-
ment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 422 (1988) 
("Instead of operating as a general compromise standard as it did in Terry, reasonable 
suspicion now operates only as a narrow exception to traditional probable cause."); 
Gregory Howard Williams, The Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Proposal, 23 CAP. U. L. 
REv. 229, 234 (1994) ("In Terry, the Supreme Court carved out a very careful compro-
mise which weighed the needs of law enforcement against the right of citizens to be 
free of undue harassment by the police."); Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme 
Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. 
LJ. 567, 577 (1991) ("The general principles of Terry, explicitly the compromise of 
balancing relative interests of law enforcement and individual privacy .... "); see also 
Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 491, 492 (1999) ("But before reviewing all the possible interactions, let's 
examine the choices before the Supreme Court in 1968. Terry v. Ohio was widely 
viewed as a compromise."). This is not to deny that many commentators see Terry as a 
distinctly pro-law enforcement decision as well. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 12, at 406 
(arguing that "Terry was at least as significant a victory for the police as Miranda had 
been for the accused"); UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 164 (describing Terry as "[o]ne of 
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Court's opinion in Terry easily lends itself to such an interpretation.397 
According to this "compromise view," the Supreme Court in Terry was 
faced with two diametrically opposed views of the so-called "stop and 
frisk" practice at issue in that case. On one hand, police were claim-
ing that a stop was not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and a 
frisk was not a search, the result being that the Fourth Amendment 
did not speak to the practice of stop and frisk at all-i.e., police could 
do as they liked. On the other hand, the defendant and various civil 
liberties advocates were claiming that a stop was a seizure and a frisk 
was a search, the result being that the Fourth Amendment's Reason-
ableness Clause required both to be supported by no less than prob-
able cause. Given those alternatives, the theory goes, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Terry split the baby and gave a little something to 
everyone: the Fourth Amendment did apply to stop and frisk prac-
tices, but the probable cause standard did not. Because a stop was not 
an arrest and a frisk was not a full-blown search, both were constitu-
tionally permissible so long as they were supported by a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and the suspect 
398 
could be armed and dangerous. 
As a theoretical proposition, the Supreme Court in Terry did in 
fact have both options presented by the compromise view of the deci-
sion. Conceivably, the Court could have found the Fourth Amend-
ment inapplicable to stop and frisk practices or applied it with full 
force. In reality, however, Terry was not the compromise decision we 
the most 'pro[-]police' decisions of the Warren Court"); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL 
WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 277 (1982) (describing Warren's vote to affirm in Terry as "a 
considerable bow in the direction of law enforcement"); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's 
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271, 
1309 ( 1998) (describing Terry as "a victory for the police"). 
397 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as 
'stop' and 'frisk' that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within 
the meaning of the Constitution."); see also Scott E. Sun by, "Evnyman "'s Fourth Amend-
ment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 
1770 n.62 (1994) ("Both Camara and Terry, the cases that opened the door to the rea-
sonableness test, were themselves carefully portrayed as compromise decisions between 
the government's argument that the Fourth Amendment did not apply at all and the 
petitioner's argument that a warrant based on traditional probable cause was re-
quired."). 
398 To be precise, the Court in Terry never did rule on what would become known 
as a "Terry stop," nor did it use the "reasonable, articulable suspicion" terminology for 
which the decision would become famous. For both, one must tum to Justice Harlan's 
concurrence. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-34 (Harlan,J., concurring) (referring repeatedly 
to "articulable suspicion" and arguing that a frisk is not constitutionally permissible 
unless officers first have the right to make a forcible stop). 
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tend to think it was, for the state of Ohio never advocated the consti-
tutional legitimacy of stop and frisk based on less than a reasonably 
founded suspicion in the first place. Nowhere in its brief did Ohio 
claim that stop and frisk was outside the Fourth Amendment's pur-
view; in fact, just the opposite was true. Explaining its position in the 
case, Ohio stated: 
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective Jaw enforcement 
requires that the validity of brief informal detention be recognized 
whenever it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the de-
taining officers could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A 
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the 
courts can determine that detention was not arbitrary or harassing .... 
While the rule permitting temporary detention for questioning is op-
erative under circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest, 
there must exist some suspicious or unusual circumstances to authorize 
even this limited invasion of citizens' privacy.399 
Similarly, the National District Attorneys Association, Americans for 
Effective Law Enforcement, and the United States, each acting as ami-
cus curiae on Ohio's behalf, argued that a stop and frisk was permissi-
ble only when backed by a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity 
and danger to the approaching officer.400 In short, no one in Terry was 
399 Brieffor Respondent in Opposition for Petition of Certiorari at 15-16, 21, Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), reprinted in 66 l.A,'\'DMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 
381, 403-04, 409 (citation omitted). Ohio's position during oral argument likewise 
conceded that police conducting stop and frisk were bound by a reasonable suspicion 
standard. Oral Argument at 22, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 l.A,'\'DMARK BRIEFS, supra 
note 83, at 694, 715 (reproducing Ohio's statement that police '"will not be permitted 
to stop and frisk an individual simply because he has a suspicion-a mere suspicion-
unless there are reasonable circumstances justifying the frisk"' (quoting State v. 
Chilton, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 489, 489 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1964), affd sub nom. Terry)). 
400 The National District Attorneys Association amicus brief conceded that "[t]he 
use of a constitutional standard Jess than probable cause to arrest does not require that 
temporary field detentions and protective patdowns be conducted on police hunches, 
uncontrollable by judicial scrutiny." Brief for Amicus Curiae National District Attor-
neys' Association at 32, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, 
at 653, 684. The United States's amicus brief was even more to the point, arguing: 
The Fourth Amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches is satisfied if 
the detention is reasonable under the circumstances, which necessarily must 
vary from situation to situation. This is not to argue that the Fourth Amend-
ment is inapplicable to police conduct fairly described by the term, 'stop and 
frisk'; rather, it is to say that a lesser showing will meet the constitutional test 
of reasonableness in the case of a brief detention on the street than in the 
case of a conventional arrest. If a right of limited detention does exist, we 
suggest further that a law enforcement officer has the right to pat down the 
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arguing that the police ought to be able to stop and frisk at will, so the 
option of holding stop and frisk practices completely outside the 
reach of the Fourth Amendment was never seriously on the table to 
start with. 
Recognizing what Terry was not-a compromise-is crucial to un-
derstanding what it was: a profoundly pro-law enforcement decision 
that gave to the police almost all they had asked of the Court, as con-
temporary newspapers duly noted.401 And that understanding of Terry, 
suspect's outer clothing in order to determine whether he possesses a weapon, 
assuming that this step appears reasonably necessary for the detaining offi-
cer's self-protection. 
Brieffor Amicus Curiae United States at 2·3, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 Lfu'IDMARK 
BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 438, 439-40. Similarly, the Americans for Effective Law En-
forcement's amicus brief stated: 
The law enforcement process which we ask this Court to sustain in the "stop 
and frisk" cases under consideration is simply this: A police officer may detain 
pedestrians or motorists in public places, and question them as to their iden-
tity and purpose in the particular location, when under the circumstances, 
such detention and questioning seems appropriate to a prudent police offi-
cer-one mindful of his responsibility '"to prevent crime and catch crimi-
nals"'-because reasonable suspicion of criminality has been aroused, al-
though there is not yet probable cause to believe that a crime has been, or is 
being, committed. 
Brief for Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement at 6, Terry (No. 67), 
reprinted in 66 Lfu"i"DMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 499, 507 (citation omitted); see also 
Brief for Amicus Curiae New York at 3-4, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 Lfu'IDMARK 
BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 38, 540-41 (arguing for the constitutionality of a New York 
statute giving police officers the right "to question any individual in a public place 
where there is a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is about to 
be committed," and that the statute properly allowed a frisk of a suspect "only where 
there are facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that the person being ques-
tioned is armed and may use his weapon"). 
401 See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, High Court Backs Rights of Police to Stop and frisk, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 1968, at 1 (noting that the Court's decision in Terry "gave the police 
virtually the full range of powers that law enforcement representatives had asked of the 
Court"); see also Editorial, "Unreasonable" Still Stands, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1968, at 46 
(opining that Terry "will help persuade policemen that the Court does not lie awake 
nights dreaming up ways to increase the hazards of their jobs"). In fairness, the Court 
in Terry stopped short of giving the police all they had asked, as the Court never for-
mally recognized the legitimacy of a stop based on less than probable cause. See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 19 n.16 ("We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional pro-
priety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'de-
tention' and/or interrogation."). Yet neither did the Court deny the legitimacy of a 
stop based on reasonable suspicion, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurrence. 
See id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the 
officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional 
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop."). If Terry is in any way a 
compromise, perhaps it is here, in the Court's reticence to formally recognize what its 
holding implicitly embraced. 
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in tum, is key to seeing the Warren Court's dramatic change in atti-
tude toward criminal procedure in the late 1960s, especially when 
compared to the Court's Miranda decision two years earlier. In 
Miranda, the Court eschewed its multifactored voluntariness test for 
judging the admissibility of police-procured confessions in favor of a 
bright-line rule that gave interrogators more guidance and less con-
trol. Implicit in the Court's ruling was a need to curb police discre-
tion, a reflection of the fact that law enforcement could not be trusted 
at that time. In Terry, by contrast, the Court's reasonable articulable 
suspicion standard gave the police so much discretion (and reviewing 
courts so little upon which to judge police conduct) that it is hard to 
believe that both decisions were written by Chief Justice Warren.402 
Even the tone of the opinions is notably different. In Miranda, the 
Court showed no sympathy whatsoever for the difficulties police faced 
in bringing criminals to justice, while in Terry, the Court's opinion is 
all but dripping with that concem.403 As Bill Stuntz has likewise rec-
ognized, "[o]ne cannot read the two opinions without sensing that 
something in the author's thinking changed between 1966 and 
1968."404 
Given the potential for minority oppression inherent in stop and 
frisk practices, the contrast between Miranda and Terry is even more 
stark. In Miranda, racial concerns were just beneath the surface of the 
Supreme Court's opinion,405 but those concerns were miniscule com-
pared to what the Court confronted in Terry. In terms of sheer num-
bers, harassing street stops posed a much greater problem for blacks 
than coercive custodial interrogation ever did. 406 Indeed, those stops 
were almost exclusively perpetrated on ghetto minorities-not, as civil 
402 See Kamisar, supra note 59, at 117 (comparing Terry to Miranda and noting that 
"the stop-and-frisk cases established such a spongy test, one that allowed the police so 
much room to maneuver and furnished the courts so few bases for meaningful review, 
that the [Terry] opinion must have been cause for celebration in a goodly number of 
police stations"). 
403 See William]. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE LJ. 2137, 2152 n.43 
(2002) (contrasting Terry and Miranda). 
404 !d. 
405 See supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing an early draft of the 
Miranda opinion that couched the problem of coercive interrogation in terms of po-
lice brutality against black defendants). 
406 See Maclin, supra note 396, at 1295 (describing the prevalence of street stops in 
minority communities compared to custodial interrogation). 
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rights leader Bayard Rustin pointed out, on Wall Street's well-dressed 
bankers. 407 
By 1968, the violent ramifications of abusive stop and frisk prac-
tices were also well known. While Teny was pending, the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders (better known as the Kerner 
Commission) issued a report assessing the urban riots that had 
plagued the country for the past several years, concluding: 
We have cited deep hostility between police and ghetto communities 
as a primary cause of the disorders surveyed by the Commission .... 
Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur re-
peatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of 
the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the police .... 
. . . In nearly every city surveyed, the Commission heard complaints of 
harassment of interracial couples, dispersal of social street gatherings 
and the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without objective ba-
sis .... 
Police administrators, pressed by public concern about crime, have 
instituted such [stop and frisk] patrol practices often without weighing 
their tension-creating effects and the resulting relationship to civil disor-
der. 4GB 
Similarly, the National Crime Commission's 1967 report described 
stop and frisk practices as "a major source of friction between the po-
lice and minority groups," noting that "an integral element in every 
riot was strain between the police and members of the Negro com-
munity."409 Thus, by the time the Supreme Court decided Teny, the 
racially discriminatory aspects of stop and frisk, along with the vio-
lence it precipitated, were well documented. 
407 See id. at 1280 (discussing Bayard Rustin's comments in a 1967 national survey 
on police and community relations); see also Fred P. Graham, The Cop's Right(?) to Stop 
and rnsk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 ("Negroes, particularly 
young Negro males, are the ones most likely to be stopped and frisked in these casual, 
pre-arrest encounters between police and passers-by-and Negroes resent the fact."); 
Zion, supra note 262, at I ("Many of the critics have contended that the [Model Code] 
would most adversely affect Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the big city ghettoes because 
most investigative arrests would probably be made there .... "). 408 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 157-60 (1968). 
409 TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME, supra note 343, at 116. 
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No doubt, the Supreme Court was aware of stop and frisk's inher-
ent danger of abuse and its role in exacerbating racial tensions. The 
NAACP had argued the point in its Terry amicus brief,410 the Justices' 
internal memoranda show that they had considered it,411 and the Terry 
opinion itself recognized the problem, citing the National Crime 
Commission's findings. 412 Yet in the face of clear evidence that police 
were using stop and frisk to harass minorities, the Supreme Court 
condoned the practice, breaking from an entire line of established 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to do it. Given Miranda, the 
Court's decision in Terry was almost unthinkable just two years ear-
lier-and Terry was an "easy" eight-to-one ruling.413 Obviously, some-
thing had changed, causing the Supreme Court to reevaluate its ear-
lier commitment to protecting minorities from abusive police 
practices. The question, again, was what. 
Because Terry was as much a blow to the civil rights movement as 
it was a bow to law enforcement interests,414 one consideration that 
410 See Brief for Amicus Curiae N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund at 
68, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LAt"'DMARK BRIEFS, supra 
note 83, at 565, 644 (arguing that "[i)f the police and the ghetto dweller view each 
other with fear, suspicion, often hatred, any enforced stop is a potential source for 
conflict"). 
411 A handwritten letter from justice Brennan to Chief justice Warren stated: 
I've become acutely concerned that the mere fact of our affirmance in Terry 
will be taken by the police all over the country as our license to them to carry 
on, indeed widely expand, present "aggressive surveillance" techniques which 
the press tell us are being deliberately employed in Miami, Chicago, Detroit + 
other ghetto cities. This is happening, of course, in response to the "crime in 
the streets" alarums being sounded in this election year in the Congress, the 
V.'hite House + every Governor's office .... It will not take much of this to ag-
gravate the already white heat resentment of ghetto Negroes against the po-
lice-the Court will become the scape goat. 
Letter from justice William]. Brennan, Jr., United States Supreme Court, to Chief jus-
tice Earl Warren, United States Supreme Court (Mar. 14, 1968), reprinted injohn Q. 
Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 
ST.jOHN'S L. REV. 749,825-26 (1998). 
412 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 & n.11 (recognizing "[t]he wholesale harassment by 
certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Ne-
groes, frequently complain" (citing TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME, supra note 343, at 
183)). 
413 Only Justice Douglas dissented, and he had initially voted with the majority in 
conference to affirm. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 454 
(reproducing Terry conference notes). Justice Douglas apparently remained with the 
majority until the Court's opinion changed from a probable cause-based analysis to the 
more general "reasonableness" analysis it ultimately chose. See Barrett, supra note 411, 
at 838 (discussing justice Douglas's defection from the majority in the Terry opinion). 
414 See WHITE, supra note 401, at 277 (describing Warren's position in Terry as "a 
considerable bow" in favor of law enforcement interests). 
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warrants mention is the nation's waning support for civil rights in the 
late 1960s. With the rise of urban riots, the public image of black 
Americans changed dramatically over the course of just a few years. 
By the late 1960s, people no longer saw blacks as peaceful, praying 
protesters being savagely beaten by white policemen, but as lawless 
looters shouting "[b]urn, baby, burn" while exiting broken storefront 
windows with all they could carry.415 The emergence of militant 
groups like the Black Panthers in late 1966 and radical civil rights 
leaders like H. "Rap" Brown in 1967 only reinforced this image as 
shouts of "black power" replaced pleas for black suffrage and racial 
hate became the topic dujour on the evening news.416 By early 1968, 
many Americans who had supported the civil rights movement in ear-
lier years no longer did, resulting in what one columnist described as 
a "decisive, almost sudden shift" away from the movement's popular 
backing.417 At the very least, the Supreme Court's decision in Terry was 
consistent with that shift, echoing the country's loss of empathy for 
the plight of blacks in the late 1960s. 
Even so, the Supreme Court's decision in Terry almost certainly 
had more to do with the nation's desire for "law and order" than its 
growing disillusionment with the cause of civil rights. By early 1968, 
crime and lawlessness were all that the nation could think about. 418 
Then came one last spasm of violence that would help give the "turbu-
lent 1960s" its name. On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was as-
sassinated, setting off riots in over one hundred cities across the na-
tion, including Washington, D.C., where federal troops guarded the 
415 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 12, at 49-50 (discussing the change in public 
perception of blacks due to urban riots); TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME, supra note 
343, at 116 ("The riots changed the attitude of some Americans toward the civil rights 
movement from sympathy to antipathy."). This is not to say that urban riots were the 
only factor contributing to the decline of support for civil rights in the mid- to late-
l960s, only that it was a factor-and a very salient one at that. 
416 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 12, at 58-59 (noting the formation of the 
Black Panthers in October 1966 and subsequent decline in Northern, white support 
for the civil rights movement); POWE, supra note 12, at 277-78 (discussing the ascen-
dancy to power of H. "Rap" Brown and its alienating effect on the civil rights move-
ment). 
417 Herbers, supra note 339, at E3. Congressional activity during this time re-
flected the shift perfectly. In 1965, the Voting Rights Act sailed through both houses, 
whereas in july 1967, the House refused to pass Presidentjohnson's modest proposal 
for rat extermination funding in urban ghettos, dubbed a "civil rats bill" by conserva-
tives. See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 215 (discussing bill and unsympathetic mood of 
Con~ress in 1967). 
18 See supra notes 333-339 and accompanying text (noting the salience of the 
crime problem in late 1967 and early 1968). 
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White House and set up a machine gun post on the Capitol's front 
steps.419 Over the course of the following week, nearly fifty people 
across the country would die in connection with racial disturbances 
while another 21,000 would be charged with riot-related crimes.420 
The following month, student radicals at Columbia University seized 
five campus buildings for days, culminating in a bloody confrontation 
between students and police that led to over two hundred injuries, 
seven hundred arrests, and the suspension of classes for the remain-
der of the spring semester.421 And as if that were not enough, June 6, 
1968, marked the assassination of presidential contender Robert F. 
Kennedy, just days before the Court announced its Terry decision.422 
For those of us who were still in diapers in 1968 (or perhaps just a 
twinkle in our fathers' eyes), it is difficult to imagine how crazy the 
world must have appeared at that time. Without the benefit of hind-
sight, one would have thought the nation was truly coming apart at 
the seams. Not surprisingly, most Americans surveyed in mid-1968 
said law enforcement had "broken down"423-and that was before any-
one knew about 1968's 16% rise in the crime rate, a record for the 
decade.424 Naturally, the nation's unrest put immense pressure on the 
Court to support law enforcement, which by then had made a come-
back in public esteem.425 
419 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 493-94 (discussing the riots in the wake of Martin 
Luther King's assassination in 1968); MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 396 (same). The 
United States Army was also dispatched to Chicago and Baltimore. /d. at 396. 
420 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 396 (describing the riots in the wake of Martin 
Luther King's assassination in 1968); RICE, supra note 96, at 48 (same). 
421 See RICE, supra note 96, at 48 (mentioning the Columbia University incident); 
WHITE, supra note 326, at 219-20 (same). 
422 Robert Kennedy was shot on June 4, 1968, and died on June 6; Terry was an-
nounced on june 10. Barrett, supra note 411, at 758 n.29. 
423 Injune, 1968,53% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that "[!Jaw en-
forcement has broken down in this country, and lawlessness has taken over," while 
38% disagreed and 9% were unsure. Louis Harris and Associates, Harris Survey (June 
16, 1968), WL USHARRIS 061668 R2C 013. In August, the percentage of those agree-
ing with that statement had risen to 81%. See Public Opinion Online, Accession No. 
0174711, Question #012 (Harris Survey, Aug. 24, 1968). 
424 See FED. BUREAU OF 1!\'VESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STAT£5-1968, at 4 (1969) (reporting a 16% increase in the 
crime rate in 1968). 
425 See Schumach, supra note 324, at 1 (noting the "great change from public skep-
ticism of the police position"). For a provocative discussion of how television portray-
als of police from the 1950s to the 1970s reflected the public's changing perception of 
law enforcement, see Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of 
Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 ( 1987). 
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Yet the Supreme Court in Terry must have felt pressure to support 
law enforcement in general, and stop and frisk in particular, for other 
reasons as well. By 1968, the Court had come under heavy fire for its 
pro-defendant criminal procedure rulings, which, according to presi-
dential candidate Richard Nixon, were responsible for the breakdown 
of "law and order" in the first place.426 Moreover, while Terry was 
pending, Congress debated and passed legislation purporting to re-
verse Miranda's holding-a clear signal to the Court that public re-
sentment over its previous efforts to regulate police conduct was run-
ning high.427 Additionally, the National Crime Commission's 1967 
report and the ALI's 1966 draft Model Code had both recommended 
the enactment of stop and frisk laws that would authorize police-
citizen encounters based on reasonable suspicion, more as an effort to 
codify existing practices than to inspire legislative innovation.428 Stop 
and frisk based on reasonable suspicion had been a standard law en-
forcement practice since at least 1942,429 and by 1968, it had become 
"a matter of routine in every major police department in the coun-
try."430 Thus, for a number of reasons, Justice Douglas' observation in 
his Terry dissent was undoubtedly right: the Court was under "power-
ful hydraulic pressures ... to water down constitutional guarantees 
426 See supra note 323 and accompanying text (discussing Nixon's anti-Court cam-
paign rhetoric). 
427 See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). 
428 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No. 
1, 1966) (discussing stop and frisk issue); NAT'L CRJME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 
382, at 95 (same). 
429 The Uniform Arrest Act of 1942 provided: 
'A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground to 
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime .... 
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he 
has stopped or detained to question ... whenever he has reasonable ground 
to believe that he is in danger .... ' 
Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315,320-21, 325 (1942) (quoting 
the Act and discussing its provisions). 
430 Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, 
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 42 ( 1968); see also Graham, supra note 333, at E8 (de-
scribing stop and frisk as "a matter of routine in most communities for years"). By the 
time the Court decided Terry, six states had enacted stop and frisk laws (the most 
prominent being New York), and sixteen states and seven courts of appeal had judi-
cially approved of the practice. Brief of National District Attorneys' Association, supra 
note 400, at 15, 31-32, reprinted in 66 LAJ\'DMARK BRJEFS, supra note 83, at 647, 667, 683-
85. 
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and give the police the upper hand" and those pressures had probably 
"never been greater" than they were in 1968.431 
Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Terry reflected the Jus-
tices' fear of antagonizing public opinion or their genuine concern 
about the collapse of law and order is, of course, impossible to know. 
Either way, the timing of Terry's result was no fortuity. As Earl Dudley, 
Chief Justice Warren's law clerk on the Terry decision, candidly ex-
plained: 
Individually, the Justices of the Supreme Court may have felt differ-
ing degrees of sympathy with the arguments of the police, but collec-
tively they were unwilling to be-or to be perceived as-the agents who 
tied the hands of the police in dealing with intensely dangerous and re-
• • • • 432 
curnng situations on City streets. 
Again, context matters, and given the context of 1968, it is inconceivable 
that the Court in Terry would have decided the case any differently 
than it did.433 In Terry, the Supreme Court had the perfect opportu-
nity to play the role of countermajoritarian hero. It chose not to. In-
stead, the Court capitulated to law enforcement interests, proving true 
the adage that "courts love liberty most when it is under pressure 
least."434 As much as any landmark decision of the criminal procedure 
revolution, Terry demonstrates that the Court is a product of its time. 
431 Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas,]., dissenting). As Fred Graham reported in the 
N= York Times: 
The Supreme Court's decision will be its first comment on "stop and frisk" 
laws, and the pressures will be strong for it to approve some degree of "frisk-
ing." The President's national crime commission and a panel of the Ameri-
can Law Institution have urged widespread enactment of such laws to improve 
police efficiency. Further, public opinion would be outraged, under present 
circumstances, if the courts should say states cannot pass laws to let police 
search dangerous-looking characters who are suspected of committing crimes. 
Graham, supra note 333, at ES. 
432 Dudley, supra note 393, at 893. For an insightful argument that crime rates 
have played a significant role in the ebb and flow of criminal procedure protections, 
see Stuntz, supra note 403. 
433 Others have likewise recognized that the sociopolitical context of the late 1960s 
was extremely hostile to protecting defendant's rights. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 59, 
at 116 (discussing the social upheaval of late 1960s and attributing that upheaval to 
creating "an atmosphere that was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren 
Court's mission in criminal cases"); Allen, supra note 25, at 538-39 (arguing that "the 
most fundamental reason" for the Court's conservatism on matters of criminal justice 
in the late 1960s was the social and political context at that time). 
434 John P. Frank, Revii!W and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 
109, ll4 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954). 
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By 1968, the time to protect criminal defendants had passed, and the 
criminal procedure revolution had come to an end. 
CONCLUSION 
By conventional wisdom, the criminal procedure revolution is a 
perfect example of the Supreme Court playing the role of counterma-
joritarian hero, protector of those without power, popularity, or po-
litical clout. Upon close inspection, however, the revolution's five 
most celebrated decisions-Mapp, Gideon, Miranda, Katz, and Terry-
fail to support that view. Only in Mapp and Miranda did the Warren 
Court even come close to approaching the sort of countermajoritarian 
decision making we tend to associate with the revolution, and both of 
those decisions teach us something quite different than conventional 
wisdom would have us believe. Mapp demonstrates that when enter-
ing a new doctrinal area, the Court's actions tend to be supported by 
favorable sociopolitical conditions and a factual scenario ideally suited 
for change. Miranda shows that even in its most aggressive decisions, 
the Court tends to stay well within the parameters of publicly accept-
able policy positions. Though the Supreme Court in Mapp and 
Miranda undoubtedly played the hero, in neither case did it act in the 
truly countermajoritarian fashion for which it has been credited. 
That said, all five landmarks of the criminal procedure revolution 
do show what we in academia have tended to overlook: the Court's 
inextricable tie to its historical setting. In the early- to mid-1960s, the 
nation championed civil rights and fought a war on poverty. It is no 
coincidence that the Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions 
during that period did so too. By the same token, when the consensus 
supporting defendants' rights collapsed under the weight of riots and 
skyrocketing crime rates in the late 1960s, it is hardly surprising that 
the Court's criminal procedure rulings took a markedly conservative 
turn toward the cause of "law and order." Simply put, the Court had 
no inclination to impose significant pro-defendant protections on a 
country that had lost interest in protecting criminal defendants. 
Whether the Court was responding to the national mood or merely 
reflecting it, the point is the same: in all five decisions, the Court 
moved with the tide of public opinion rather than against it. 
In the end, it is only natural that the Warren Court's landmark 
criminal procedure cases coincided with the prevailing ideology of the 
times in which they were decided. The Constitution is written in 
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broad, sweeping terms. It takes judges to give those terms meaning.435 
Like it or not, the fact that judges decide cases and interpret the law 
means that personal perspectives will inevitably make their way into 
the decision-making process, and so will the social and political cur-
rents that shape those perspectives. As such, the Court's capacity for 
playing a counterm.Yoritarian role is extremely limited-closer, in 
fact, to zero than the romantic hero we all tend to imagine. 
In 1968, Kenneth Pye wrote: "A hundred years from now lawyers 
will not be amazed by the changes wrought by the Warren Court. 
They will wonder how it could have been otherwise in the America of 
the sixties."436 It has been just over fifty years since Earl Warren be-
came Chief Justice, but already those words ring true. One need not 
believe in the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian hero to defend 
judicial review, but often we do. We see the Court as impervious to 
majoritarian pressures when, in fact, nothing could be further from 
the truth. Time has shown that the Supreme Court is inextricably 
bound by the historical context in which it operates. We ought to 
recognize that fact and be more realistic in our approach to judicial 
review. 
435 See Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional 
Evi~ 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1752 (1997) ("If most controversial social issues plau-
sibly can be converted into constitutional disputes, and the document's text is inde-
terminate as to how those disputes ought to be resolved, how do we show fidelity to the 
Constitution without subjecting ourselves to uncabined judicial rule?"); Levy, supra 
note 154, at 7 ("[W]hat counts is not what the Constitution says, because it says so very 
little; what counts, rather, is what the Supreme Court has said about the Constitu-
tion .... "). 
436 Pye, supra note 125, at 268. 
